• Democratic socialist gains are driven mainly by domestic economic concerns, not Israel.

• Heavy spending in Democratic primaries is often an inefficient response.

• AIPAC should emphasize education and selective candidate support.

• Deep-blue districts need a viable center-left alternative in general elections.

• A small third-party bloc could matter greatly in a closely divided Congress.

The Democratic socialist and allied progressive left has scored a series of striking victories in 2026. Most of the Democratic Socialist victories in Democratic primaries occurred in deep-blue districts where the winner of the primary is currently guaranteed to win in the general election.

These races include: CO-1—Melat Kiros, beat longtime incumbent; PA-3—Chris Rabb, won Philadelphia seat; NY-7—Claire Valdez, socialist-backed victory; NY-10—Brad Lander, defeated Dan Goldman; NY-13—Darializa Avila Chevalier, defeated incumbent; NJ-11—Analilia Mejia, won Sherrill seat; NJ-12—Adam Hamawy, Gaza surgeon wins; MI-13—Donavan McKinney, defeated incumbent; and CA-14—Aisha Wahab, faces Melissa Hernandez in both August special and November general elections.

The progressive left has also produced candidates in less overwhelmingly Democratic states and districts including: Abdul El-Sayed MI, Troy Jackson ME, Manny Rutinel CO-8, William Lawrence MI-7, and Sam Forstag MT-1. These races test whether the progressive left can win beyond deep-blue electorates.

I have some comments on the reasons for the debacle and some suggestions on how groups like AIPAC and DMFI should proceed both in the current and future election cycles.

First, there must be a recognition that the world does not revolve around Israel. The rise of the progressive left probably has much more to do with intense frustration over health insurance, economic opportunity, and income and wealth inequality. Democratic socialists have responded with proposals such as Medicare for All and aggressive redistribution that are often impractical but highly appealing to the relatively small share of voters who participate in Democratic primaries—often roughly 20 percent of the eventual general-election electorate.

Republican candidates with the party’s record on cutting SNAP benefits and premium subsidies for health care are not competitive in many districts, regardless of the Democrat’s position towards Israel. In deep-blue districts, however, winning that primary usually means winning the seat, allowing strongly anti-Israel socialists to enter Congress even when their broader views may not represent the district’s general-election electorate. I understand this outcome because many voters even if they disagree with the Democrat’s view on Israel differ from the Republican party on a wide variety of issues including immigration, health care, economic policy, the growing isolationism and most of all concerns about President Trump.

The long-term answer therefore cannot simply be spending more money in Democratic primaries. Deep-blue districts need a pragmatic progressive or center-left alternative in the general election, something neither the Republican nor Democratic party can provide. The long-term solution to the declining political support for Israel is the creation of a viable political party with a pragmatic approach to governing and a reasonable approach to Israel.

The short-term options for AIPAC and DMFI in the 2026 cycle are relatively narrow because the die has largely been set for the fall election. In some cases, AIPAC support has backfired, as in the NJ 11 primary, where their intervention led to the nomination of a more radical Democrat. In Michigan the expenditures for Stevens may have weakened El-Sayed but there were less expensive ways to accomplish this.

AIPAC needs to move away from support of individual candidates and towards a broader education effort about the conflict and the world. In the current cycle, AIPAC should explain why terrorism and the history of the intifadas have made an Israeli Palestinian settlement so difficult, distinguish legitimate criticism of Israeli governments from efforts to delegitimize Israel, and confront Iran’s role in supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region—including the brutal repression of the Iranian people themselves. These educational efforts do not always have to be tied to an individual race.

Some 2026 candidates in both parties do deserve AIPAC support both because of their support for Israel and the views of their opponent. These candidates include Melissa Hernandez (D), CA-14; Janelle Stelson (D), PA-10; Eileen Laubacher (D), CO-4; Paige Cognetti (D), PA-8; Elaine Luria (D), VA-2; Don Davis (D), NC-1; Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (D), WA-3; Emilia Sykes (D), OH-13; Bobby Pulido (D), TX-15; Tom Barrett (R), MI-7; Gabe Evans (R), CO-8; Aaron Flint (R), MT-1; and Brent Taylor (R), TN-9.

The most important long-term problem is preventing Democratic socialists in deep-blue districts from becoming permanently entrenched in Congress. These candidates are often nominated in primaries dominated by activists and involving only around 30 percent of the voters who will participate in the general election. Yet once they win the Democratic nomination, the political composition of these districts makes election in November almost automatic. These candidates cannot be beaten in the Democratic primary. The only way to beat the candidates is the construction of a pragmatic and progressive third-party which champions economically efficient and progressive solutions.

The potential universe of deep-blue districts where a pragmatic progressive alternative could compete is considerably larger than the handful in which democratic-socialist candidates were elected this term. A substantial bloc of Democrats in the current Congress supports policies associated with the party’s progressive wing, including Medicare for All, major elements of the Green New Deal, and increasingly critical positions toward Israel. The relevant question is not whether a pragmatic-progressive alternative could win every such race; it plainly would not. The question is whether it could win enough of them to matter.

Even if an independent or third-party candidate had only about a one-in-six chance of prevailing in a competitive three-way race, victories in even a handful of deep-blue districts could upend the existing political calculus. In a House in which control may depend on only a few seats, such candidates could become pivotal to determining the majority and could demonstrate that winning the Democratic primary no longer guarantees election in November.

The problem will be more acute in 2028 and spread to even more Senate and House seats. Schumer is likely to be challenged in New York and Bennet is likely to be challenged in Colorado, actions that will endanger two pro-Israel Democrats.

The most effective way to stop the increase of socialist anti-Israel candidates from entering Congress is not beating them in primaries where most voters are progressive but beating them in the general election by fielding a pragmatic fiscally conservative progressive. The rationale for an organization built around the idea of a Democratic Majority for Israel is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Pro-Israel Democrats deserve support, but there is no longer a dependable pro-Israel majority within the Democratic Party.

On July 15, 103 House Democrats voted for Thomas Massie’s amendment eliminating $3.3 billion in annual assistance to Israel, compared with 98 Democrats opposed, and 10 voting present. Democratic leadership itself divided, with Hakeem Jeffries opposing the amendment and Katherine Clark supporting it.

The decision of centrist Democrats to oppose Israel is couched in terms of opposing Netanyahu and the current government and support for a two-state solution. But these votes do not reflect the recent history where Palestinians turned their backs on Oslo, started violent Intifadas, and then initiated October 7.

The movement by Democrat centrists away from Israel is an attempt to placate the growing anti-Israel wing of the party. Melat Kiros has described October 7 as an “inevitable consequence” of apartheid and occupation while denying that this justified the attack. Darializa Avila Chevalier defended attending a pro-Palestinian demonstration on October 8, 2023, and supports a one-state solution. Abdul El-Sayed has called Israel’s conduct genocide and apartheid, favors ending U.S. military aid, and has repeatedly resisted directly affirming Israel’s right to exist specifically as a Jewish state.

Centrist Democrats seem increasingly unwilling to draw boundaries around such rhetoric. Buttigieg, Newsom, Whitmer, Slotkin and Stevens have now all endorsed El-Sayed after he won the nomination. There must be some point at which principle overrides party loyalty. As the old saying goes, lie down with dogs and you get fleas.

I cannot simply migrate to the Republican Party. I find much of its immigration policy gratuitously cruel, oppose its large reductions in Medicaid and food assistance, and disagree with combining those cuts with very large tax reductions. CBO estimates that the 2025 reconciliation law will reduce Medicaid spending by about $1.2 trillion and SNAP by $211 billion through 2035 while greatly expanding immigration enforcement.

I would however if I was a resident of Michigan vote for Mike Rogers and if I was a resident of Maine vote for Susan Collins.

On foreign policy, the growing isolationism of Thomas Massie, Rand Paul, Marjorie Taylor Greene and influential voices such as Tucker Carlson creates another reason for concern. Trump remains more supportive of Israel, but his foreign policy is unpredictable and his commitment to supporting the Iranian people has been inconsistent.

An AIPAC backed third party can win by uniting people in the center in both deep blue and deep red districts and in swing districts where voters do not want either Republican or Democratic party rule. This approach will give substantive results as early as 2028 when a relatively small number of successful third-party candidates could control the balance of power in the House of Representatives and maybe also the Senate.

Author’s Note: One place to start would be recruiting candidates with credible answers to the domestic problems that are driving voters toward the socialist left—for example, candidates willing to support the practical health-care reforms outlined in A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care. Amazon Kindle edition. This book is linked to other policy proposals on student debt, retirement income and taxes. I appreciate your support.

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One month after the October 7 massacre, Melat Kiros published an open letter attacking the position taken by more than 100 major law firms on antisemitism and Israel. Sidley Austin reportedly asked Kiros, then an associate at the firm, to remove the letter. She refused and was fired—an event that helped redirect her from corporate law into progressive politics and ultimately a run for Congress.

The letter deserves to be considered in three parts. First are its familiar anti-Israel arguments: claims that are, in my view, misleading or wrong but are widely made and can be debated. Second are its more inflammatory conclusions about October 7, Zionism and Israel’s continued existence—the portions that help explain why the letter had such serious professional consequences. Third is the larger question of utility. Even apart from whether its claims are correct, does Kiros’s rhetoric offer any plausible path toward peace, coexistence or a workable political settlement?

Much of the letter consists of standard anti-Israel fare. Kiros describes Israel as a colonial and occupying power, characterizes its treatment of Palestinians as apartheid and argues that its military response after October 7 constituted disproportionate force and collective punishment. Many people hold some or all these views, and each deserves serious discussion. But Kiros presents them as settled conclusions while offering, at best, an extraordinarily selective account of the conflict.

Israel is not simply a European colonial outpost populated by descendants of foreign settlers. A large share of Israeli Jews are descended from people who fled or were driven from communities elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Around half of Israel’s Jewish population has roots in Arab or other Muslim countries, where ancient Jewish communities have now almost entirely disappeared. Their experience does not fit comfortably within a simple story of European colonizers displacing an indigenous population.

Nor does Kiros’s colonial account adequately acknowledge the role of Britain—the actual imperial power governing Palestine. At precisely the moment Jews were desperately attempting to escape Nazi persecution, Britain sharply restricted Jewish immigration. Jews fleeing for their lives were prevented from reaching Palestine, and many refugees and Holocaust survivors were forced to attempt entry clandestinely. That history does not erase Palestinian suffering, but it greatly complicates Kiros’s portrayal of Zionism as little more than an imperial project imposed upon the region.

The apartheid accusation is especially unpersuasive when applied indiscriminately to Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries. Get off an airplane in Israel and one immediately encounters a multilingual country: Hebrew, Arabic and English appear together on many airport, road and public signs. Arab citizens vote, form political parties, serve in the Knesset, work as physicians and university professors, and have served as judges, including on Israel’s Supreme Court.

Muslim religious life is not prohibited or driven underground. Israel contains hundreds of mosques, and Muslim citizens have access to a state-recognized system of Sharia courts that decides marriage, divorce, alimony, paternity and other personal-status matters. These are unusual features for a country supposedly organized around the systematic exclusion of its Arab population.

Cross-country comparisons are difficult, and substantial economic disparities remain between Arab and Jewish citizens within Israel. Even so, Arab citizens of Israel appear broadly on par economically with citizens of other Arab countries in the region and better off than those in several neighboring states. They possess citizenship, voting rights, political representation, religious institutions and access to an independent court system. Inequality and discrimination deserve criticism, but they are not synonymous with apartheid, and Israel bears little resemblance to South Africa’s former system of legally mandated racial separation and political exclusion. The comparative economic position of Arab Israelis is an interesting subject that merits fuller treatment in a separate comment.

Conditions in the West Bank present a more difficult case because Palestinians there live under varying combinations of Israeli military control and Palestinian Authority administration without Israeli citizenship. The Oslo process was intended to replace that arrangement gradually with Palestinian self-government and a negotiated settlement, but it failed. In my view, much of the responsibility lies with Palestinian and broader Arab leaders who repeatedly rejected an achievable partial settlement coupled to a promise of more to come.

The claim that Israel used excessive force after October 7 is also widely held and cannot simply be dismissed. The scale of Palestinian civilian suffering was immense. Yet Kiros gives little attention to the absence of any easy Israeli response after Hamas murdered civilians, seized hostages, embedded itself within Gaza and promised further attacks. Israel faced choices among terrible alternatives: leave Hamas in power, negotiate under the pressure of mass hostage-taking, or conduct a military campaign in one of the world’s most densely populated urban environments. One can criticize how Israel fought the war without pretending that it had an obvious, humane and risk-free solution available.

The portions of Kiros’s letter that most clearly set it apart—and likely explain the reaction of Sidley Austin’s partners—begin with her argument that violent Palestinian resistance is the predictable consequence of colonialism and occupation. Many people accuse Israel of occupation, apartheid or excessive force. Far fewer, especially one month after October 7, applied a theory of anticolonial violence so directly to the murder and kidnapping of Israeli civilians.

Kiros invokes an anticolonial passage associated with Jean-Paul Sartre, describes October 7 with the words “We saw this gaze,” and says the massacre “did not occur in a vacuum.” The invocation is especially peculiar because Sartre himself was, at least in a qualified sense, a Zionist: he welcomed Israel’s creation as a legitimate expression of Jewish national independence, even as he later advocated recognition of Palestinian national rights. Although Kiros calls the attack unjustifiable, her surrounding rhetoric portrays it as the foreseeable response of an oppressed population to its occupier. To many readers, this sounds less like historical context than a partial rationalization of terrorism.

She then places Hamas’s massacre and Israel’s military response side by side as unjustifiable acts. A law firm did not have to oppose criticism of Israel to view this as extraordinarily poor judgment. While victims were still being identified and hostages remained in Gaza, Kiros moved quickly from condemning the massacre to explaining why Israel had supposedly brought it upon itself.

