This memorandum provides a comprehensive analysis of the 2026 Senate landscape, evaluating the structural and ideological factors that will define the upcoming midterm elections; a separate analysis focusing on the House map will follow.

In a field crowded with partisan prognosticators, this report is grounded in a commitment to objectivity -- explicitly acknowledging personal political preferences to ensure they do not dictate or distort the resulting data. By identifying these biases upfront, we can more clearly navigate the competing narratives that define this cycle.

Key Results

• Divergent Narratives: The 2026 political cycle is defined by a paradox: a macro-environment heavily favoring a “Blue Wave” is being countered by a Democratic shift toward extreme positions on healthcare, taxes, and Middle East policy that risks alienating moderate voters.

• Candidate & Policy Liabilities: Georgia and Maine are two states where a drift to the left and specific problems with Democratic nominees may derail prospects in these essential defensive contests, turning winnable races into significant vulnerabilities.

• The Michigan Friction: Deep intra-party divisions regarding Middle East foreign policy have created a significant vulnerability in Michigan, potentially fracturing the coalition necessary for Democrats to hold the seat.

• The Need for a New Approach: If Democrats fail to win in states like Texas, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, and Iowa during a favorable “Blue Wave” environment, it will signal that the party brand is irreparably damaged in these regions. Such an outcome would confirm a state of de facto one-party rule and the urgent need for a new political approach or a third party to restore genuine choice.

• The Pickup Map: North Carolina remains the most likely state to flip in favor of Democrats. New Hampshire and Michigan have emerged as premier GOP targets following the retirement of Democratic incumbents.

Introduction: Perspective vs. Analysis

In a world defined by hyper partisanship, the line between independent observation and partisan advocacy has dangerously blurred. As Gerard Baker noted in the Wall Street Journal (March 30, 2026), many commentators now prioritize “instantaneous certitude” over objective uncertainty, allowing their ideological preferences to dictate their forecasts. Baker argues that such “metaphysical certainty” is a hallmark of political engagement, but it is fatal to honest analysis.

I hold distinct worldviews on the Mideast and domestic economic policy. The reader must understand my perspectival biases and my commitment to not having these biases shape my analysis.

My strategic foreign policy outlook aligns with John Bolton’s viewpoint. The underlying objective in Iran must be regime change. A government that killed 40,000 of its own citizens in a couple of weekends and publicly executes its own youth -- such as the recent hanging of 19-year-old wrestling champion Saleh Mohammadi -- is not a credible partner for diplomacy. I believe that true diplomacy in 2026 is not a substitute for military victory, but a dividend of it.

However, an analyst’s preference for a policy must not be confused with its success. While I support concept of the war in Iran, I must objectively note that the administration failed to adequately prepare for the regime’s stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, successful regime change, the only real justifiable goal of this war, depends on coordination with the Kurds and Iranian opposition -- a synchronization that is currently not evident.

My views on domestic reform also diverge from the current binary choices offered by two major parties. I reject the policy adopted by both parties of delaying necessary implementation of Social Security reform, a policy which can only increase costs and the pain of the adjustment process. I reject both the Republican erosion of ACA subsidies and the Democratic push for Medicare for All.

In my view, the Democratic party is more interested in making grand overtures towards its base than in sponsoring realist economic reforms. It is against this backdrop -- acknowledging my biases while ruthlessly prioritizing data over dogma -- that I assess the current political, economic, and policy environment.

An evaluation of the 2026 political environment:

This evaluation of the upcoming November election balances two approaches -- an assessment of the broad political-economic “mood” versus a granular analysis of policy positions and individual matchups.

Historically, midterm elections serve as a referendum on the party in power. Currently, the “political environment” strongly favors a Democratic surge. The war in Iran remains broadly unpopular, and the domestic economy is reeling from rising interest rates and inflation (with headline CPI projected to hit 3.5%–3.8% by Q3). My view is that inflation and interest rates can go much higher than headline projections.

Policies championed by the Trump Administration and the Republican congress -- including the phase-out of enhanced ACA subsidies and aggressive deportation strategies have impacted some people directly and have been witnessed by many friends and neighbors of affected people.

These factors suggest a significant “blue wave” is structurally possible.

The 2026 blue wave is not a certain outcome. Increasingly, the Democratic party has moved to the left with many candidates taken extreme positions on health care, taxes and the middle east to mollify the base of the party.

Despite a major opening created by Republicans eliminating ACA subsidies, Democrats are doubling down on Medicare for All. This unworkable model risks the insurance of 160 million people, turning a Republican fumble into a Democratic liability, as explained in the essay Should Democrats Adopt Medicare for All in 2028?

Similarly, the progressive fixation on wealth tax, an unrealistic approach risks alienating high-income voters who are open to paying more but are terrified of structural wealth destruction.

Vehement criticism of Israel, and in some cases actual support of Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah, from the Democratic base allow Republicans to classify some Democrat candidates as soft on terror.

Mainstream voices including the IOC and Bob Costas, the legendary sportscaster, are pushing back on the progressive view that transgender people should be allowed to compete against women in sports.

Candidate views and quality can influence election outcomes even in a wave election. Candidate quality is especially important in Senate elections where major party nominees tend to have a long resume and reputation to defend.