There is nevertheless an uncomfortable truth beneath the rhetoric: this conflict has produced violence, trauma and hatred on both sides. Every day on my LinkedIn feed, I encounter another account of an October 7 atrocity or of an earlier attack on Jews in Palestine, often beginning with the 1929 Hebron massacre. Kiros presents Palestinian violence almost entirely as a response to Israeli oppression, but history is not that simple. For every violent act against Palestinians cited in her letter, I can point to a violent act committed against Jews.

Kiros briefly endorses a single state in which Jews and Palestinians possess equal rights, but she never explains how either people could reach that destination. How would Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups be disarmed? Who would prevent Iran and its regional proxies from exploiting the new state or turning Palestinian territory into another front against Israel? Who would protect Jews and Palestinians from communal violence, terrorism or an attempted seizure of power? Why would Israelis—surrounded by hostile forces and newly traumatized by October 7—surrender the sovereignty, army and secure refuge that exist precisely because Jews historically could not depend on others to protect them? Kiros does not confront these questions because her letter reads less like an effort to solve the conflict than an opportunity to assign blame and vent anger.

The history of failed negotiations is more complicated than Kiros suggests, but Palestinian leaders have repeatedly declined to accept an attainable partial settlement and continue negotiating from there. Rabin accepted the Oslo process, under which Israel recognized the PLO and transferred substantial governing authority to the Palestinian Authority. Barak and the Clinton Parameters contemplated a sovereign Palestinian state in Gaza and most of the West Bank, supplemented by land swaps; Clinton later described Arafat’s failure to close the deal as a terrible mistake. In 2008, Olmert offered Abbas a state based broadly on the pre-1967 lines, territorial exchanges, a connection between Gaza and the West Bank, a division of Jerusalem and international administration of the holy sites. Abbas did not accept the proposal, and Olmert warned that another comparable offer might not appear for 50 years. After October 7, even that prediction may look optimistic.

Some form of Swiss-style federation or confederation may ultimately offer a better long-term answer than either permanent occupation or an artificial effort to divide every road, settlement and holy place. Such a system might combine autonomous Jewish and Palestinian cantons or states with shared federal institutions, local control over civil affairs and joint responsibility for infrastructure, economic policy and external security. But it would first require a viable Palestinian governing authority capable of enforcing the law, controlling armed groups, resisting Iranian interference, accepting Jewish national rights and honoring agreements. Equality cannot be created merely by declaring one state; it must rest on functioning institutions, credible security arrangements and at least a minimum level of mutual trust.

Kiros’s letter contributes nothing to that process. By presenting Palestinian violence principally as a response to Israeli oppression, questioning Israel’s legitimacy and offering no credible transition from conflict to coexistence, her screed pushes both peoples farther from compromise. Venting may attract political supporters, but it is not a peace plan.

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· Republican-aligned organizations hold nearly twice as much cash as Democratic-aligned organizations.

· Trump’s political operation controls the largest concentration of political money.

· Crypto, AI and pro-Israel organizations now rival the major party committees.

· Cash balances alone understate the influence of groups such as EMILY’s List and Democratic Majority for Israel.

This memorandum examines the financial status of 25 nationally significant federal political war chests and what those balances suggest about the 2026 elections.

The 25 Largest Political War Chests

1. MAGA Inc. — Trump-aligned super PAC — $400.6 million

2. Senate Leadership Fund — Republican Senate super PAC — $238.6 million

3. Congressional Leadership Fund — Republican House super PAC — $141.8 million

4. Republican National Committee — National Republican Party committee — $128.5 million

5. Fairshake — Cryptocurrency-industry super PAC — $127.0 million

6. Senate Majority PAC — Democratic Senate super PAC — approximately $126 million

7. Democracy PAC II — Soros-family-funded Democratic super PAC — $121.6 million

8. National Republican Congressional Committee — Republican House campaign committee — $92.7 million

9. House Majority PAC — Democratic House super PAC — $89.9 million

10. United Democracy Project — AIPAC-affiliated electoral super PAC — $80.3 million

11. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee — Democratic House campaign committee — $79.0 million

12. Americans for Prosperity Action — Koch-network conservative super PAC — $65.3 million

13. Democracy PAC — Soros-family-funded Democratic super PAC — $64.5 million

14. Never Surrender — Trump leadership PAC — $60.9 million

15. National Republican Senatorial Committee — Republican Senate campaign committee — $55.9 million

16. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee — Democratic Senate campaign committee — $41.0 million

17. Leading the Future — Artificial-intelligence-industry super PAC — $31.0 million

18. Progressive Turnout Project — Democratic voter-mobilization organization — $25.5 million

19. LCV Victory Fund — Environmentalist Democratic-aligned super PAC — $19.5 million

20. Democratic National Committee — National Democratic Party committee — $16.3 million

21. Club for Growth Action — Conservative economic-policy super PAC — $11.4 million

22. Working for Working Americans–Federal — Labor-backed super PAC — $8.2 million

23. Working Families Party PAC — Progressive electoral organization — $7.7 million

24. Everytown Victory Fund — Gun-control advocacy super PAC — $6.9 million

25. VoteVets — Democratic-aligned veterans organization — $5.6 million

The list ranks nationally significant party committees, super PACs, leadership PACs and electoral organizations within the universe examined by this memorandum. It is not intended to include every corporate, labor, trade-association or professional PAC registered with the Federal Election Commission.

The figures generally represent cash on hand as of June 30, 2026. Senate Majority PAC remains an approximate figure because the reported amount may involve recent filings or related organizational funds that are not yet fully reflected in the FEC’s processed summary data.

This analysis excludes fundraising conduits such as ActBlue and WinRed because they primarily process contributions for other committees rather than control the money as a discretionary political war chest. It also excludes nonprofit organizations that may spend heavily on issue advertising but do not publicly report directly comparable federal cash balances.

Comments

Comment 1. Trump’s Financial Dominance

MAGA Inc.’s war chest of more than $400 million is unprecedented for a candidate-aligned super PAC. Combined with the separate Never Surrender fund, President Trump and his political allies control an extraordinary pool of resources that gives them substantial influence over Republican primaries, general elections and the party’s future direction.

Comment 2. Republicans Hold the Financial Advantage

The Republican-aligned organizations listed above hold approximately $1.20 billion, compared with roughly $612 million for Democratic-aligned groups—an advantage of nearly two to one. The Republican financial advantage extends well beyond the official party committees and increasingly resides in allied organizations that can shape both primary and general election outcomes.

These totals exclude special-interest organizations that are not consistently aligned with one party, including the cryptocurrency-funded Fairshake, AIPAC’s United Democracy Project and the AI-focused Leading the Future.

Comment 3. Democrats Are Missing from the Top Five

No Democratic-aligned organization appears among the five largest political war chests. AIPAC’s United Democracy Project, with $80.3 million, also holds slightly more cash than the DCCC, the Democratic Party’s principal House campaign committee.

Comment 4. Technology Money Has Become a Major Force

Crypto and AI organizations on the list hold approximately $158 million combined. That gives technology interests a larger political war chest than any individual Democratic Party committee.

Comment 5. AIPAC Remains Financially Formidable

AIPAC’s United Democracy Project retains $80.3 million despite spending roughly $30 million on Haley Stevens’s apparently unsuccessful Michigan Senate primary campaign. The Michigan intervention may have failed to stop Abdul El-Sayed, but it still demonstrates AIPAC’s ability to impose enormous costs on candidates it opposes and leaves the organization well financed for competitive November races.

AIPAC is more likely to intervene where an Israel-critical Democrat is running in a genuinely competitive race. The clearest possibilities include the Senate races in Michigan and Maine and several contested House seats, including CA-14, CA-22, CO-8, PA-10 and MI-7. AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups, including Democratic Majority for Israel, have also halted or suspended support for some lawmakers in response to their votes for the Massie amendment restricting assistance to Israel.

Comment 6. Cash on Hand Does Not Measure the Entire Political Network

EMILY’s List and Democratic Majority for Israel illustrate the limits of ranking organizations solely by their bank balances. EMILY’s List raised approximately $38 million and spent nearly $40 million during the cycle but held only $2.8 million on June 30. DMFI PAC raised $5.7 million, spent $5.5 million and retained approximately $1 million.

Their absence from the top 25 is therefore appropriate for a cash-on-hand ranking, but it should not be interpreted as evidence that they lack influence over Democratic nominations, fundraising and candidate positioning. Endorsements, donor networks and the ability to raise and spend money quickly can matter as much as the balance reported on any single filing date.

Conclusion

The 2026 money hierarchy shows a Republican financial advantage, an extraordinary concentration of resources around Trump and a growing role for specialized interests outside the formal party structure. The organizations with the largest bank accounts will not determine every election, but they will have substantial power to decide which candidates receive support, which face opposition and which issues dominate the campaign.

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• Democratic-socialist candidates won several deep-blue primaries with support from only a small share of the districts’ general-election voters.

• A pragmatic center-left independent could potentially unite unaffiliated voters, Republicans and conventional Democrats.

• A small independent bloc could hold substantial leverage in a closely divided House, including in the election of the Speaker.

• Shimon Blau’s qualification for the CO-1 ballot provides the first test of this strategy, although he remains a long shot.

The 2026 primaries have created a genuine opening in several of the country’s safest Democratic congressional districts. Five democratic-socialist or movement-left candidates defeated more conventional Democrats or captured seats previously held by them:

• Colorado 1: Melat Kiros defeated 15-term incumbent Diana DeGette.

• New York 7: Claire Valdez won the open seat of retiring liberal Nydia Velázquez.

• New York 10: Brad Lander defeated Dan Goldman.

• New York 13: Darializa Avila Chevalier defeated Adriano Espaillat.

• Pennsylvania 3: Chris Rabb won the nomination in one of the nation’s most Democratic districts.

These candidates are not identical, but the results mark a clear movement toward democratic socialism, activist politics and, in several races, a much more hostile position toward Israel and American military support for it.

However, primary voters are not identical to general election voters. A Bipartisan Policy Center analysis of nationwide voter files found that unaffiliated voters averaged 23 percent of general-election electorates but only 10 percent of primary electorates; primary voters were also five years older on average. Brookings found that Democratic and Republican primary voters alike regarded themselves as more ideological than the general-election voters in their districts.

The district-level numbers on turnout reinforce the point:

• New York 7, 10 and 13: Only 67,000 to 84,000 ballots were cast in each Democratic primary. The winners received 32,790 to 55,060 votes, equal to roughly 15 to 20 percent of the votes cast in the corresponding 2024 general elections.

• Colorado 1: Kiros received 83,685 votes, about 24 percent of the 345,639 votes cast in the district in 2024.

• Pennsylvania 3: Rabb’s 65,775 primary votes equaled 19 percent of the district’s 2024 general-election vote.

State rules determining who is eligible to vote in a primary partly determine the difference in composition between primary and general election electorates. New York and Pennsylvania have closed primaries where only voters registered to a party can participate. Colorado allows registered Independents to vote in the primary of their choice.

None of this invalidates the victories or proves that the nominees would lose a referendum on their programs. It does show that the primary did not establish the existence of broad electorate support for Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, abolition of ICE, or the new left’s position on Israel.

In a one-party district, many November voters support the Democratic nominee because the Republican alternative is unacceptable, not because they endorse every element of the nominee’s agenda.

A Republican, especially a modern Republican, will not win in these districts. A pragmatic, center-left independent may nevertheless have a path to victory.

She could seek most Republican voters, a large share of unaffiliated voters and enough conventional liberals, pro-Israel Democrats and fiscally cautious progressives to form a majority.

The candidate could remain liberal on abortion, civil rights, environmental protection, health-care access and the safety net while offering economically feasible policies, support for Israel and less ideological politics.

The potential constituency for this hypothetical third-party candidate extends beyond the five 2026 races. Long-serving Democrats in safe or strongly Democratic seats—including Katherine Clark in Massachusetts, Chellie Pingree in Maine, Frank Pallone in New Jersey, Adam Smith in Washington and Brad Sherman in California—now vote well to the left of the national electorate.

Voteview’s congress-by-congress estimates indicate that several, particularly Pallone, Smith and Sherman, have moved materially left during their careers. A credible center-left movement could eventually test whether these districts’ broader electorates have moved as far as their dominant Democratic primary electorates.

The claim that congressional politics are inevitably binary – vote for Jeffries or Johnson for speaker -- overlooks the potential power of an independent block. Recent elections for House Speaker demonstrate the potential leverage held by a small number of independents in the House.

Kevin McCarthy required 15 ballots in January 2023, and the House required four more ballots to elect Mike Johnson that October. In January 2025, Johnson won 218–215, with one vote cast for Tom Emmer. One additional vote for another named candidate would have prevented Johnson from winning on that ballot.

The Constitution does not require the Speaker to be a member of Congress. Representatives may vote for any individual. I, David Bernstein, the author and publisher of this blog could legally be elected Speaker of the House. This will be the plot of my new Netflix TV series, stay tuned.

The possibility of an independent Speaker, combined with an alternative platform that differs substantially from both the Republican and Democratic agendas, provides the rationale for an independent candidacy. Such a candidate must offer more than opposition to the movement left; the campaign needs a coherent governing program capable of attracting voters who are dissatisfied with both parties.

I have begun developing such a platform and have made substantial progress on four issues: health insurance, student debt, retirement saving and capital-gains taxation. Democratic proposals in these areas too often promise benefits that cannot realistically be financed or sustained. Republican approaches frequently acknowledge legitimate fiscal and economic problems but respond with repeal without an adequate replacement, abrupt benefit reductions, or policies that shift excessive risk onto households least able to bear it. The proposals are summarized, with links to the complete papers, in Four Policy Papers for a Third-Party Economic Agenda.

The first test of the hypothesis that a third-party candidate can win in a deep-blue district will occur in CO-1. On July 24, the Colorado secretary of state determined that 1,918 of the signatures submitted by Shimon Blau were valid, exceeding the 1,500 required and placing him on the November ballot. Blau describes himself as socially liberal and fiscally conservative and entered after Kiros’s victory. Blau is a late entrant and remains a long shot but now that we understand the contours of the Democratic-Socialistic threat I expect more such candidacies in 2028 as the Democratic-Socialist threat spreads and becomes more evident earlier in the process.