The remainder of this memo analyzes key 2026 Senate races to evaluate the likely outcome of the contest for control of the Senate. I attempt to control and point out the perspectival biases which impact the analysis.

A subsequent memo will do the same for the contest for control of the House.

Senate elections:

Competitive Senate candidates typically have defined resumes, governing records, and policy histories. Statewide contests tend to expose gaps in credibility quickly, hence candidates in competitive states – states that are neither deep blue nor deep red – cannot rely on party coattails.

Many states have sorted into safely red or blue categories. The number of potentially competitive Senate races is, in the current political map, fairly small. At this time, Senate races in 10 states -- Maine, Georgia, Texas, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, North Carolina, Iowa, and New Hampshire -- are potentially in play. (Although, I would argue Democrat victories in five of the states Texas, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, Iowa -- require a substantial blue wave.)

Maine Senate:

The Maine Democratic primary has devolved into a bitter choice between Governor Janet Mills, who at 78 would become the oldest freshman senator ever elected to a full term, and frontrunner Graham Platner, a 41-year-old oyster farmer with no governing resume. Platner has out-raised the Governor nearly three-to-one, fueled by a populist message and high-profile endorsements from Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren.

The support for Platner is astonishing given his history of disqualifying rhetoric and personal baggage. His past social media comments -- including Reddit posts that critics condemn as victim-blaming regarding sexual assault -- and a controversial chest tattoo resembling the Nazi SS Totenkopf symbol make him a massive liability.

This primary dynamic is a gift to Susan Collins who crushed a far more robust, capable Sara Gideon, in 2020. Collins won that race by nine points even though the party’s presidential nominee lost the state. The only way Democrats flip this seat is a total collapse of the Trump and Republican brands and if Platner is the nominee they could lose the race even if there was a huge blue wave.

Georgia Senate: Ossoff’s Strategic “Reagan” Blunder

Jon Ossoff enters 2026 with a massive $25 million war chest, but his re-election is complicated by a significant historical and policy error. In justifying his recent votes to halt arms shipments to Israel, Ossoff cited Ronald Reagan’s 1982 pause on munitions as a successful precedent for using “leverage.”

Reagan’s 1982 pause created a security vacuum that led directly to the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 American service members. Far from a success, that catastrophe -- orchestrated by the Iranian-backed nascent Hezbollah --forced Reagan to reverse course and deepen strategic cooperation with Israel. By sanitizing this history, Ossoff risks promoting a policy that has historically invited disaster for U.S. peacekeepers.

Israel is not the top issue for most Georgians, but it is visceral for many of the state’s 130,000 Jewish voters and for a large number of voters in Georgia with ties to the military. Ossoff, the first Jewish senator from the Deep South won’t do well in a group where typically 70 percent of voters go to the Democrat and given the closeness of Geogia elections even a small shift in a small part of the electorate could be decisive.

The Republican primary on May 19 will determine if the GOP can capitalize on this “security gap.” The field currently includes two current members of Congress, Mike Collins and Buddy Carter and an outsider Derek Dooley, a former coach with the backing of the governor Brain Kemp. The primary contest will likely be determined in a runoff.

My bias in this election is clear. I am a Zionist, who can tolerate some but not much criticism of Israel. I find Ossoff’s use of the Reagan analogy to be historically flawed and dishonest. I am not a citizen of Georgia, but, if I was, I could not vote for Ossoff.

Texas Senate: The Grudge Match and the Seminarian

Democrats have pinned their 2026 hopes on State Representative James Talarico, a former middle school teacher and Presbyterian seminarian who defeated U.S. Rep. Jasmine Crockett in the primary. Talarico is an articulate, faith-forward candidate without much economic expertise. His mantra is

“We follow a barefoot rabbi who gave only two commandments: love God and love your neighbor.”

The real spectacle is the Republican runoff race between incumbent Senator John Cornyn and the impeached but acquitted Attorney General Ken Paxton. Hands down this is the most entertaining race in the country.

Cornyn’s campaign has focused heavily on Paxton’s legal “baggage,” including his 2023 impeachment and long-standing securities fraud charges, using a “Thou Shalt Not” ad to highlight Paxton’s violation of several of the ten commandments. Paxton has retaliated with the “Love Boat” theme song to highlight Cornyn’s years in Washington. (I might have gone with the B 52s Love Shack, if I was running Paxton’s campaign.)

Democrats have not won a statewide race in Texas since Ann Richards in the 1990s. They are hoping that this time will be difficult. If it is not different, someone should think about organizing a third-party in Texas because, a loss by the Democrat this year would verify that in statewide races Texas only has one choice in the current two-party system.

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Michigan Senate: A Primary “Shit Show”

The Michigan Democratic primary is a battleground for a party deeply fractured between constituencies with different views of the Mideast. Two of the candidates Haley Steven and Mallory McMorrow have fairly conventional views while Abdul El-Sayed is a vocal critic of U.S. Mideast policy.

A recent leaked recording revealed El-Sayed was not willing to say anything about the death of Khamenei because a lot of people in Dearborn are sad today. Here is a partial list of Iranian backed terror initiatives. The world is better off with the precedent set that terror has consequences.