Sources and Method

Primary-electorate composition: Bipartisan Policy Center, “The Effect of Open Primaries on Turnout and Representation” (2024).

Primary voters and ideology: Brookings, “The 2018 Primaries Project: The Ideology of Primary Voters.”

New York rules and results: New York State Board of Elections registration deadlines and 2026 unofficial primary returns.

Colorado primary participation: Colorado Legislative Council, “Primary Election Law” (2026), and secretary of state ballot-return data reported after the primary.

Congressional ideology: Voteview, congress-by-congress Nokken-Poole first-dimension estimates; career comparisons calculated from the current member dataset.

Blau ballot qualification: The Colorado Sun, July 24, 2026.

Election comparisons use the winning 2026 Democratic primary vote divided by total votes cast in the corresponding 2024 U.S. House general election. Percentages are rounded; 2026 results are current through July 24, 2026.

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Why should AIPAC spend so much on this primary when the Republican nominee Mike Rogers is relatively moderate, at least to the extent where any Republican can be described as moderate, and strongly supportive of Israel.

The unacceptable outcome is Senator Abdul El-Sayed.

El-Sayed’s response to the March attack on Temple Israel in West Bloomfield helps explain that concern. He unequivocally condemned the attack, declared that antisemitism had no place in the community and said there was “never a justification” for attacking innocent people or a house of worship. But he then repeatedly invoked the phrase “hurt people hurt people,” emphasized that the attacker had recently lost relatives in an Israeli airstrike and argued that events 6,000 miles away could produce violence in Michigan. The FBI subsequently described the attacker as Hezbollah-inspired and Israeli intelligence claims the attackers brother was a commander in Hezbollah.

His more recent remarks have been still more explicit. El-Sayed has described Israel as a “rogue state,” accused it of genocide and apartheid, previously equated the Israeli government’s evil with that of Hamas, and repeatedly refused to say that Israel should continue to exist as a Jewish state. When asked whether he supported one state or two, he said that was not his choice to make.

American Jews are routinely expected to restrain Israel, criticize its government and prove that their attachment to it does not override their American obligations. Comparable pressure is rarely placed on Arab or Muslim political leaders to moderate rhetoric denying Jewish self-determination or attributing anti-Jewish violence to Israel; in El-Sayed’s case, the rhetoric has intensified as the campaign has progressed.

AIPAC therefore has a legitimate reason to oppose him. The question is when.

Defeating El-Sayed in the primary would send a clear warning that a Democrat who crosses a particular political line may never reach the general election. But it would also create a dangerous political outcome. Michigan Democrats are badly divided, and in my view either Democratic nominee is likely to lose to Rogers.

If Stevens wins the primary after nearly $50 million in outside intervention and then loses in November, progressives will claim that AIPAC and other centrist organizations purchased the nomination, rejected the candidate preferred by Democratic voters and still lost the seat. The defeat would be a disaster not only for centrist Democrats but also for AIPAC’s influence within the party.

An El-Sayed nomination followed by a general-election defeat would produce a much clearer result. The progressive wing would have chosen the nominee and would bear responsibility for losing a competitive Senate seat. The defeat would be a blunt message to the Democratic Party: nominate candidates who alienate Jewish voters and other supporters of Israel, and Republicans may win elections even in a state like Michigan where the current governor and both senators are Democrats.

The least risky strategy for AIPAC would therefore be to stay out of the Democratic primary. If El-Sayed wins the nomination, AIPAC and its allies could then spend heavily to destroy him in the general election.

That approach would prevent AIPAC from being blamed for a Stevens defeat, force progressives to defend their own candidate before the full Michigan electorate and still produce an acceptable senator—either Stevens or Rogers. The only risk is that El-Sayed might win, not an impossible outcome in a year where the overall political outlook increasingly resembles the one that existed in 2006 and 2018 two blue-wave years.

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· Ideological primaries are producing more polarized congressional nominees.

· Party-brand drag may hurt otherwise well-matched candidates in competitive districts.

· Extreme rhetoric can drown out economic issues that favor Democrats.

· The political environment generally favors Democrats, but the party’s shift left may squander that advantage.

· A more ideological Congress will be less capable of bipartisan governing.

· Continued political paralysis will make resolution of problems like Social Security less likely.

At first glance, the setup for the 2026 midterm elections looks like a textbook environment for a historic Democratic “blue wave,” mirroring the backlash cycles of 2006 and 2018.

The nation is bogged in an unpopular and poorly executed military engagement overseas and the Administration has administered a harsh deportation policy resulting in ICE agents killing several innocent people. Inflation and interest rates are rising, young adults can’t afford houses, older adults aren’t selling homes. While unemployment is low the new entrants to the workforce are having a hard time finding jobs and long-term unemployment is high.

A recent Fox News Poll suggests that Democrats are well positioned for success in November 2026.

“Voters say Democrats can better handle income inequality (+22 points), healthcare (+21), inflation (+10), the economy (+9), and foreign policy (+7). Republicans hold the advantage on crime (+7 points), while government spending (Democrats +3) and national security (R +2) are more evenly divided. On immigration, the GOP had an 8-point edge in April. Now, Democrats are preferred by one point.”

Under normal political gravity, these compounding missteps would guarantee a sweeping rebuke at the ballot box.

However, the political landscape is far more polarized than in 2006 or 2018. As ideological polarization intensifies, the escalating conflict between each party’s fringe and center is having a significantly more adverse impact on the electoral prospects of Democrats than Republicans.

This memo assesses recent 2026 primary elections to forecast likely control of the Senate and House in 2027. In addition, this memo considers how the election will impact the ideological center of the new Congress and its ability to effectively conduct the nation’s business.

The Senate:

While Republicans face competitive headwinds nationally, their internal cohesion gives them a major structural advantage in high-stakes Senate contests. GOP voters remain broadly aligned on key pillars—low taxes, deregulation, border enforcement, and alignment on foreign policy.

Trump by putting his thumb on the scale replaced two highly respected conservative Senators Cornyn in Texas and Cassiday with more loyal and more MAGA replacements. These two changes assure that the 2027 Republican caucus in the Senate will be more MAGA and less willing to compromise than the current one.

The replacement of Cornyn by Paxton puts Texas in play. Louisiana remains safely red with Letlow as the nominee.

The Democratic party has come together around a qualified candidate in most contested Senate races with two exception Maine and Michigan.

In Maine, rallying around former logger Troy Jackson following Graham Platner’s collapse trades one vetting failure for another, pitting an aggressive populist with documented anger-management baggage and a hard-left platform directly against Susan Collins’ appeal to moderate women.

In Michigan, the Democratic Party is so deeply divided by the bitter Gaza-centered contest between Abdul El-Sayed and Haley Stevens that Republican Mike Rogers is in strong shape regardless of who wins the primary.

I expect the Democrats will lose both the race in Maine and the race in Michigan.

Democrats appear poised to flip North Carolina and could flip the Senate in a blue wave, but I believe the most likely outcome for this election cycle is a Senate with the same Democrat/Republican composition as the current Senate.

The House:

The House of Representatives to be seated in January 2027 will be more ideological and more polarized than the current House.

Progressive, democratic-socialist, and populist insurgents have expanded their footprint, primarily by winning primaries in safe Democratic districts but also by moving into a few rural or genuinely competitive seats. The most prominent examples include Chris Rabb in Philadelphia’s PA-3, Analilia Mejia in New Jersey’s formerly suburban Republican NJ-11, Brad Lander, Claire Valdez, and Darializa Avila Chevalier in New York’s NY-10, NY-7, and NY-13, and Melat Kiros defeating Diana DeGette in Denver’s CO-1.

Republican primaries have produced a parallel movement toward Trump-aligned and hardline populist candidates. Steve Toth defeated Dan Crenshaw in TX-2. Gun-rights YouTuber Brandon Herrera secured the TX-23 nomination after Tony Gonzales withdrew following a personal scandal. Trump-backed David Flippo won in NV-2, while former baseball player Mark Teixeira won in TX-21. These results show Republican voters replacing independent-minded or national-security-oriented conservatives with candidates less likely to challenge the president or party leadership.

Thomas Massie was a somewhat different case. His defeat by Ed Gallrein reflected not simply an ideological shift within the party, but a highly personal rupture between Massie and Donald Trump. Trump made Massie’s removal a priority and ultimately prevailed, demonstrating the danger Republican incumbents face when they openly defy him—even when their dissent is grounded in long-standing conservative or libertarian principles.

The departures of Jared Golden and Don Bacon eliminate two of Congress’s rare cross-party survivors and further accelerate the disappearance of members willing to distance themselves from their national parties.

The political and economic environment still gives Democrats a plausible path to a wave election, but Democrats enter the election substantially more divided on a range of issues. Republicans had serious internal disagreements over the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, but nearly all of them ultimately voted for final passage: only Thomas Massie and Brian Fitzpatrick joined the Democrats in opposition.

The sharpest and perhaps least bridgeable Democratic division involves Israel and Gaza. Much of the progressive wing describes Israel’s conduct as genocide and demands an end to military assistance. Some party moderates, including some Jewish Democrats, have responded by becoming increasingly critical of Israel to hold the coalition together. In July, 103 House Democrats voted for an amendment that would have cut $3.3 billion in Israeli security assistance, demonstrating that the division is no longer confined to a handful of Squad members.

Democrats face two electoral problems in their effort to retake the House. In some districts, they have nominated a candidate whose positions are well to the left of the median voter; elsewhere, a locally suitable candidate may be defined by more ideological nominees in the party, sometimes within the same television market.

The clearest examples of nominee mismatch are Matt Dunlap in ME-2, a progressive Medicare-for-All supporter replacing the more independent Jared Golden; Sam Forstag in MT-1, an AOC-backed union populist contesting a Republican-leaning western Montana district; Manny Rutinel in closely divided CO-8, whose strong biography may be offset by rhetoric about stopping ICE from “terrorizing” communities; and Randy Villegas in CA-22, a Sanders- and AOC-endorsed progressive who defeated a more moderate Democrat in a conservative Central Valley battleground. These candidates may have compelling local biographies, but they have less room for ideological error in districts concerned with agriculture, energy, immigration, firearms, rural hospitals, and the cost of environmental regulation.

The more widespread problem is not nominee mismatch. It is party brand drag. The party brand problem may adversely impact Democrats in Colorado and in northeast states including NY, NJ and PA.

Party-brand drag occurs when candidates are judged not only by their own records and positions but also by the most visible or controversial members of their party. The danger for Democrats is that inflammatory rhetoric about Israel, Hamas, American foreign policy, or defunding ICE and the police may drown out economic issues on which the party is better position.

The Fox News poll found the public currently has a lot confidence in Democrats than Republicans on the economy. Even Medicare for All may not be a huge negative for many voters frustrated with health care, although, I suspect the Green New Deal is problematic in rural areas. Regardless, rhetoric that appears anti-American or sympathetic to terrorism can be used against Democratic candidates almost anywhere.

In Colorado, Democrats have nominated several candidates whose backgrounds appear well suited to difficult districts. Dwayne Romero in CO-3 is an Army veteran, businessman, former local official, and former state economic-development director. Eileen Laubacher in CO-4 is a retired Navy rear admiral and former National Security Council official. Jessica Killin in CO-5 is an Army veteran and former congressional chief of staff who has built a serious campaign in a historically Republican Colorado Springs district.

Melat Kiros is helping define the Democratic field well beyond CO-1, complicating the campaigns of Democrats in CO-3, CO-4, CO-5, and even competitive CO-8. Romero, Laubacher, and Killin have military, business, and public-service backgrounds that could appeal to independents, veterans, and Republicans dissatisfied with Trump, but congressional elections are increasingly nationalized.

Republicans do not need to prove that these candidates share Kiros’s support for Medicare for All, abolishing ICE, a Green New Deal, and ending military aid to Israel; they need only argue that electing any Democrat will strengthen a House caucus increasingly influenced by politicians who do. As a result, every Colorado Democratic nominee may be forced to defend or distance themselves from positions developed for overwhelmingly Democratic Denver but far less popular elsewhere in the state.

The same problem threatens several districts in northeastern states – NY, PA and NJ. Democrats need to run up the score in this region if they are going to take back the House.

The same party-brand problem threatens the northeastern districts Democrats must win—or defend by substantial margins—to retake the House, including NY-3, NY-4, NY-17, and NY-19; PA-1, PA-7, and PA-8; and NJ-7. Republicans will use the victories of Brad Lander, Claire Valdez, and Darializa Avila Chevalier in New York City, Chris Rabb in overwhelmingly Democratic PA-3, and Analilia Mejia in NJ-11 to argue that even moderate suburban Democrats would strengthen a party increasingly influenced by democratic socialists, anti-ICE activists, and critics of Israel.

These safe-seat nominees may never appear on a battleground district’s ballot, but their statements will circulate through regional media and Republican advertising in races such as Laura Gillen’s NY-4, Lawler’s NY-17, the Lehigh Valley’s PA-7, northeastern Pennsylvania’s PA-8, and Rebecca Bennett’s NJ-7—all currently among the region’s most competitive contests.

Concluding Thoughts:

James Carville’s rule remains relevant: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Most Americans are voting on prices, wages, health care, immigration, energy costs, and the competence of government—not on which side can demonstrate the greatest ideological devotion to Israel or the Palestinians. Yet Kiros sometimes appears to be campaigning to represent Ramallah.

My two concerns, based on observations from this election cycle, are that too much of the Democratic Party prefers ideological purity to building a durable governing coalition, while too much of the Republican Party’s MAGA wing prizes loyalty to Donald Trump over independent judgment, compromise, and workable policy. A Democratic Party devoted to moral performance and a Republican Party devoted to personal loyalty may energize their most committed activists, but both will struggle to govern a divided country effectively.