Republican Mike Rogers, a former congressman who lost a close Senate contest in 2024, will be the Republican nominee. The Cook report lists the race as a toss-up. I suspect the state would easily flip to the republicans if El-Sayed is nominated, a possibility in a three-way Democratic primary.

Montana Senate: The “Tester Strategy” and the Independent Gamble

The Montana Senate race was upended when incumbent Senator Steve Daines withdrew from the race at the last minute and his choice for his successor, former U.S. attorney Kurt Aimes filed paperwork to enter the race.

This maneuver was designed to freeze the field and prevent Democrats from recruiting a heavyweight contender like Jon Tester or a former governor. Alme is not yet the nominee “for certain” as he faces two primary challengers on June 2, but with the immediate and dual endorsements of Daines and President Trump, he is the overwhelming favorite.

Seth Bodnar, a West Point graduate, Green Beret, and former University of Montana President, is running as an Independent. Bodner has Tester’s endorsement and is raising funds through Act Blue. This approach, which was used unsuccessfully in the 2024 Nebraska Senate race, assumes that the Democratic brand is dead in rural America.

Whether an Independent can announce a desire to caucus with Democrats and win in a red state is the cycle’s experimental gamble.

Ohio Senate: The return of Sherrod Brown

The Ohio Senate special election is shaping up to be a clash of statewide titans, as former Senator Sherrod Brown, the former Senator who lost his reelection race in 2024 is the favorite for the nomination in 2026.

Following the resignation of J.D. Vance to become Vice President, Governor Mike DeWine appointed then-Lieutenant Governor Jon Husted to the vacancy. Husted will be the Republican nominee.

The polls have this election as a dead heat in November. Ohio has been trending sharply Republican. Obama was the last Democrat to win the state at the presidential level. This race should be close and could flip to the Democrat if the national mood and events turn against the Republicans.

Alaska Senate: Ranked Choice and the Peltola Surge

Alaska is likely to remain a toss-up election the entire year because of its unique rank-choice voting system and the existence of four candidates on the ballot. The two top candidates, current Senator Dan Sullivan and former Representative Mary Peltola have both won statewide races. It is highly likely that neither candidate will initially have 50 percent of the vote and the outcome will be determined by the second choice of people who vote for the minor candidates.

North Carolina Senate: The Battle of the Heavyweights

North Carolina represents the Democrats’ premier pickup opportunity, as the retirement of Republican Thom Tillis has transformed this into a high-stakes open-seat contest between two seasoned veterans. Former Governor Roy Cooper, who never lost a statewide race during his eight-year tenure (2017–2025), enters the general election with a formidable $14 million war chest and a consistent 8-to-10 point lead in post-primary polling.

Governor Cooper faces Republican Michael Whatley, the former RNC Chairman and Trump-backed operative who consolidated the GOP base with a dominant 65% primary victory. Whatley is a disciplined campaigner, but Cooper’s brand of moderate politics combined with a favorable environment of Democrats should flip North Carolina.

2026 Iowa Senate Outlook

Ashley Hinson, a current congresswoman is the likely Republican nominee for Senate. Iowa Democrats have a competitive primary between State Senator Zach Wahls, the candidate with local support and State Representative Josh Turek, the candidate with a lot of endorsements from national leaders.

The Republicans control all major offices in Iowa today including all four Congressional seats. In 2018, Democrats had 3 of 4 House seats. Hinson is the heavy favorite even if there is a blue wave.

Open Seat in New Hampshire:

The New Hampshire Senate race is a high-stakes battle for the open seat of retiring Democrat Jeanne Shaheen, where former Senator John E. Sununu currently dominates the Republican primary field with a 29-point lead over Scott Brown. The Democratic nominee will be Representative Chris Pappas. Polls show the race to be close. Political analysts rate the race as tilt or leans Democratic.

Ultimately, the state is a “must-hold” for Democrats to maintain Senate control. The race is currently rated a “Tilt” or “Lean” Democratic in a traditionally swing state,

Conclusion:

Amidst a crowded field of 2026 political prognosticators, my analysis deliberately prioritizes an honest accounting of my own biases to ensure they do not cloud the objective data.

The current landscape is defined by sharply competing narratives, starting with the undeniable structural tilt of the political environment, which suggests a massive “blue wave” is possible. However, momentum for the Democrats faces a significant counter-narrative: a party drifting toward symbolic, unpractical, and extreme positions on healthcare, taxes, and Middle East policy that risk alienating the very voters required to sustain a national mandate.

This ideological drift, combined with specific candidate liabilities, creates a precarious map for the Democratic caucus. In key battlegrounds like Georgia and Maine, the combination of extreme policy platforms and weak candidate profiles could doom what should otherwise be winnable seats. Furthermore, deep internal divisions regarding the Middle East threaten to cripple the party’s coalition in Michigan, potentially handing a crucial swing state to the opposition through sheer intra-party friction.

Finally, the Democratic brand has deteriorated so significantly in deep-red states like Texas, Montana, Iowa, Ohio, and even Alaska, that voters appear to be experiencing de facto one-party rule. In these environments, the absence of a competitive opposition highlights a growing necessity for a viable third party to challenge the current status quo. Ultimately, while the national environment favors a Democratic surge, the party’s insistence on “far-left” positioning and its failure to compete in rural strongholds may prevent them from fully capitalizing on a favorable 2026 cycle.