The Congress seated in January 2027 will be more ideological, polarized, and less capable of governing than the current one. The disappearance of cross-party members, combined with the growth of the progressive left and the MAGA right, will make durable compromises on health care, taxes, energy, immigration, and entitlement reform increasingly difficult. Administrations will rely more heavily on reconciliation, executive orders, and regulations that are reversed whenever power changes hands. It is not likely the new Congress will consider the policy recommendations on health care, student debt, retirement and taxes outlined in my four-book policy series.

Political paralysis is perilous for the country, especially on Social Security. Allowing the trust funds to approach depletion and then imposing abrupt benefit cuts is not a responsible option, yet continued delay makes that outcome more likely. Each year of inaction narrows the available choices and makes a gradual, balanced solution more difficult.

The danger extends beyond Social Security. Federal debt continues to rise, while many households approach retirement with inadequate savings, high health-care costs, or student debt extending into later life. These problems require long-term reforms rather than emergency legislation. Increasing polarization raises the risk that Congress will postpone action until the remaining solutions are more painful, expensive, and unfair.

Author’s Note

If The Household Balance Sheet: A Third-Party Economic Program for Health Care, Student Debt, Retirement Security, and Capital Gains and other books in the policy series generate $10 million in sales revenue, I will interpret that as evidence of a vast, previously undetected constituency for pragmatic policy—and reluctantly run for office. Until then, buying, reviewing, and recommending the series is a far less disruptive way to support the movement.

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Troy Jackson is poised to replace Graham Platner as the Democratic nominee against Susan Collins. According to a detailed Washington Post investigation into Jackson’s temperament and more importantly for voters in Maine, the Bangor Daily News, his six years as Maine Senate president included yelling, cursing, table-pounding and a now-famous flying water bottle.

One female senator was reportedly screamed at from inches away after refusing to change her vote. Another Democratic leader allegedly ordered Jackson out of her office after he cursed, shouted and became aggressive during an argument over gun legislation. Jackson’s campaign disputes some details and denies that he physically intimidated anyone, while acknowledging occasions when his frustration got the better of him.

This raises an obvious question: What happens when this populist former lumberjack debates Susan Collins, a 73-year-old senator whose public manner resembles a grandmother patiently explaining that everyone may have dessert after finishing the peas?

Perhaps Democrats should not wait to find out. Jackson’s campaign should hire a 4-foot-11 actress to pose as a timid, soft-spoken and relentlessly irritating female staffer. Her assignment would be to correct him in public, disagree with him at inconvenient moments and begin every conversation with the words, “Actually, Troy.”

If Jackson can endure six months of this without shouting, pounding furniture or sending a beverage airborne, he is ready for Susan Collins. If he cannot, better to discover that in a campaign office than during a televised debate.

Progressives should also abandon the comforting fiction that misogyny is exclusively a right-wing condition. Older left-wing men can be wonderfully egalitarian in the abstract—and considerably less enlightened when an actual woman contradicts them.

The 2020 confrontation between Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren offered a useful example. After Sanders publicly denied Warren’s account of a private conversation, she confronted him: “I think you called me a liar on national TV.” We cannot know precisely what Sanders said privately, but Warren was clearly correct about the effect of his denial. Many Sanders supporters immediately treated his certainty as proof and portrayed Warren as dishonest, calculating or hysterical.

The larger joke is Maine Democrats’ candidate selection. Primary voters chose Graham Platner over Gov. Janet Mills. After Platner collapsed, party delegates rallied around another older male populist with substantial baggage.

Maine Democrats apparently agree that a woman cannot beat Susan Collins. Their solution is to keep finding men who might lose to her.

Collins must be terrified—or at least trying very hard not to smile.

Authors Note: www.EconomicMemos.com deals with economic policy, personal finance, investments and even politics. Please explore, and if you like politics, also read this article about the myth of the small donor.

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It is a compelling story. It is also completely fake.

A fascinating piece in Tablet Magazine detailing the rise of “American Priorities”—a massive new pro-Palestine Super PAC—has officially blown this narrative to pieces. The group, which pledged to dump over $10 million into the 2026 midterm cycle to back anti-Israel candidates and unseat incumbents, isn’t being funded by bake sales or campus lunch-money donations. It is backed by deep-pocketed Silicon Valley multi-millionaires, specifically former executives from the tech and mobile advertising giant AppLovin, alongside other elite tech founders.

The arrival of American Priorities exposes a series of uncomfortable truths that the political left has spent a decade trying to hide.

1. The Small-Donor Myth Is Dead

First, let’s discard the romantic illusion that any serious political faction operates solely on grassroots pocket change. The “small-donor” narrative has always been more of a marketing strategy than a financial reality. Building a national political infrastructure, buying airtime, running sophisticated digital operations, and mounting primary challenges against entrenched incumbents requires serious, heavy-duty capital.

When progressives need to scale up their operations to compete at the highest levels, they don’t just rely on recurring monthly donations from college students. They do exactly what everyone else does: they court wealthy tech executives, venture capitalists, and elite mega-donors who can write six- and seven-figure checks to supercharge a PAC. The AppLovin-backed influx of cash proves that big money is not a partisan vice; it is the baseline currency of modern political warfare.

2. The Progressive Double Standard

This brings us to the staggering hypocrisy of the progressive establishment. For cycles on end, progressive candidates and organizations like Justice Democrats have treated outside political spending as an absolute moral failure. They have scolded rivals, demanded pledges to reject corporate PAC money, and framed any campaign benefiting from independent expenditure groups as inherently corrupt.

Yet, as the Tablet piece illustrates, when a well-funded Super PAC like American Priorities steps in to spend $1 million in North Carolina or drop $2 million in New Jersey to advance an anti-Israel, progressive agenda, the moral outrage mysteriously evaporates. Suddenly, the nuances of campaign finance become highly acceptable. Candidates claim “no involvement” with the PAC while reaping the massive benefits of its ad buys and ground games. The left’s grievance with big money, it turns out, was never actually about the presence of money in politics—it was entirely about who the money was being used to support.

3. The Selective Vilification of AIPAC

Nowhere is this hypocrisy more glaring—or more dangerous—than in the selective vilification of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). For the past few cycles, progressive rhetoric has uniquely fixated on AIPAC’s political spending, describing it in terms that border on conspiratorial. AIPAC money is routinely characterized not merely as political opposition, but as a dirty, foreign, subverting force buying up American democracy.

When we look at the facts, this obsessive, singular fixation on pro-Israel money reveals a disturbing double standard. Political spending is ubiquitous. Labor unions, environmental groups, tech oligarchs, and now massive pro-Palestine Super PACs like American Priorities all spend tens of millions of dollars to influence elections.

To suggest that money spent by pro-Israel Americans is uniquely corrupt, while millions of tech-advertising dollars weaponized against Israel is just “participating in the process,” crosses a clear line. It taps into ancient, antisemitic tropes about wealthy Jewish cabals buying political outcomes. The reality is simple: the anti-Israel side of the aisle is playing the exact same high-stakes, big-money game. They are utilizing super PACs, courting tech elites, and flooding the airwaves.

The Bottom Line

The story of AppLovin’s executives financing American Priorities should forever change how we talk about campaign finance. It proves that there are no uniquely pure actors in modern American politics. Everyone uses money. Everyone uses PACs. The next time a progressive politician rails against the corrupting influence of outside spending, look at who is funding their defense. The myth of the pure grassroots crusade is officially over.

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AZ-06

The Democratic primary features a battle between progressive challenger JoAnna Mendoza and centrist Kirsten Engel, who is seeking her third consecutive run for this seat. Republican incumbent Juan Ciscomani is running unopposed for re-election. In this EVEN Toss-up district, nominating a centrist keeps Democrats highly competitive, whereas choosing a progressive likely drops independent suburban support and hands Ciscomani an effortless path to victory.

AZ-01

Centrists Amish Shah and Marlene Galán-Woods hold the advantage over progressive lane-holder Jonathan Treble, with frontrunner Shah seeking his second consecutive general election campaign. (Shah was arguably the more “progressive” option in 2024. These labels are fluid.)

The wide-open Republican primary to replace the retiring incumbent is a highly competitive, vacant-seat race primarily between traditional conservative Jay Feely and MAGA-aligned Joseph Chaplik. In this R+1 Toss-up playground, a hard-right GOP nominee maximizes a centrist Democrat’s chances to flip the seat, while a moderate Republican candidate dramatically squeezes a progressive Democrat’s general election prospects.

WI-03

The Democratic primary features a sharp contrast between centrist frontrunner Rebecca Cooke and progressive Eau Claire City Council President Emily Berge. Hardline conservative incumbent Republican Derrick Van Orden faces no primary opposition as he prepares to defend this rural battleground. In this Lean Republican terrain, nominating a centrist like Cooke keeps Democrats competitive with rural ticket-splitters, while a progressive nominee allows Van Orden to easily consolidate moderate swing voters.

MI-07

The Democratic primary is split between national security centrists Bridget Brink and Matt Maasdam and progressive climate organizer William Lawrence. Republican incumbent Tom Barrett faces an open primary road to secure his nomination for this highly competitive frontline seat. In this EVEN Toss-up district, a centrist nominee preserves the winning coalition model used previously by Elissa Slotkin, whereas a progressive nominee shifts the ideological battlefield, significantly lowering the barrier for Barrett to hold the seat.

WA-03

Bipartisan centrist incumbent Representative Marie Gluesenkamp Perez faces a robust, progressive challenge from the left in activist Brent Hennrich. On the Republican side, traditional conservative state Senate Minority Leader John Braun is clearing the field with heavy establishment and Trump backing. In this Lean Democratic district, a successful progressive primary challenge would radically upend the general election math, opening a massive door for Braun to flip the seat back to the GOP column.

MI-10

Centrists Tim Greimel and Christina Hines face progressive Eric Chung in a heavily funded open-seat primary to replace John James who is running for governor. The Republican field is an active, multi-candidate primary anchored by traditional suburban conservative favorite Michael Bouchard. In this Tilt/Lean Republican Detroit-area battleground, a moderate Democratic nominee keeps suburban independent margins entirely fluid, while a progressive nomination likely allows Bouchard to comfortably cruise to victory.

MN-02

The Democratic primary is an open clash between establishment-aligned moderate incumbent Angie Craig and a grassroots progressive activist running on a robust social safety net expansion. On the Republican side, a competitive primary continues to boil between a traditional conservative suburban businessman and a hard-right MAGA candidate. In this Lean Democratic suburban battleground, a progressive upset over Craig would spark massive national conservative super PAC spending, turning a generally safe seat into an immediate Toss-up.

FL-09

The Democratic primary features moderate incumbent Darren Soto facing a determined progressive challenger focusing heavily on housing affordability and bold climate legislation. The Republican primary remains a competitive multi-candidate fight among local conservatives aiming to exploit shifting state dynamics. In this Lean Democratic district, a progressive primary victory risks accelerating the state’s recent conservative shifts, narrowing the Democratic path to holding the seat in November.

KS-03

Centrist standard-bearer incumbent Sharice Davids faces a vocal primary challenger from the left demanding swift Medicare for All implementation and full student debt cancellation. The Republican primary is actively contested by two traditional pro-business fiscal conservatives running on agricultural stability. In this Lean Republican district, a progressive nominee faces an incredibly steep climb with suburban moderates, making a Davids primary win essential for keeping the general election competitive.

AK-ALL

In this Lean Republican statewide seat governed by Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV), the top two finishers are virtually guaranteed to be Mary Peltola and Nick Begich. The ideological makeup of the third and fourth place positioners could determine the outcome in a rank choice voting election.

The November Horizon

The battle for the majority relies on winning the center, the ongoing primary trends are actively paving the way for an even more polarized, unyielding Washington in 2027. Hard as it may be to imagine deeper gridlock, progressive surges in deep-blue bastions and MAGA dominance in deep-red terrain are structurally locking in a hyper-partisan legislative baseline.

Consider this a preview of coming attractions. When the primary season ends, we will provide a rigorous assessment of the likely outcome of the contest for the control of both the House and Senate and an evaluation of the likely ideological makeup of the new Congress. Beyond mere partisan counts, that deep dive will explore whether a deeply fractured legislative branch can manage fundamental governance, or if institutional gridlock will completely freeze the national agenda. Stay tuned.

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I am leaving for vacation to visit my new granddaughter. I will return to the subjects of inflation and affordability when I come back.

Tonight is election night—and, for me and many other supporters of Israel and opponents of antisemitism, a deeply discouraging one.

Comment One

I now expect the next Congress to include roughly 15 Democrats whose rhetoric or positions I regard as effectively pro-Hamas. This is my preliminary assessment rather than a final documented count. When I return, I will define precisely what I mean by “pro-Hamas,” identify the members who meet that definition, and add up the total.

Even many moderate Democrats are hedging their support for Israel through vague statements and mixed votes.

AIPAC’s decision to spend heavily to defeat Tom Malinowski in New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District now looks even more misguided. Malinowski’s defeat helped Analilia Mejia, a candidate who describes Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocide, win the nomination.

After AIPAC-backed primary loss, Tom Malinowski endorses rival who says Israel committed genocide

Comment Two

Moderate Democrats increasingly say that they support Israel but oppose Benjamin Netanyahu and favor a two-state solution. But October 7 demonstrated the enormous security obstacles standing in the way of such a solution.

A woman who wanted to confront me about Israel once asked, “What do you think of Bibi Netanyahu?” My response was: “What do you think of Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot?”

Both men oppose Netanyahu, but neither treats Israel’s security threats as secondary. Eisenkot is a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces who has broadly supported Israel’s military operations while criticizing Netanyahu’s strategy. Bennett has explicitly said that Israel can no longer permit terrorist organizations to construct extensive military infrastructure along its borders.

This grieving father and former general could challenge Netanyahu

Naftali Bennett says Israel-U.S. alliance is at risk

I do not believe that many of Israel’s American critics would be satisfied with either Bennett or Eisenkot. That suggests that their objection extends beyond Netanyahu himself.

Comment Three

As of tonight’s returns, Melat Kiros appears headed toward victory in Colorado’s 1st Congressional District Democratic primary.