Friends, neighbors, and members of this community, thank you for being here today.

Before anything else, sincere thanks go to the friends and family who have supported this effort from the beginning. Entering public life is never an individual decision. It is something made possible by the encouragement, patience, and belief of the people closest to us. Their support means everything.

Today, standing here with that support behind me, I am announcing my candidacy for the United States House of Representatives.

This campaign is not about ambition or personal advancement. It begins with a simple observation that many Americans share: the country is on the wrong path, and the two major parties have shown that they are unable to put us back on the right one.

Across this country and in communities like ours, households are struggling financially. The cost of living has risen faster than wages for many families. Health insurance is increasingly expensive and complicated. Student debt is preventing millions of people from saving, buying homes, or preparing for retirement.

These problems are serious, long-term challenges that require honest solutions. Yet neither political party has presented a viable plan to address them.

Take Social Security. The program is moving steadily toward insolvency, a reality acknowledged by experts across the political spectrum. Yet year after year the problem is ignored. Both parties prefer to postpone the conversation rather than confront it honestly.

At the same time, both parties are increasingly being driven by the most ideological voices within their coalitions.

On the Democratic side, proposals such as Medicare for All are often presented as simple solutions, even though the economic and political obstacles to implementing such a system are enormous. Meanwhile Republicans have pursued policies that weaken the Affordable Care Act, including allowing key coverage supports such as enhanced premium tax credits to expire while advancing regulatory changes that could further destabilize the system.

The result is not progress but paralysis.

The same dynamic appears in higher education policy. Many Democrats promote the idea of free or universal debt-free college, including for families that have the means to pay their share. Republicans, meanwhile, enacted sweeping changes to the student loan system in the 2025 tax legislation that could make access to higher education more difficult and leave many borrowers more financially vulnerable.

Neither approach reflects a balanced understanding of the problem.

What is missing in Washington today is a basic recognition of tradeoffs.

Public policy always involves choices. Resources are limited, and responsible leaders must weigh costs against benefits. Yet too often Democrats default to the most expensive possible solution, accompanied by constant calls for new and higher taxes, even when lower-cost approaches could achieve many of the same goals.

At the same time, Republicans are not being honest with the public about the steps required to restore long-term solvency to programs like Social Security. Any credible solution requires that Americans save more for retirement. But how can families save more when they are losing health insurance coverage or struggling under the burden of student debt?

Ignoring these realities does not solve the problem. It only makes the eventual choices more difficult.

This campaign begins with a different premise: that honest leadership means acknowledging tradeoffs and pursuing practical solutions that improve people’s lives without pretending that difficult choices do not exist.

Running as a third-party candidate is not easy. The two established parties form a powerful duopoly in American politics. They control most of the institutions, most of the funding, and most of the political infrastructure.

But the fact that something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.

Many Americans today feel politically homeless. They see a system dominated by partisan conflict and ideological purity tests rather than by problem-solving. They want leaders who are willing to work for the common good rather than for the interests of party factions.

This campaign is for those voters.

We know this will be a difficult race. Competing against two established parties is never simple. But change in this country has always begun with citizens willing to challenge entrenched systems when those systems stop serving the public.

And today, it is increasingly clear that the existing two parties have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that they cannot solve the problems facing this country.

That is why this campaign matters.

A third-party movement grounded in practical solutions, fiscal responsibility, and a willingness to acknowledge tradeoffs can help move this country forward again.

Once again, sincere thanks go to the friends and family whose support made this moment possible, and to all of you who have come here today to be part of this effort.

The road ahead will not be easy. But it is necessary.

Thank you for being here, thank you for believing in the possibility of a better politics, and thank you for joining this campaign.

God bless you all, and God bless the United States of America.

Author’s note: This post is partly a thought experiment and written with a bit of fun. www.economicmemos.com normally focuses on developing serious policy proposals and analyzing major economic challenges. Posts like this one explore how those ideas might appear in real-world political debate. Reader support helps make it possible to continue developing and publishing new policy proposals.

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Lisa Lerer’s New York Times report on the unusually high number of congressional retirements — 63 members so far — frames the exodus as a story about threats, dysfunction, Trump’s continuing grip on Republican primaries, and generational impatience among Democrats. Go to Ballotpedia for a list of retirees from the House.

But the deeper question is not why members are leaving. It is what replaces them. When incumbents depart, decisive power shifts from general electorates to primary electorates. And primary voters in both parties reward ideological clarity and factional loyalty more than coalition maintenance or legislative pragmatism.

This dynamic is visible not only in House retirements but in marquee statewide contests. The two Texas Senate races are a revealing test. On the Republican side, whether the nominee resembles a John Cornyn–style institutional conservative or a more combative, Trump-defined figure such as Ken Paxton will signal how fully MAGA loyalty has become the entry ticket to viability. On the Democratic side, the contest pits U.S. Rep. Jasmine Crockett, a high-profile Dallas congresswoman known for her combative, base-energizing style and emphasis on turnout, against State Rep. James Talarico, an Austin legislator with a reputation for coalition-building and a more traditional electability-focused message — making the primary a clear illustration of the tension between activist priorities and broader general-election appeal.