Can we agree that refusing to identify the terrorist firebombing of peaceful Jewish demonstrators in Boulder, Colorado, as antisemitic represents, at a minimum, an indefensible failure of moral clarity?

The attacker targeted a predominantly Jewish gathering supporting the hostages taken on October 7, shouted “Free Palestine,” and attacked participants with incendiary devices and a makeshift flamethrower. One victim later died. Yet Kiros declined to characterize the attack as clearly antisemitic.

Democratic socialist candidate won’t call Boulder attack antisemitic

This is where a substantial part of the Colorado Democratic Party now stands.

Comment Four

Many deep-blue districts that have nominated candidates hostile toward Israel were decided in primaries with turnout far below that of a general election.

In a three-way general-election contest, a viable and well-funded independent candidate who is both anti-Trump and unequivocally opposed to antisemitism could be competitive.

It is too late to place such candidates on the ballot in 2026.

The 2028 effort starts tonight.

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Colorado’s June 30 Democratic primaries in the 1st and 8th Congressional Districts have implications far beyond Colorado. They illuminate two of the most important fault lines in the Democratic Party’s internal conflict between ideological progressives and pragmatic liberals: Israel and Medicare for All.

Israel is by far the more emotionally divisive issue. It raises fundamental questions about antisemitism, terrorism, national survival and whether unequivocally pro-Israel Democrats still have a secure place in the party.

Medicare for All presents a less visceral but equally revealing test: whether Democrats define commitment by adopting the most sweeping slogan or by developing reforms that can be financed, administered, enacted and sustained.

In CO-1, I strongly support Diana DeGette over Melat Kiros. I do not reach that conclusion reluctantly or simply because DeGette is the incumbent. Kiros’s statements about Israel reflect a moral and historical framework that I find unacceptable after October 7.

Her November 2023 letter about Israel formally says that there was no justification for the Hamas attack. But that sentence appears only after an extended argument portraying the massacre as the predictable expression of “violent resistance” to colonial oppression. The letter calls Israel colonial and apartheid, largely removes Hamas’s ideology and agency from the moral accounting, and invokes a passage asking what kind of hateful “gaze” an occupier should expect from the occupied: “We saw this gaze.”

I regard the letter as pro-Hamas in its moral framing and Hamas-apologetic at its core. It does not openly praise Hamas. Instead, it minimizes the organization’s choices and atrocities while devoting far more attention to explaining why Israelis supposedly brought the attack upon themselves. A formal disclaimer does not neutralize the argument surrounding it.

Kiros’s recent refusal to identify the Boulder firebombing as antisemitic reinforces my concern. The attacker deliberately targeted a predominantly Jewish gathering seeking the return of hostages held by Hamas. He shouted “Free Palestine,” later told investigators that he wanted to kill “Zionist people,” and killed one of his victims. Yet Kiros said she could not know what was in the perpetrator’s heart.

That is not moral nuance. It is ideological blindness.

Medicare for All creates a more complicated comparison because DeGette also says she supports moving toward it. I disagree with her. Replacing most American health financing with a single federal program would require enormous changes in taxation, employment compensation, provider payment, union benefits and existing private and public coverage. It would also concentrate decisions about medical benefits and contested treatments in the federal government, making them more vulnerable to changes in national political control.

But DeGette’s experience distinguishes her from Kiros. DeGette is the ranking Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee and could chair it if Democrats retake the House. She has worked on technically difficult health legislation, including bipartisan measures involving medical research, prescription drugs and Medicare transparency.

That record does not make her correct about Medicare for All. It does demonstrate that she understands Congress as an institution in which progress requires hearings, statutory language, budget estimates, implementation rules and coalitions that extend beyond one ideological faction.

I would prefer that DeGette move away from Medicare for All and consider a more practical alternative. My paper, “A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care,” proposes four mutually reinforcing reforms: catastrophic reinsurance to lower underlying premiums, portable employee-owned coverage, modernization of health savings arrangements and broader use of Medicaid where it provides more protective coverage at lower cost.

DeGette has not endorsed my proposal. But her knowledge and committee position make her far more capable of evaluating such ideas, improving them and incorporating workable elements into legislation. I would rather debate health policy with an experienced legislator who understands implementation than entrust it to a candidate whose politics place ideological certainty above complexity.

CO-8 offers the clearer moderate-progressive choice. Manny Rutinel is not Melat Kiros on Israel. He supports Israel’s existence, a two-state solution and continued military assistance. But Shannon Bird is more firmly situated within the mainstream pro-Israel Democratic coalition and has a much stronger record of practical governing.

Bird served on and ultimately led Colorado’s Joint Budget Committee. The Center for Effective Lawmaking ranked her Colorado’s most effective legislator for the 2023–24 term. She has negotiated budgets and worked on education, housing, health care and affordability. That is the often-uncelebrated work through which political promises become actual programs.

Rutinel’s health-care position has also changed. While seeking the Working Families Party endorsement in 2025, he supported single-payer health care. He now emphasizes Medicaid, Affordable Care Act assistance and a public option. Candidates may reconsider their positions, but voters are entitled to ask whether the newer position represents genuine rethinking or adjustment to the realities of running in a swing district.

Bird does not claim that a single enormous federal bill will resolve every weakness in American medicine. Her approach is more incremental, but incremental does not have to mean timid. Restoring coverage assistance, protecting Medicaid, lowering prescription prices, improving Medicare and developing a workable public option could materially improve people’s lives while creating a foundation for further reform.

The common thread between Israel and Medicare for All is judgment.

Can a candidate condemn Israeli policies without rationalizing terrorism or questioning Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish state? Can a candidate pursue universal access to health care without insisting that only one immensely disruptive financing structure is morally legitimate? Can a legislator recognize complexity, compromise where appropriate and still retain clear principles?

DeGette and Bird have demonstrated a greater capacity to make those distinctions and to get things done.

That matters nationally. Congress is losing Democratic Representative Jared Golden of Maine and Republican Representative Don Bacon of Nebraska, two members from competitive districts willing to resist party pressure and work across ideological lines. A Bird victory in the primary and general election could give the House a new leader in that tradition: liberal on many goals, moderate in temperament, supportive of Israel and capable of building coalitions.

I care deeply about these races because I want the Democratic Party to remain both principled and capable of governing. I support reproductive freedom, an effective social safety net and serious public action where markets fail. I also support Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish democracy and its right to defend itself against terrorism.

I want universal access to affordable health care, but I do not believe the answer is to place nearly the entire health-financing system under one federal program. Moral seriousness requires more than adopting the most sweeping position available. It requires understanding tradeoffs, respecting contrary evidence and designing policies that can survive legislation, implementation and future elections.

DeGette and Bird do not agree with me on everything. But they are much more likely to translate Democratic values into durable results. CO-1 will test whether Democrats reject a politics that rationalizes Hamas violence and struggles to recognize antisemitism at home. CO-8 will test whether voters elevate a proven bridge-builder who could help replace the practical leadership Congress is losing.

Together, these races will say a great deal about whether the Democratic Party intends to govern—or merely to signal.

Appendix A: Melat Kiros, Israel and the Historical Record

Kiros’s November 7, 2023, letter was written in response to law firms that had condemned antisemitism, Islamophobia and threats on university campuses. She objected especially to their characterization of calls for Israel’s elimination as antisemitic.

The letter does contain a sentence saying there was no justification for October 7. But the organization of the argument matters. Before reaching that disclaimer, Kiros describes Zionism as colonialism, calls Israel an apartheid state and says that people whose land is taken and whose existence is threatened inevitably “resist with violence in kind.” She then describes October 7 as an “obvious symptom” of violent resistance to colonialism and invokes the “gaze” passage.

That is why I view the letter as Hamas-apologetic despite its formal condemnation. Its moral structure shifts Hamas from perpetrator to symptom. Hamas’s antisemitic ideology, deliberate targeting of civilians, hostage-taking and independent political agency receive little attention. Israel and Zionism are treated as the originating cause from which nearly all subsequent violence follows.

The historical account is also one-directional. Kiros refers to violence inflicted by the Israeli government and settlers “since 1917,” although Israel did not exist until 1948. Violence during the British Mandate was not simply committed by Zionists against passive Palestinians. Jews were killed in the 1920 Jerusalem disturbances and the 1921 Jaffa riots. In 1929, Arab mobs murdered 67 Jews in Hebron, destroyed an ancient Jewish community and attacked Jews in Safed. Across the 1929 violence, 133 Jews were killed.

Jewish underground organizations later committed terrorism and atrocities, and Palestinians suffered mass displacement and loss during the 1948 war. But the broader context also matters. Palestinian Arab leaders and the surrounding Arab states rejected the United Nations partition plan, and after Israel declared independence, armies from five Arab countries invaded with the objective of defeating the newly established Jewish state.

The Palestinian exodus had multiple causes. Some Palestinians were expelled by Jewish or Israeli forces; others fled combat, fear, atrocities or the collapse of local leadership; and in some places Arab authorities ordered or encouraged evacuation. It is therefore too simple either to attribute the entire refugee crisis to Israeli expulsion or to claim that Arab armies generally told Palestinians to leave.

Both histories must be confronted. But a narrative that excludes the massacre of Jews before Israel’s creation—and omits the Arab rejection of partition and invasion of the new state—cannot credibly explain the conflict as an uninterrupted chain of Palestinian resistance to Israeli violence.

The apartheid accusation also requires greater precision than Kiros provides. Serious concerns exist about Israeli rule, settlements and unequal legal systems in the West Bank. Those issues should not be minimized. But Israel’s Arab citizens vote in national elections, serve in the Knesset and judiciary, and maintain extensive religious institutions. Public information appears in Arabic as well as Hebrew and English. Hundreds of mosques operate in Israel, and state-recognized Sharia courts exercise binding jurisdiction over important Muslim personal-status matters—authority that Sharia councils in the United Kingdom do not possess.

Those realities do not prove that discrimination is absent. They do demonstrate why treating Israel proper as an exact equivalent of apartheid South Africa is misleading and why the circumstances of Arab Israeli citizens must be distinguished from those of Palestinians living under occupation.

The colonial description is incomplete for another reason. A large portion of Israel’s Jewish population descends from communities in the Middle East and North Africa, many of whose members arrived as refugees or were displaced from Arab and Muslim-majority countries. Gadi Eisenkot, currently a serious contender to replace Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister, is the son of Moroccan Jewish immigrants. His emergence does not resolve the Palestinian question, but it illustrates why Israel cannot accurately be reduced to a white European colony imposed on the Middle East.

Finally, there is the Boulder attack. Kiros initially declined to identify it as antisemitic even after the attacker targeted a predominantly Jewish hostage-support gathering, shouted a pro-Palestinian slogan and told investigators that he wanted to kill Zionists. Even progressive Democratic leaders who agreed with Kiros on many other issues criticized her response.

People have a legal right to express even harsh, offensive and anti-Zionist views. But free speech is not immunity from moral evaluation. Nor does the First Amendment compel a private law firm to retain an employee whose public statements it concludes are incompatible with the judgment, values or client responsibilities expected of its attorneys.

Sidley Austin had the right to fire Kiros. Voters have the same right—and obligation—to judge what her letter reveals about her fitness for Congress.

Appendix B: Why Medicare for All Is the Wrong Test of Democratic Commitment

The objective of universal or near-universal health coverage should not be confused with support for one specific financing structure.

A Medicare for All system would move most health spending onto the federal budget and require correspondingly large new revenues. Households might pay less in premiums and out-of-pocket costs, but those savings would be accompanied by major changes in taxes and compensation. Employers would no longer sponsor insurance in its current form, requiring difficult decisions about whether existing employer contributions would be converted into wages, taxes or savings.

Provider payment creates another unavoidable tradeoff. Private insurers frequently pay hospitals and physicians substantially more than Medicare. Paying Medicare-like rates could reduce national health spending, but abrupt reductions would impose major pressure on hospitals and medical practices. Paying substantially higher rates would reduce disruption but greatly increase the federal cost of the program.

A single federal payer would also concentrate authority over benefits, reimbursement and medical necessity. That could produce consistency and administrative savings, but it would magnify the consequences of elections. A future administration hostile to reproductive care, gender-related treatment or other contested services would exercise enormous influence over nearly everyone’s coverage.

The practical alternative is not complacency. The existing system leaves too many people uninsured or exposed to unaffordable premiums, deductibles and medical debt.

My proposal would use catastrophic reinsurance to reduce underlying insurance costs rather than relying entirely on back-end subsidies. It would make employer contributions portable so that coverage follows the worker rather than the job. It would reform health savings arrangements to help moderate-income households manage deductibles, and it would use Medicaid more broadly where it is less expensive and more protective than heavily subsidized private coverage.

These reforms could be enacted separately, tested and adjusted. They preserve choice while directly addressing identifiable market failures.

The relevant distinction is therefore not between politicians who care about universal coverage and those who do not. It is between those who treat Medicare for All as a test of ideological virtue and those willing to do the difficult work of designing a health system that is affordable, administratively workable and politically durable.

On that test, DeGette’s legislative experience and Bird’s record of practical governance make them better choices.

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Additional Reading

Letter by Kiros

https://medium.com/@melatakiros/dear-us-law-firms-77ec63e838af

Universal Health Care Proposal by Bernstein

I. The 2026 Primaries and the Politically Homeless Middle

At this writing, the results of the June 23 congressional primaries are not yet known. But the contests have already revealed something important about the direction of New York’s Democratic Party. These are not traditional battles between liberals and conservatives. Nearly all the leading candidates are liberal on abortion, labor rights, LGBTQ protections, immigration, taxation and the social safety net. In NY-7, even candidates opposing Mamdani-backed Claire Valdez hold strongly progressive positions. In NY-10 and NY-13, the most consequential dividing line is Israel and whether candidates will join Mamdani’s effort to move the congressional delegation toward the democratic-socialist left.