A Paxton versus Crockett outcome for the general election could be viewed as the canary in the coal mine test for future politics. It is not clear either party wants to win this race.

Arizona offers a parallel signal. The recent departure of a comparatively moderate Republican candidate, Karrin Taylor Robson, narrows the field and may strengthen the lane for overtly MAGA-aligned contenders.

The House map reflects the same structural pattern. In deep-blue districts such as CA-11 (Pelosi), NJ-11 (Sherrill), and several Chicago- and New York–based seats, retirements remove institutional stabilizers and empower activist-heavy primaries. Additional examples include MD-05 (Hoyer) and CA-26, where open-seat volatility favors energized ideological factions. In ME-02, a highly contested district, the departure of a Jared Golden could result in the nomination of a left wing Democrat and the flipping of the seat.

On the Republican side, deep-red districts such as GA-14 (Marjorie Taylor Greene), TX-19 (Jodey Arrington), and FL-02 (Neal Dunn, retiring), along with open or newly unanchored seats including NE-02 (Don Bacon, retiring), NY-21 (Elise Stefanik, retiring), FL-16 (Vern Buchanan, retiring), and NV-02 (Mark Amodei, retiring) — and even R-leaning but competitive terrain like TX-22 (Troy Nehls) — collectively illustrate how retirements and structurally safe primaries are intensifying incentives to compete on ideological purity, turning many of these contests into intra-party races to demonstrate the strongest alignment with MAGA-oriented voters rather than broader general-election adaptability.

What qualifies as “leftward” or “rightward” drift differs by party. Among Democrats, movement left is defined less by rhetoric and more by issue alignment: Medicare for All, Green New Deal–style climate frameworks, a harder line on Israel, and calls to abolish or significantly defund ICE or police institutions.

Among Republicans, the central sorting variable is allegiance to Donald Trump, with reinforcing signals on immigration maximalism, skepticism of Ukraine funding, tariff advocacy, and willingness to nationalize cultural confrontation. In both parties, drift means tighter alignment with activist issue clusters rather than district-specific cross-pressure.

Across roughly twenty structurally revealing open House seats, many are structurally incentivized toward outward ideological movement relative to the incumbents they replace. Because this sorting dynamic is occurring simultaneously in both parties, polarization intensifies even if chamber control changes hands. The center thins while the activist wings thicken. Today’s Congress may appear dysfunctional. Compared to the more ideologically sorted institution emerging from these primaries, it may eventually look comparatively restrained.

Authors Note: The way out of this mess is in my view the formation of a third party, which could become viable very quickly if the third party concentrated on winning seats in the House of Representatives.

This blog available at www.economicmemos.com has a lot of information on policy including student debt and healthcare, see this material on student debt and this material on health insurance. The blog also covers personal finance and investments. Sometimes the material can get really technical. See this article about how to conduct statistical tests on PE ratios.

Most blogs are concentrated on a narrow set of topics. The real strength of this blog is its ability to analyze problems by combining information and methods developed in different fields. The most recent example of this is a paper on UNH valuation, which incorporates the author’s expertise as an investor and an economist with a finance background with his expertise on health care policy.

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Key Takeaways by Race

Races covered (in memo order):
Maine-02 (ME-02), Alaska At-Large (AK-AL), Nebraska-02 (NE-02), New Jersey-11 (NJ-11), New York-10 (NY-10), New York-12 (NY-12), California-47 (CA-47).

• ME-02: Jared Golden’s exit removes a uniquely cross-partisan incumbent; depending on the GOP nominee, the race could either flip Republican or produce a rare ranked-choice coalition outcome with implications for House control.

• AK-AL: Incumbent Nick Begich III is the clear front-runner under Alaska’s top-four system but ranked-choice rules mean a strong plurality does not fully eliminate upset risk if he fails to attract second-choice support.

• NE-02: Despite an open seat, both parties appear likely to nominate broadly acceptable candidates; polarization risk is low and the race will turn on execution and the national environment rather than ideology.

• NJ-11: A splintered Democratic special primary may yield a nominee with a weak mandate, while a credible, non-MAGA Republican makes the seat meaningfully more competitive than recent history suggests.

• NY-10: A clean establishment-versus-progressive primary, centered around mid-east politics, creates a realistic scenario for an independent “insurance” candidacy if the anti-Israel candidate prevails.

• NY-12: A crowded field creates low-plurality risk, but demographic constraints—especially a large, institutionally rooted Jewish electorate—have so far prevented ideological polarization.

• CA-47: California’s top-two jungle primary elevates coalition math over ideology; while the incumbent is likely to advance, fragmentation could still produce a nonstandard general-election matchup.

ME-02: Golden’s Open Seat and Polarization Risk

The retirement of Jared Golden leaves Maine’s 2nd District unusually exposed. Golden repeatedly won a Trump-leaning seat by assembling a personal, cross-partisan coalition and relying on ranked-choice transfers. No declared candidate clearly reproduces that formula, making this one of the most volatile races of the cycle.

The Democratic field includes Joe Baldacci, a Bangor-based state senator with local roots and family name recognition; Matthew Dunlap, a former statewide officeholder with institutional credibility; Paige Loud, a lower-profile grassroots candidate; and Jordan Wood, whose résumé is largely national and issue-driven and appears poorly matched to the district’s rural, working-class electorate. On the Republican side, Paul LePage, the former governor, brings high name recognition and a polarizing style, while James Clark, an Army veteran, offers a more conventional and less incendiary conservative profile.

The general election hinges on the matchup. A LePage–Wood race would likely be highly polarized, creating room for a third-party centrist.

A Clark–Wood race would favor Republicans and could flip the seat.

A Clark versus a more mainstream Democrat would likely be close and could plausibly be one of the marginal races that determines control of the House.

AK-AL: Begich Leads, but RCV Leaves Room for Surprise

Rep. Nick Begich III is seeking reelection and is the clear front-runner in Alaska’s at-large House race, both because he is the incumbent and because of the enduring strength of the Begich family name in Alaska politics. He is the only clearly defined conservative in the field, making him well positioned to lead the August 18 top-four primary, potentially with a sizable plurality.

That advantage, however, does not guarantee victory under Alaska’s ranked-choice voting system. Begich will be the first choice of many voters but he will need fifty percent to win under rank choice voting rules and my not be the second choice for many voters.

NE-02: Competitive but Unlikely to Produce an Extreme Nominee

The retirement of Don Bacon removes a Republican who repeatedly won Nebraska’s most competitive district by cultivating crossover appeal and distancing himself from his party’s national brand. His absence creates uncertainty, but the current field does not show signs of ideological escalation on either side.

On the Democratic side, the primary is genuinely competitive, but the declared candidates largely come from mainstream backgrounds — elected officials, veterans, administrators, and party professionals — and are differentiating on experience, competence, and biography rather than on ideological position. There is little risk that Democrats will nominate a candidate out of step with the district’s moderate, suburban electorate.

On the Republican side, the picture is clearer. Barring an unexpected late entry, Joe Harding (Omaha City Council) appears positioned to be the nominee. While he lacks Bacon’s districtwide electoral history, his local executive experience and urban governing profile point toward a broadly acceptable, non-MAGA style candidacy rather than an ideologically polarizing one.

Both parties appear likely to nominate candidates capable of appealing beyond their base, making this a contest defined more by execution and national environment than by primary-driven polarization.

NJ-11: AIPAC’s Intervention, a Fragmented Democratic Outcome, and a Real General Election Test

The Democratic primary to replace outgoing Rep. Mikie Sherrill in New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District has become one of the earliest intra-party flashpoints of the 2026 cycle.

Eleven candidates competed in the February special primary, which remains unresolved, with progressive organizer Analilia Mejia narrowly leading former Rep. Tom Malinowski in late returns, roughly 28.9 percent to 27.8 percent, with thousands of ballots still outstanding. The eventual nominee will face Republican Joe Hathaway in the April 16 special general election in a district that has leaned Democratic in recent cycles.

A defining feature of the primary was heavy outside spending by American Israel Public Affairs Committee and allied entities aimed at defeating Malinowski. That intervention fragmented the field and may now result in the nomination of a candidate with rigid openly anti-Israel views.

Joe Hathaway, the mayor of Randolph, a former aid to Governor Christie, a Yale graduate, is the Republican nominee. He was not opposed in the primary. He is firmly in the Chris Christie wing of the party, is not MAGA, is thought to be a good communicator, is openly pro-Israel. This race could become quite competitive.

NY-10: Goldman vs. Lander, and the Outer Edges of a Safe Seat

Rep. Dan Goldman faces a Democratic primary challenge from Brad Lander in New York’s 10th Congressional District, a Lower Manhattan–Brooklyn seat that is overwhelmingly Democratic but internally diverse. The race has sorted along establishment versus progressive lines rather than around local service issues. Goldman’s coalition centers on institutional Democrats and older, pro-Israel voters; Lander’s support draws heavily from the city’s progressive and activist base.

Goldman enters with strong backing from party leadership, including Gov. Kathy Hochul and House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries. His campaign emphasizes governance, rule of law, and a conventionally pro-Israel posture that aligns with the district’s long-standing mainstream Democratic electorate. Lander, while an experienced citywide official, is running as the vehicle for the party’s left flank, with endorsements from Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. The substantive contrast is less about policy detail than about coalition composition and turnout in a low-salience primary.

The Republican baseline in NY-10 is minimal. In 2024, Republicans captured roughly 15 percent of the general-election vote, underscoring how limited the GOP’s role is in a typical cycle. That matters for possible 2026 scenarios. If Lander were to win a narrowly contested Democratic primary, the district would be one of the few in New York where an independent or third-party candidacy could plausibly test dissatisfaction among pro-Israel, centrist, and moderate Democrats who supported Goldman. Any such effort would draw primarily from Democratic and unaffiliated voters rather than from Republicans. Ballot access is feasible but time-constrained: independent nominating petitions must be filed in late May, ahead of the June primary, meaning any serious effort would need to be organized in advance as an insurance option rather than a post-primary reaction.