Mamdani has endorsed Brad Lander against Representative Dan Goldman, Valdez for the open NY-7 seat and Darializa Avila Chevalier against Representative Adriano Espaillat. He described the American Israel Public Affairs Committee as one of the “monsters” preventing the birth of a new political world and subsequently defended that language. He did not expressly call every AIPAC donor a monster. But political organizations are made up of people, and much of AIPAC’s support comes from Jewish Americans who believe that Israel’s survival and a strong American-Israeli relationship are legitimate political objectives. Dehumanizing an organization inevitably reaches the citizens who support it.

I am what might be called a card-carrying AIPAC supporter. I also favor a pragmatic path toward improved universal health coverage, protection of Medicaid, more portable insurance and targeted assistance that helps borrowers eliminate student debt earlier in life. Yet under the political vocabulary Mamdani has introduced, support for those liberal economic objectives does not matter. Because I support AIPAC and Israel, his rhetoric places people like me among the “monsters.”

The atmosphere surrounding Goldman’s campaign illustrates the danger. Poetica Coffee served Goldman and his young daughter without initially recognizing him. The shop later refunded his purchase, announced that it did not serve “genocide enablers,” suggested that his money probably came from AIPAC and told him never to return. Mamdani eventually said that the online post went beyond ordinary political disagreement, but he stopped short of an unambiguous condemnation. A mayor who wishes to govern the entire city should have been able to say plainly that political disagreements do not justify publicly humiliating and excluding a Jewish congressman from a neighborhood business.

A relatively small number of voters in several low-turnout, safely Democratic primaries may therefore determine not only who represents New York City, but what the Democratic Party appears to stand for nationally. Candidates selected in these districts will become prominent congressional voices, while Republicans across the country will use their statements to define Democrats running in far more moderate states and districts. The consequences will extend well beyond New York.

My differences with the progressive wing also extend far beyond Israel. My paper A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care supports broader and more continuous coverage while rejecting both Republican retrenchment and the disruptive replacement of nearly all existing insurance with Medicare for All. My Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt rejects both indiscriminate debt cancellation and a repayment structure that leaves borrowers indebted into middle age or retirement. The Four Economic Questions argues that government must acknowledge scarce resources, fiscal trade-offs and the consequences of every spending decision.

These are governing questions. Too much of the progressive movement instead offers slogans, moral accusations and performative politics without workable transition plans, durable financing or serious consideration of unintended consequences. I have reluctantly concluded that the Democratic Party, as presently constituted and increasingly influenced by this movement, is not capable of governing responsibly. It is more interested in demonstrating ideological purity than in designing policies that can be enacted, financed and sustained.

II. Why It Is Too Late for 2026

New York does not categorically prohibit a defeated primary candidate from continuing on another ballot line. The candidate must ordinarily have secured that line before the primary. Independent nominating petitions for the 2026 general election had to be filed between May 19 and May 26, almost a month before the June 23 primary.

A defeated Democrat also has no general right to seize an existing minor-party nomination after the votes are counted. A lawful substitution requires a recognized vacancy and compliance with additional election-law procedures. A write-in campaign remains technically possible, but it is not a realistic substitute for appearing on the printed ballot.

Goldman and other non-Mamdani candidates may still win. The structural lesson remains unchanged. A centrist who loses the Democratic primary without securing another line beforehand has no practical route back onto the November ballot.

For 2026, the opportunity has passed.

III. New York’s Third-Party Precedent

New York has a long history of consequential minor-party candidacies. The clearest precedent is James L. Buckley’s 1970 Senate victory. Running on the Conservative Party line, Buckley won a three-way contest with approximately 39 percent of the vote, defeating Democratic nominee Richard Ottinger and Republican incumbent Charles Goodell.

Buckley was not a centrist, but his victory demonstrated the relevant electoral principle. When the two major-party nominees leave a substantial portion of the electorate politically homeless, a well-organized third candidate can win New York with a plurality.

IV. The 2028 Centrist Imperative

Centrists must begin building a statewide political organization now. It will need a recognizable identity, legal counsel, financing, professional petition operations, congressional-district organizations and a credible process for selecting candidates. Most important, its candidates must commit to the independent line from the outset rather than treating it as insurance after losing a Democratic primary.

The first objective should be to return safely Democratic House seats to pragmatic representation by appealing to moderate Democrats, pro-Israel liberals, independents and center-right voters who cannot support either democratic socialists or many Republican nominees.

The second objective should be the 2028 Senate election. If Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez seeks and wins the Democratic nomination, a credible centrist could compete against her and the Republican nominee in a three-way race. The centrist would not need 50 percent. A coalition of politically homeless Democrats, independents and moderate Republicans could win a plurality.

Mamdani’s movement understands that political power belongs to those who organize before the election. In 2026, centrists waited to learn whether they had lost the Democratic primaries before considering alternatives. In 2028, they must stop asking the Democratic Party to take them back and place their own candidates on the ballot from day one.

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By upgrading to a paid subscription, you get a speech which succinctly explains The Third-Party Economic Platform.

The speech today:

1. Provides a complete, multi-sector policy platform spanning healthcare, student debt, education, and retirement.

2. Establishes a unique rhetorical lane that rejects both Republican gridlock and progressive overreach.

3. Introduces an innovative, market-driven K-12 “Course Choice” framework to disrupt institutional monopolies.

4. Delivers a detailed 7-pillar tax reconciliation model designed to shield the squeezed middle class from systemic inflation.

5. Connects immediate household balance-sheet relief to the long-term structural survival of Social Security.

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Thank you all for being here.

We are standing at a crossroads—not just in this district, but across our entire nation.

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Matt Dunlap’s victory in the Democratic primary for Maine’s 2nd Congressional District offers an unusually clear illustration of both the advantages and the peculiarities of ranked-choice voting.

Dunlap appeared to be running third in early election-night returns. But those returns were incomplete. Once all first-choice votes were counted, the official first round was:

• Joe Baldacci: 24,966

• Matt Dunlap: 22,933

• Jordan Wood: 22,712

• Paige Loud: 8,194

Baldacci finished first, but with less than one-third of the vote. Because no candidate received a majority, the ranked-choice process began.

Loud was eliminated first. After her ballots were transferred to each voter’s next available choice, the remaining candidates stood at:

• Baldacci: 25,923

• Dunlap: 25,681

• Wood: 25,377

Only 546 votes separated first place from third.

More importantly, Dunlap led Wood by just 304 votes.

Wood was therefore eliminated. His supporters strongly preferred Dunlap to Baldacci: 10,243 of Wood’s ballots transferred to Dunlap, while 6,632 transferred to Baldacci. Another 8,502 Wood ballots did not contain a continuing preference for either finalist.

The result was:

• Matt Dunlap: 35,924

• Joe Baldacci: 32,555

Dunlap won with approximately 52.5 percent of the votes remaining in the final round.

That explains how Dunlap won. But it does not fully capture how close the race came to following an entirely different path.

The Decisive 304-Vote Margin

Suppose that 153 voters counted for Dunlap at the decisive stage had instead supported Wood.

Each switched vote would subtract one from Dunlap and add one to Wood, changing the difference between them by two votes. A shift of 153 voters would therefore have erased Dunlap’s 304-vote advantage and placed Wood narrowly ahead.

The approximate totals would then have been:

• Baldacci: 25,923

• Wood: 25,530

• Dunlap: 25,528

Dunlap—not Wood—would have been eliminated.

The later preferences of Dunlap’s supporters would then have determined whether Baldacci or Wood won the nomination.

Wood would have entered that hypothetical final round only 393 votes behind Baldacci. Among Dunlap ballots that ranked remaining candidate, Wood would have needed to receive only 394 more transfers than Baldacci to move ahead.

That would not have required an overwhelming preference for Wood. A relatively even division, tilted modestly toward Wood, could have made him the nominee.

Would Wood Have Won?

There are reasons to believe that Wood would have had a strong chance.

Wood, Dunlap and Loud all ran to Baldacci’s left and supported Medicare for All. They also criticized the Democratic establishment’s support for Baldacci. When Wood was eliminated, his supporters preferred Dunlap to Baldacci by a substantial margin.

It is therefore plausible that Dunlap’s voters would have reciprocated by preferring Wood to Baldacci.

But the available totals do not prove that conclusion.

Voters do not rank candidates solely along a left-to-right ideological scale. Biography, geography, age, political experience, personality and perceptions of electability can all affect second choices.

Dunlap and Baldacci were both familiar Maine officeholders with strong roots in the Bangor–Old Town area. Dunlap had served as secretary of state, state auditor and a state legislator. Baldacci was a lawyer, former Bangor city councilor and state senator.

Wood, by contrast, was a younger former congressional staffer from Auburn who had worked as chief of staff to California Representative Katie Porter. Some Dunlap voters may have been ideologically closer to Wood but culturally or institutionally more comfortable with Baldacci.

The public round totals show how Wood’s voters divided between Dunlap and Baldacci. They do not show how Dunlap’s voters would have divided between Wood and Baldacci.

The appropriate conclusion is therefore not that Wood certainly would have won. It is that Wood might well have won, and that an extraordinarily small change in the vote would have tested a completely different final matchup.

What This Says About Ranked-Choice Voting

Ranked-choice voting is often described as a system that identifies the candidate with the broadest support.

In one important sense, it accomplished that goal. When Dunlap and Baldacci became the finalists, Dunlap received most of the ballots that continued into the final round.

But ranked-choice voting does not compare every candidate directly against every other candidate.

It follows a sequence. The lowest candidate is eliminated in each round, and that elimination determines which comparison occurs next.

The Maine count eventually compared Dunlap with Baldacci. It never produced a Wood–Baldacci final or a Wood–Dunlap final.

Wood’s 304-vote deficit prevented those comparisons from taking place.

The outcome was therefore path dependent. A very small change in the elimination order could have created a different final pairing and possibly a different winner.

That is not necessarily an argument against ranked-choice voting. Every electoral system has rules that become decisive in close contests.

Under ordinary plurality voting, Baldacci would have won despite receiving less than one-third of the first-choice vote. Ranked-choice voting instead produced a nominee supported by most of the active final-round ballots.

But the phrase “majority winner” requires some qualification. It does not always identify the only candidate who could have assembled a majority. It identifies the candidate who assembled a majority after a particular sequence of eliminations.

Matt Dunlap won under Maine’s established rules. Yet a shift of fewer than two-tenths of 1 percent of the ballots could have eliminated him—and might have made Jordan Wood the Democratic nominee.

November: A Two-Candidate Race—For Now

Dunlap will now face former Republican Governor Paul LePage in the general election.

The contrast is unusually sharp.

Dunlap has identified Medicare for All as one of the policies he intends to advance. LePage, during his years as governor, repeatedly opposed Medicaid expansion and resisted implementing it even after Maine voters approved expansion in a statewide referendum.

That leaves substantial political space between the two candidates.

It is disappointing that voters currently have no centrist or pragmatic option to succeed Jared Golden, whose political appeal rested in part on his willingness to depart from national party orthodoxy. The district is now being offered a much sharper ideological choice at a time when many voters may prefer continuity, moderation and practical problem-solving.

A pragmatic independent could reject both the Republican impulse to reduce public health care assistance and the Democratic proposal to replace most existing insurance with Medicare for All. Such a candidate could support improved universal coverage while preserving private insurance, state exchanges, employer contributions and individual choice.

That middle-ground position is developed in my recent speech, Beyond Medicaid Cuts and Medicare for All. It is written for an independent or third-party congressional candidate running against a Republican who favors reducing health care assistance and a Democrat who supports Medicare for All.

Maine’s 2nd District would appear to offer a particularly interesting setting for such a candidacy.

The relevant standard is not whether an organized minor party has nominated someone. Organized third parties rarely win congressional elections. The more important question is whether a credible individual—with a substantive career, a strong local reputation and the personal standing to compete with the major-party nominees—could finish among the top two.

Under Maine’s ranked-choice system, such a candidate would not necessarily be a spoiler.

Suppose a credible independent finished second in first-choice votes. The third-place major-party candidate would be eliminated, and that candidate’s later preferences could propel the independent to victory.

The Democratic primary demonstrated the basic mechanism. Dunlap did not begin in first place. He won because he survived the elimination round and then received enough support from Wood’s voters to pass Baldacci.

A third candidate in November could follow a similar path—but only by reaching second place. A candidate finishing third would be eliminated and could affect the result only through the later preferences of that candidate’s supporters.

At present, however, no third candidate has qualified for the printed ballot in Maine’s 2nd Congressional District. The official nonparty candidate list contains no congressional candidate, and neither the Green Independent Party nor the Libertarian Party nominated one.

A declared write-in candidate can still enter by August 25. Such a candidacy would trigger ranked-choice voting in the federal race, but the candidate would face the enormous disadvantage of having no name printed on the ballot. Building the recognition and organization needed to finish second as a write-in would be exceptionally difficult.

Unless such a candidate emerges, November will be a direct Dunlap–LePage contest, and no ranked-choice redistribution will be required.

LePage enters the general election with significant advantages. He carried the 2nd District during his unsuccessful statewide campaign for governor in 2022, and Donald Trump carried the district by approximately nine points in 2024. National Republicans regard the open seat as one of their strongest opportunities to gain a Democratic-held district.

Dunlap must unite a Democratic electorate that was deeply divided in the primary while persuading independent voters that his progressive positions are compatible with the needs of a politically mixed and largely rural district. His success in attracting Wood’s later-choice voters demonstrates an ability to assemble a coalition within the Democratic primary. In a two-person general election, however, there may be no later rounds and no transferred votes to rescue either candidate.

The primary showed how a few hundred votes can determine not only who survives a ranked-choice count, but which political coalition is given the opportunity to form a majority. The general election will determine whether Dunlap can build a broader coalition against one of Maine’s best-known—and most polarizing—political figures.

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The following speech is written for a third-party candidate running for Congress who proposes a pragmatic path toward improved universal health coverage in the United States. It contrasts that approach with a Republican agenda centered on reducing federal health care assistance and a Democratic opponent who supports replacing the existing system with Medicare for All.