NY-12: Splintered Field, Not Yet an Ideological Fight

New York’s 12th District, opened by the retirement of Jerry Nadler, has a highly splintered Democratic primary in which a winner could plausibly emerge with well under 30 percent of the vote. Early speculation that Nadler stepped aside because his pro-Israel views were no longer viable has not been borne out by the race itself. Unlike NY-10, the contest has not sorted into a clear progressive-versus-establishment or pro- versus anti-Israel fight.

A key reason is demographic. NY-12 has a substantially larger and more institutionally rooted Jewish electorate than NY-10, which has acted as a moderating constraint on how far any serious contender can push on Israel or foreign policy. As a result, the race remains centered on credibility, experience, and coalition building rather than ideological polarization, even as the field remains crowded and fragmented.

CA-47: Jungle Primary Creates Unusual Math, Even With an Incumbent

California’s 47th District uses a top-two jungle primary, meaning all candidates — Democrats, Republicans, and independents — appear on the same ballot and only the two highest vote-getters advance. That structure can occasionally produce unexpected outcomes if one party’s vote fragments badly while another consolidates.

In 2026, incumbent Dave Min is the clear anchor and is very likely to finish in the top two. The remaining field is more fractured, with multiple Republican candidates and at least one independent competing for the second slot. While an independent advancing would require an unusually high level of vote splitting and remains unlikely based on current information, the jungle primary rules mean the race is shaped as much by coalition math as by party strength — leaving open the possibility of a nonstandard general election matchup even if Min advances comfortably.

For the framework and discussion on when and why centrist third-party candidacies become viable, especially in fragmented primaries and alternative electoral systems, see my earlier piece here: https://www.economicmemos.com/p/where-centrist-third-party-candidates.

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Why this quiz

A recurring argument for third-party or independent runs is that some races are simply “too expensive” to contest seriously. That claim is not equally true across offices.

U.S. House races, especially in smaller states, can sometimes be competitive at single-digit millions. In Iowa, several House races have been decided by razor-thin margins, and there is at least one closely contested seat opening up because a Republican incumbent is running for the Senate. In that context, a well-organized, well-targeted House campaign costing a couple of million dollars can plausibly matter.

U.S. Senate races are different. Even in a small, relatively inexpensive media state, the financial scale is much larger.

I am illustrating this point by giving you questions on the relative costs of House and Senate races in Iowa, a small state with a relatively inexpensive media market.

Quiz Question 1: Iowa U.S. House (2024)

In the 2024 general election, Iowa held four U.S. House races. Looking only at campaign spending by the general-election nominees from the two major parties, how much did Republicans and Democrats spend in total, and what was the statewide House total?

A)
Republicans: $9.0 million
Democrats: $6.1 million
Statewide total: $15.1 million

B)
Republicans: $13.0 million
Democrats: $8.1 million
Statewide total: $21.1 million

C)
Republicans: $18.7 million
Democrats: $11.6 million
Statewide total: $30.3 million

D)
Republicans: $24.5 million
Democrats: $15.2 million
Statewide total: $39.7 million

Quiz Question 2: Iowa U.S. Senate (2020)

In the 2020 Iowa U.S. Senate general election, the race featured an incumbent Republican senator and a well-funded Democratic challenger.

How much did each major-party candidate spend, and what was the statewide total?

A)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $19 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $26 million
Statewide total: $45 million

B)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $34 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $73 million
Statewide total: $107 million

C)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $30 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $56 million
Statewide total: $86 million

D)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $46 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $94 million
Statewide total: $140 million

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Answer and discussion

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Memo: Why Republicans Are Willing to Challenge Senator Cassidy Without Risking the Louisiana Senate Seat

Former President Donald Trump’s decision to endorse and actively encourage a MAGA-aligned challenger against a sitting Republican U.S. Senator would be risky in a competitive two-party state. In Louisiana, and in many other states throughout the country, it is not.

Trump won the state decisively. Louisiana Democrats have not held a U.S. Senate seat since 2005. Since then, Democratic statewide success has been episodic and contingent, largely confined to gubernatorial races under unusual conditions. Those victories depended on a weak Republican opponent, a uniquely positioned Democratic candidate with strong cultural or family ties to the state, and favorable timing. They did not produce a durable Democratic bench or competitive federal infrastructure. As a result, Democrats remain structurally noncompetitive in Louisiana’s federal elections.

Senator Bill Cassidy is often described as a moderate, but his policy record does not support that characterization. He is a consistently conservative legislator who has supported low taxes, limited government, and restrictive approaches to federal health spending. His legislative focus on restructuring ACA-related subsidies and premium supports places him squarely within contemporary conservative policy frameworks.

This distinction matters, because Cassidy’s vulnerability within the Republican Party is not ideological but relational. His vote to convict Trump in the second impeachment created a lasting breach with a large portion of the Republican base. Since then, he has governed conservatively but without the personal loyalty signaling that increasingly defines Republican primaries in Louisiana.

In Louisiana, more than ten candidates are seeking or preparing to seek the Republican nomination, while only a handful of Democrats have entered the race. None of the Democratic candidates show evidence of broad statewide appeal, major fundraising capacity, or an ability to consolidate independent or crossover Republican voters.