The speech translates the policy framework developed in my new paper, A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care, into the language of a congressional campaign. The paper explains the proposal in greater technical detail, including its four mutually reinforcing reforms: catastrophic reinsurance, portable employer contributions, modernized Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Accounts, and a more efficient role for Medicaid.

The speech does five things:

1. Rejects the false choice between government withdrawal and complete government control. It argues that Americans should not have to choose between cutting Medicaid and ACA assistance or replacing nearly all existing coverage with a single federal program.

2. Presents a practical path toward universal coverage. The proposal combines catastrophic reinsurance, portable employer contributions, improved premium tax credits, FSA and HSA reform, and expanded Medicaid and CHIP eligibility.

3. Explains how the reforms work together. Rather than treating each proposal as an isolated initiative, the speech shows how lower premiums, portable coverage, smoother subsidies, and public insurance for lower-income households reinforce one another.

4. Connects health insurance to household financial security. Continuous and affordable coverage helps families avoid medical debt, preserve emergency savings, change jobs, start businesses, and save for retirement.

5. Offers a different philosophy of governing. The candidate supports the complete plan but invites Congress to examine, improve, and enact individual provisions rather than insisting that every reform be accepted at once.

The full speech appears below.

Good evening and thank you for being here.

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There is no left lane in Montana Politics.

• The Proxy Trap: Independent campaigns fail if seen as path-markers for a national Democratic majority that inherently opposes Montana’s core economic interests.

• The Bankhead Paradox: The Democratic nominee’s refusal to withdraw shields Seth Bodnar from being branded a partisan proxy, enabling a true center-right campaign.

• The Cannibalized Primary: A Pyrrhic victory by the progressive activist in Montana’s first district Democrat party with 37 percent of the vote will lead to a big defeat in the general election.

Montana is, by all current metrics, a bright red state heading toward an inevitable conservative sweep. Yet national political pundits consistently misread why. In the standard, hyper-polarized vocabulary of Washington, Montana is filed away as a monolithic echo chamber, populated by reflexive partisans.

This assessment is lazy; the looming red wall is not a sign that Montana voters are inherently unreachable, but rather that they are entirely unreachable by the modern, national Democratic Party. Forced into a rigid binary choice, Montanans vote Republican because the alternative directly threatens their way of life—leaving the GOP as the only viable choice that fits the state’s economic baseline.

Montana voters are, above all, acutely aware of their own economic architecture. They understand that their standard of living relies entirely on natural resource extraction, a robust agricultural engine, and a fiercely guarded ethos of personal liberty. When national media operations analyze Montana federal races, they often assume a traditional, linear political spectrum consisting of a “left lane” and a “right lane.” But in Montana, the political geometry is completely different: there is no left lane wide enough to secure a statewide majority. Instead, the true, wide-open vacuum in the state’s politics exists entirely within a sensible, right-center lane. When candidates fail to recognize this, or worse, try to masquerade as independent centrists while acting as proxies for national Democratic majorities, Montana voters see right through it.

The State Profile: Economic Survival vs. National Dogma

To understand why the national Democratic brand faces an existential wall in Big Sky Country, one must look at the specific, material policy pressure points. The contemporary national Democratic platform does not merely clash with Montana’s cultural values; it directly threatens its core industries. Consider the sweeping environmental mandates emerging from federal agencies and progressive urban hubs. The push to fast-track electric vehicle (EV) mandates and restrict gasoline-powered cars—championed by states like California and mirrored in national legislative packages—is viewed east of Lake County with deep suspicion, if not outright hostility. In a geographically massive state where ranchers and utility workers regularly drive a hundred miles through whiteout sub-zero conditions, an EV mandate is not a progressive luxury; it is a practical impossibility.

The friction amplifies across the state’s energy sector. Recent federal restrictions on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export approvals and the ongoing institutional squeeze on fossil fuel lending options—often accelerated by urban ESG directives—act as an artificial brake on high-wage, blue-collar employment in central and eastern Montana. Similarly, heavy-handed agricultural regulations strike at the heart of family-owned ranches already squeezed by volatile global markets. When forced to choose between standard populist-conservative rhetoric and a national Democratic agenda that structurally destabilizes their energy grids and agricultural supply chains, Montana’s independent voters will choose the GOP every time, regardless of their personal ambivalence toward national partisan figureheads.

The friction amplifies across the state’s cultural landscape, revealing a distinct brand of Big Sky libertarianism that upends standard partisan assumptions. On sensitive social questions like reproductive rights, Montana voters have proven to be remarkably independent, even outpacing much of the nation by explicitly enshrining abortion access in their state constitution. Consequently, national Democratic messaging on abortion doesn’t necessarily alienate the electorate; rather, it is completely neutralized by a hierarchy of needs where economic survival trumps everything. A voter may favor reproductive freedom, but when forced into a binary choice, that preference is entirely eclipsed by a national Democratic economic agenda—on energy, agriculture, and regulation—that rural Montanans view as an existential threat to their livelihoods.

The U.S. Senate Main Event: The Defiant Democrat and the Proxy Illusion

This economic reality provides the essential backdrop for the marquee federal showdown: the U.S. Senate race. Republican Kurt Alme has anchored his base firmly within the populist GOP, benefiting from institutional consolidation following the intra-party shakeups orchestrated by national figures. Across the aisle, the traditional Democratic base nominated Alani Bankhead. But the true disruptive force in the race is Independent Seth Bodnar, the former University of Montana President and decorated veteran whose pristine resume theoretically poised him to capture the state’s massive block of unaligned voters.

For months, conventional wisdom dictated that Bodnar’s path to victory required consolidating the anti-GOP vote, leading to massive backroom pressure from national operatives urging the Democrat, Bankhead, to drop out and avoid splitting the “left lane.” However, as a recent New York Times report vividly detailed, Bankhead dug her heels in, fiercely refusing to step aside and publicly declaring that Bodnar was “absolutely the last person on the face of this earth” she would clear the field for.

While partisan strategists viewed Bankhead’s defiance as a fatal blow to the centrist coalition, a colder calculation reveals it is the best gift Bodnar could have received. If Bankhead had capitulated and withdrawn, Bodnar would have instantly inherited the “Democrat proxy” mantle. Kurt Alme’s campaign would have easily weaponized that development, convincing right-center voters that Bodnar was simply a Trojan horse designed to deliver a Senate majority to leadership in Washington.

With Bankhead remaining on the ballot to absorb the institutional, deep-blue progressive votes in Missoula and Bozeman, Bodnar is liberated. He no longer must pander to progressive policy positions that are toxic statewide. Instead, he can mount a true two-front war: criticizing the national Democratic apparatus for economic and environmental overreach, while simultaneously hammering Alme as a rubber stamp for national partisan excesses. Bankhead’s presence proves Bodnar’s independence, allowing him to credibly construct a distinct, center-right perspective tailored directly to the state’s unique character.

This structural independence isn’t just a clever electoral strategy; it addresses a critical legislative crisis in Washington. Under the current gridlock, massive federal bills are routinely voted up or down on a strict party-line basis, driven entirely by partisan whims rather than rigorous fiscal or economic analytics. A truly independent center-right representative from Montana answers to no national party boss, positioning them uniquely to intercept these hyper-partisan packages, demand structural data-driven modifications, and strip away coastal policy riders that sabotage rural economies.

The House Districts: Polarized Flanks and Pyrrhic Victories

The architectural failure to deliberately claim the right-center lane is even more pronounced in Montana’s two congressional districts. In the massive, rural strongholds of the 2nd District, the primary landscape was defined by an uncontested clear-out. Incumbent Republican Troy Downing faced zero intra-party opposition, smoothly advancing to a safe general election cruise against a deeply fractured and under-funded Democratic ticket.

The real tactical lessons emerge farther west in the highly competitive 1st District.

In House District 1, voters are treated to a stark, highly polarized choice that perfectly underscores the vacuum in the middle. The Republicans nominated Aaron Flint, an aggressive, populist conservative talk radio host who built his victory by explicitly leaning into national culture-war narratives and securing the endorsement of Donald Trump. Rather than countering with a pragmatic, rural populist who could pick off moderate independents, the Democrats committed a major tactical error by elevating Sam Forstag.

The mechanics of Forstag’s primary win lay bare a profound structural breakdown. He won a crowded primary with just 37.3% of the vote—not because he represented a party-wide mandate, but because most of the party cannibalized itself. The center-left electorate split its votes between rural populist Ryan Busse (33.1%) and agrarian moderate Matt Rains. While the moderate majority was fragmented, Forstag’s highly disciplined progressive base in university hubs like Missoula and Bozeman turned out with 100% efficiency to secure a narrow plurality.

It is the definition of a Pyrrhic victory. Forstag won the primary battle but structurally doomed the general election ticket. He enters November commanding less than forty percent support from his own primary base, burdened by endorsements from national progressive icons like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders that are completely toxic to general election swing voters. Furthermore, Forstag’s alignment with the national progressive wing exposes a severe flank on foreign policy. His core activist base’s highly critical stance on Israel and traditional defense allocations stands in sharp, disqualifying contrast to Western Montana’s patriotic, pro-defense veteran populace. With Flint pulling the GOP to the populist right and Forstag pushing the Democrats to the urban left, District 1 is screaming for a viable, center-right independent candidate. Yet, no such option exists on the House ballot, leaving moderate voters to choose between two unpalatable extremes.

The political layout of Montana is not monolithic but is more the result of an unattractive binary choice. Until a permanent, organized center-right party emerges to bridge this gap, Montana’s pragmatic independent majority will continue voting red as a matter of economic survival, waiting for a vehicle that can translate their unique regional needs into real, analytical leverage in Washington.

Author’s Note: The political friction in Montana perfectly illustrates a national crisis: a broken binary system where local economic survival is routinely sacrificed to party-line whims. Breaking this gridlock requires a fundamentally different approach to governance—one built on objective data and fiscal realism rather than partisan dogmas. For a comprehensive look at how these evidence-based policies can design a pragmatic path forward for competitive districts, read my independent vision here: 2026 Campaign Resources Briefing.

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Ten Policy Briefs

Healthcare & Education Finance

• A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Health Care: Several tax provisions which could lead to universal health coverage

• Should Democrats Adopt Medicare for All in 2028? A critical evaluation of long-term healthcare platforms and their electoral viability.

• A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt: A fiscally responsible approach to student debt relief without massive loan discharges.

Fiscal Policy & Tax Reform

• A Pro-Growth, Progressive Alternative to No Tax on Tips” An analysis of the distortionary impacts of the 2025 no tax on tips provisions on ordinary wage income and retirement savings incentives.

• Tax Reconciliation and Capital Gains Tax Reform A proposal for a broader base instead of higher rates.

• Policy by Posture: Behavioral Blind Spots in California’s One-Time Billionaire Wealth Tax Six core problems with wealth tax proposals.

• Tax Reconciliation and Retirement Policy A proposal to use the tax code to stimulate private retirement savings for all households.

Energy & Technology Infrastructure

• Trump and Biden on Wind and LNG Neither Trump nor Biden offer a pro-growth energy policy.

• Where Should America Build AI”. Data Centers, Waters Scarcity and the Economics of Resource Allocation The lack of awareness of externalities by industry is creating substantial support for moratoria proposals.

• A Tale of Three Energy Sectors Can wind, solar, and nuclear coexist or is it winner take all?

Two Political Memos

• The Real Marquee Race in Maine Parties are moving to the fringe. Can an independent win in the center?

• Mapping the Colorado 2026 Congressional Landscape A district-by-district evaluation of Houses in a true swing state with very different urban and rural constituencies.

David P. Bernstein, PhD, is an economic consultant and author specializing in quantitative market modeling, retirement finance, and fiscal policy analysis.

For inquiries regarding policy drafting, campaign brief development, or strategic advisory roles for independent and centrist congressional campaigns, please connect via Linkedin. Also, consider supporting his work by subscribing to his blog www.economicmemos.com

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National political pundits are obsessively focused on the Planter-Collins contest for the U.S. Senate but the most consequential race in Maine involves the race to replace Jared Golden in ME-2.

Representative Jared Golden, widely recognized as one of the most effective, independent, cross-aisle lawmakers in the House is retiring. The reason for his retirement is a sobering reflection on the state of U.S. politics.

A Marine veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, Golden bluntly noted that escalating political violence and frequent threats against him and his family forced him to re-evaluate the heavy personal cost of public service, stating he had come to “dread the prospect of winning” in an unproductive and hyper-partisan environment.

https://www.bangordailynews.com/2025/11/05/opinion/opinion-contributor/jared-golden-why-i-wont-seek-reelection-column/#:~:text=I%20have%20long%20supported%20term,limits%20in%20the%20Maine%20Legislature.

ME-2 is a massive, predominantly rural swing district that structurally leans Republican.

• The Partisan Lean: The district has a Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) of R+4. Donald Trump carried the district by roughly 9.5 percentage points in 2024.

• The Golden Exception: Despite its strong conservative tilt, Golden repeatedly defied gravity here, holding the seat for four terms and winning his last re-election by less than 1%.

• The Republican Heavyweight: With Golden out, the Republican path runs through former Governor Paul LePage. As an unapologetic pioneer of the MAGA movement, LePage easily secured the 2026 Republican nomination.

• The LePage History: LePage has a flawless track record in ME-2. In his successful 2010 and 2014 gubernatorial runs, he carried the district handily. Even in 2022, when he lost the statewide gubernatorial race to Janet Mills by 13 points, LePage still won the 2nd District by roughly two percentage points. He starts with an undeniable baseline of strength here.

· An Undecided Race for Democrats: The June 9 primary results triggered an official RCV tabulation for next week, revealing a deeply divided Democratic base. Mainstream center-left State Senator Joe Baldacci holds a narrow initial lead at 31.7%, leaning on deep family name recognition in the district. Right on his heels are two candidates running firmly to his left: progressive former congressional staffer Jordan Wood at 29.2%, and traditional rural institutionalist Matt Dunlap at 28.9%. Progressive insurgent Paige Loud sits in fourth place with 10.3% of the vote.

How the Process Works:

Maine utilizes a Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) system for federal elections, which completely alters traditional campaign math.

• Voters rank candidates in order of preference (1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc.).

• If a candidate secures more than 50% of the first-choice votes in the initial count, they win outright.

• If no one crosses the 50% threshold, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated.

• The ballots cast for that eliminated candidate are redistributed to the second chance of the voters.

• This cycle of elimination and reallocation repeats until a single candidate surpasses the 50% mark.

Maine voting machines are entirely offline so it will take a week to secure the votes and make the RCV tabulations. In France, they run an actual second election in two weeks.

Likely Rank Choice Voting Outcome for Democrats:

Because Dunlap, Wood, and Loud ran as a unified block to Baldacci’s left, the progressive wing commands most of the total primary turnout.

With Paige Loud firmly in fourth place, her 10.3% of the vote will be redistributed first. Because her platform leans heavily progressive, most of her secondary support is highly likely to flow directly to Jordan Wood.

This redistribution should could push Wood past Dunlap into the top two. From there, Dunlap’s working-class and rural backers will see their second choices counted. Those votes will likely split between Baldacci’s establishment credentials and Wood’s progressive momentum. The choice between Wood and Baldacci could be close. Dunlap is probably closer to Wood ideologically, but Wood is sort of a newcomer and Dunlap voters may have a closer affinity to Baldacci than Wood.

The General Election Outlook: Confronting LePage

No matter which Democrat survives the RCV process next week, they face an uphill battle against Paul LePage. Nonpartisan forecasters like Cook Political Report have already moved this seat to “Likely Republican” following Golden’s exit. Most notably, LePage won ME2 in all three of his gubernatorial contests, even the one he lost.

Jared Golden won repeatedly in ME2 because he routinely broke with his own party on high-profile cultural and economic issues, earning the trust of independent and conservative ticket-splitters. A more traditional establishment figure like Baldacci or a firm progressive like Wood will struggle to replicate that cross-over appeal in a district Trump won by nearly double digits. LePage enters the general election as the distinct favorite to flip this seat red.

The empty center lane:

A polarizing contest between a hard-left progressive and a staunch MAGA conservative creates a massive vacuum for a moderate third-party or independent candidate. In a standard plurality election, third-party candidates usually act as spoilers. But Maine’s Ranked-Choice Voting system fundamentally changes the math.

To win, a centrist independent doesn’t need to win the initial round outright—they just need to secure second place. If a credible moderate can outlast either the MAGA or the progressive candidate and take second in the first round he or she can get 50 % + and win the RCV round and the election.

Concluding Remarks:

Golden’s departure highlights a dark trend for the next Congress: it is virtually guaranteed to be more partisan and less functional than the current one. When the pragmatists exit, they leave a vacuum. With both national parties continuously moving toward their respective ideological fringes, the lawmakers replacing independent voices like Golden will have little incentive—and even less political cover—to reach across the aisle.

The second major concern is strategic. Across the country, Democrats are enjoying substantial structural tailwinds in the 2026 midterms. Yet, by drifting further to the left to appease activist bases, the party risks snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in crucial swing districts. In a naturally conservative, working-class district like ME-2, running a standard progressive platform against a well-entrenched, populist conservative like LePage is a recipe for an unforced error.

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Authors Note: The author is more focused on economic and financial policy than on politics. Here is some of his recent work.

Tax Reconciliation and Retirement Policy

A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt

A Pro-Growth, Progressive Alternative to “No-Tax on Tips”

He is however devoting some time and energy to an evaluation of the 2026 political contests, which will determine control of Congress. Subscribe here and stay tuned!

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The speech argues that American households are struggling with their finances—even during periods when the broader economy appears strong—and that neither major political party has demonstrated the ability to address these challenges in a sustainable way.

At the same time, Social Security is moving toward a funding crisis that will require difficult decisions that Republicans and Democrats have repeatedly failed to confront.

Rising out-of-pocket health-care costs, burdensome student debt, inadequate retirement savings, and the approaching Social Security shortfall are not isolated problems but interconnected challenges.

Recent policy debates on renewal of the ACA premium tax credits, student debt reform, and improved retirement savings incentives show that Congress is incapable of balancing the needs of struggling households in a way that is fair to taxpayers.

Absent changes to the political system, the projected Social Security deficits will lead to automatic cuts to Social Security benefits in around seven years.

The third-party health care, student debt and retirement incentive proposals outlined in this speech are both desirable on their own merits but are also necessary for the adoption of a Social Security reform adjusting both future taxes and benefits.

Thank you all for being here.

We are standing at a crossroads—not just in this district, but across our entire nation.

Look around us.

We are told by the headlines that our economy is strong.

We are told by the talking heads in power that everything is on the right track—and we are told by the talking heads out of power that the sky is falling.

[Pause]

My perspective is different.

Even when the macroeconomy is strong, everyday households are struggling. Struggling to save. Struggling to pay off debt. Struggling to maintain health insurance or cover the out-of-pocket costs of a routine medical procedure.

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· Among Colorado Democrats there is a strong positive correlation between positions on Medicare-for-all and criticism of Israel and the partisan lean of the district.

· Colorado Republicans are fundamentally aligned on most issues with a minor exception regarding tariffs.

· The fundamental Republican litmus test is support for President Trump. President Trump is not now opposing any Colorado Republican candidate.

· CO-8 the only true toss-up in the state where a robust Democrat primary will determine whether a progressive or a centrist will oppose the incumbent Republican.

· Democrats will nominate viable centrist candidates in three Republican leaning districts CO-3 CO-4 and CO-5. Can these centrists win in a year where there should be a blue wave?

· Democrat failure in CO-03, CO-04, CO-05 and CO-8 in 2026 should cause the party to look inward and perhaps cause voters to consider a third-party alternative.

Introduction: A potential national blue wave is providing a significant tailwind for Democrats as the nation heads toward the 2026 midterm elections, but all political contests are local and factors specific to each state and contest shape results.

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Four distinct factors are shaping congressional races in Colorado in 2026 and beyond:

· A favorable macro-environment that gives Democrats a systemic advantage in competitive margins.

· An escalating progressive and democratic socialist challenge to establishment norms in deep-blue urban strongholds like CO-1.

· A true swing territory in CO-8 where both a fiercely contested Democrat primary and a razor-thin general election will define the exact ideological profile needed to win a toss-up electorate.

· An intentional effort to field pragmatic, district-matched centrist Democrats in traditionally Republican-leaning districts like CO-3, CO-4, and CO-5.

To understand how these competing forces and internal party tensions will manifest on Election Day, we must look directly at the underlying partisan math and current battlefield status of each individual seat.

Current Political Status of Colorado’s Eight Congressional Districts

• CO-01 [Denver Urban Core]: Diana DeGette (D) | Leaning: D+29

• CO-02 [Boulder & Northern Front Range]: Joe Neguse (D) | Leaning: D+20

• CO-03 [Western Slope & San Luis Valley]: Jeff Hurd (R) | Leaning: R+5

• CO-04 [Eastern Plains & Douglas County]: Lauren Boebert (R) | Leaning: R+13

• CO-05 [Colorado Springs & El Paso County]: Jeff Crank (R) | Leaning: R+5

• CO-06 [Aurora & Denver South-Metro Suburbs]: Jason Crow (D) | Leaning: D+11

• CO-07 [Jefferson County & Central Mountains]: Brittany Pettersen (D) | Leaning: D+8

• CO-08 [Northern Front Range]: Gabe Evans (R) | Leaning: EVEN (R+0)

Note: The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI), the statistic used in the bullets above, does not display the simple candidate-to-candidate margin or raw voter spread within a district; rather, it quantifies how much more Democrat or Republican a district behaves relative to the entire United States. The metric is calculated by isolating the two-party vote share (completely stripping out third parties) from the two most recent presidential elections, weighing the most recent cycle more heavily, and subtracting the national major-party baseline from the local district average. Consequently, a massive local victory margin like the 55-point spread in Denver’s CO-01 registers as a D+29 because the metric filters out the national baseline, indicating that the district’s major-party electorate is exactly 29 percentage points more Democrat than the national baseline average.

Factors Impacting the 2026 Colorado Congressional Midterms

The 2026 midterm landscape in Colorado presents a paradox defined by two powerful, competing national forces: the severe geopolitical, economic, and institutional crises surrounding the current Trump administration that lay the groundwork for a sweeping “Blue Wave,” juxtaposed against a significant leftward drift within the national Democrat brand that threatens to stall that momentum.

On one side, the baseline conditions for a massive anti-incumbent shift mirror the historic wave election of 2006. Under the Trump administration, severe geopolitical mismanagement failed to prevent the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a harsh domestic energy price shock and sticky inflation. Paired with highly controversial, aggressive domestic ICE enforcement actions, tracking of political enemies, and autocratic executive overreach, the administration has deeply alienated moderate and independent voters.

In a small, fiercely independent purple state like Colorado -- where unaffiliated voters now account for over 50% of the active electorate—this intense dissatisfaction with executive overreach should naturally fuel a sweeping Democrat realignment.

On the other side, an equally potent counterweight exists in the significant leftward drift of the national Democrat brand, which actively hamstrings the party’s ability to capture these frustrated voters. While many center-right independents are eager for an alternative to Trump’s autocracy, the national party’s increasingly extreme ideological platforms on economic policy and foreign affairs give mainstream voters deep pause. Rather than offering a pragmatic, stabilizing baseline, the national party is frequently perceived as captive to its furthest-left factions.

For Colorado’s vital independent center, the choice becomes an agonizing calculation: using their ballot to reject Trump’s executive overreach risks inadvertently empowering a progressive agenda they view as fundamentally unfeasible. The following structured comments analyze how this intense national tug-of-war is playing out locally across the state’s individual congressional districts.

Comment One: Democrat Candidate Ideological Views Correlate with District Partisan Lean

Democrat candidates in safe, progressive districts actively champion “Medicare for All,” and frequently criticize Israel reflecting a long-term leftward evolution that is occasionally accelerated by primary friction.

In Colorado’s deepest-blue urban center, Denver’s CO-01 (D+29), the policy landscape has veered sharply left, forcing established Democrats to aggressively defend their progressive flanks. Thirty-year incumbent Diana DeGette has steadily migrated leftward over her career, but intense pressure from democratic socialist and progressive factions nearly prevented her from securing a ballot spot on the ballot at the state Democratic convention. She is now relying on ads featuring AOC to win against progressive challengers.

This Colorado Sun survey accurately describes CO-1 candidate positions on issues and all three candidates including the incumbent have moved fairly far to the left. The winner of the convention Melat Kiros is running an explicitly ant-Israel campaign. Her rhetoric as evidenced by her posts appears both vehemently anti-Israel and antisemitic.

In contrast, safely insulated incumbents Joe Neguse (CO-02, D+20), Jason Crow (CO-06, D+11), and Brittany Pettersen (CO-07, D+8) face no meaningful primary challenges, allowing them to concentrate on the general election.

Democrat candidates in competitive or conservative districts bypass single-payer rhetoric to focus on ACA modifications and local concerns. Unchallenged in her primary, Brittany Pettersen (CO-07, D+8) avoids the mandate entirely to protect her centrist suburban position, focusing instead on high-visibility issues like medical debt and behavioral health. In redder territory—CO-03 (R+5), CO-04 (R+13), and CO-05 (R+5)—Democrat contenders like Eileen Laubacher, Alex Kelloff, Dwayne Romero, and Jessica Killin target market-friendly stabilization models: saving rural clinics, expanding telehealth, capping premiums, and modernizing VA networks.

As Colorado’s most competitive toss-up seat, the dead-even CO-08 Democrat primary serves as a direct proxy war over healthcare policy, pitting progressive Manny Rutinel and his $3.4 million single-payer platform against centrist Shannon Bird, who explicitly rejects a mandate in favor of a voluntary “Medicare for All Who Want It” option.

On the Mideast, most Democrats outside CO-1 pair criticism with Netanyahu with the stance that Hamas must be fully dismantled. Absent from that discussion is a plan on how to dismantle Hamas without the use of force.

On the issue of health care and the issue of Israel there is a clear correlation between the Democrat lean of the district and the partisan drift.

Comment Two: Position of Republican Candidates and Closeness to Trump

An issue-by-issue analysis of health care among Colorado’s Republican candidates is functionally impossible because the party maintains absolute ideological uniformity. There is no internal dissent: zero Republican candidates or incumbents support Medicare for All, no one broke ranks over preserving the ACA premium tax credits, and all stand aligned on standard federal spending restraints.

Colorado Republicans are also fairly closely aligned in their support for Israel. The internal division among Republicans is defined by a hawk-versus-isolationist split that aligns closely with how safe a district is. Traditional defense hawks running in highly competitive or suburban seats fully back international security assistance packages as essential to national defense. However, “America First” populists leveraging safe margins in deep-red strongholds, such as Lauren Boebert in CO-04, emphasize cuts to foreign assistance without specifically targeting Israel.

Because there are no policy cleavages to map against the Cook PVI, evaluating the Republican field requires pivoting away from specific issues to look at a candidate’s structural proximity to Donald Trump.

On the right, the primary rift factor is not healthcare or social policy—it is trade and executive power. The case of freshman incumbent Jeff Hurd (CO-03, R+5) proves just how thin the margin for dissent is. Hurd became one of only six House Republicans to vote with Democrats to lift the administration’s emergency tariffs on Canada, explicitly warning that normalizing broad emergency executive trade powers would backfire under a future Democrat president. The reaction was immediate: Trump labeled Hurd a “RINO,” rescinded his endorsement, and backed a hardline primary challenger.

The national party persuaded Trump to back down to avoid losing the district, something Trump did not do in redder parts of the nation. So, the political lean statistic appears to affect candidate selection for both parties.

Comment Three: Likely 2026 Outcomes

The overarching landscape of Colorado’s 2026 midterms centers on a single question: can national headwinds and optimized candidate recruitment overcome the natural gravity of a district’s Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI)? While a national blue wave provides a potent tailwind, the path to actually altering the state’s congressional map is strictly restricted to a narrow 3.5-district playing field...

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