The practical result is a de facto one-party system in which the Republican primary, not the general election, determines who holds the Senate seat. In that environment, there is little political cost to pushing candidates toward ideological extremes. When only one party can realistically win, internal factional conflict replaces inter-party competition.

These one-party dynamics, replicated across multiple states, have meaningful national consequences. The modern Senate map increasingly insulates Republicans from sustained losses of control. One-party Republican states such as Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and several other rural states effectively remove entire Senate seats from genuine competition, even in favorable Democratic cycles.

As a result, Democratic paths to Senate majorities depend on winning an unusually large number of swing or marginal states simultaneously. Even during blue-wave elections, Republican losses tend to be limited and reversible. Control may shift temporarily, but structural advantages make long-term Democratic dominance unlikely.

This insulation fundamentally alters Republican risk calculations. Because the downside of losing a seat is low and often short-lived, party actors are more willing to tolerate internal disruption. Challenging incumbents, discarding experienced legislators, or elevating more ideologically rigid candidates carries limited existential risk when the underlying electoral terrain remains overwhelmingly favorable. Even in 2026, it is difficult to construct a plausible scenario in which Republicans lose Senate control due solely to intra-party contests in deep-red states.

The answer to the question of whether Democrats can now emerge as a competitive force in states like Louisiana is “Not now,” because a “D” next to a candidate’s name functionally disqualifies him or her. The more consequential question is whether a center-right alternative can emerge within or alongside the existing party system.

A separate memo, Viable Third-Party Opportunities in the 2026 Election, examines where a center party might compete without acting as a spoiler and tilting outcomes toward one of the two major parties. That analysis is available at https://www.economicmemos.com/p/viable-third-party-opportunities.

In Louisiana and similar states, a third party would not be the spoiler. Instead, the Democratic Party would more likely absorb anti-Trump voters, limiting the third party’s downside risk.

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Key Findings

1. Third-party viability in 2026 is highly constrained at the Senate level, with meaningful opportunities limited to a small number of states that combine independent voting traditions, favorable electoral rules, and manageable campaign costs.

2. The House represents the most credible near-term entry point for a centrist party, particularly in districts where primary dynamics, open seats, or polarized incumbents leave the ideological center unoccupied.

3. Spoiler risk is asymmetric: in some regions a centrist candidate could consolidate middle-of-the-electorate voters more effectively than a major-party nominee, while in others institutional barriers make third-party entry nonviable regardless of appeal.

4. This memo examines a targeted set of House districts across selected states where these conditions appear most salient; it is not a comprehensive national inventory, and further work is required to assess additional districts as filing deadlines approach and primary fields take shape.

Introduction

This memo assesses near-term tactical opportunities for a centrist or third-party effort under the current U.S. political map and electoral rules. It does not lay out a strategy for permanently changing the political environment and dialogue or for building long-term party viability. Instead, it identifies specific races in the 2026 cycle where, given current political circumstances a centrist candidate could plausibly compete and win without functioning primarily as a spoiler.

Senate seats

Third-party Senate competition in 2026 is realistically viable only in Maine and Alaska. Both states combine three necessary conditions: a demonstrated independent voting tradition, ranked choice voting in U.S. Senate general elections, and relatively inexpensive statewide media markets.

Outside Maine and Alaska, a third-party Senate run in 2026 would almost certainly function as a spoiler rather than a competitive alternative.

Even in Alaska and Maine, where electoral rules most strongly favor independent candidacies, the absence of serious centrist efforts indicates that organizational readiness and candidate recruitment, rather than voter resistance or spoiler dynamics, remain the binding constraints on third-party viability.

House races (strategic focus)

The House is the most credible entry point for a third party in 2026. House races are lower cost, less nationalized, and involve smaller electorates, increasing the likelihood of direct voter–candidate interaction. Across states, the decisive variable is the primary process. In most cases, independent candidates may file after the primaries, allowing the center candidate and party to enter races where one or more of the major party, nominate someone from the fringe leaving the center lane empty.

The binding constraint is readiness: candidate recruitment, funding, and ballot-access execution must be prepared in advance.

In some districts, particularly in culturally conservative or strongly anti-Democratic regions, the Democratic nominee does not function as the natural alternative to a Republican candidate. Under those conditions, a centrist candidate may be better positioned than the Democrat to consolidate opposition to an extreme Republican, with the Democratic Party effectively acting as the spoiler. This dynamic is most visible in districts such as CO-03, where a Democrat has repeatedly proven nonviable in the general election and a centrist candidate could plausibly consolidate opposition to a polarizing incumbent more effectively than a major-party challenger.

Maine — House races

Maine is one of the most favorable environments nationally for a third-party House effort. Ranked choice voting materially reduces spoiler risk, campaigns are relatively inexpensive, and voters have a long history of supporting independents.

Most viable: ME-02 (open seat). Ranked-choice voting, an evenly divided electorate, and the absence of an incumbent create a genuine path to competitiveness.

Nebraska — House races

Nebraska offers a real choice for a center candidate with Don Bacon retiring, the Omaha-based NE-02 becomes an open seat where Republican primary incentives may favor a more conservative nominee.

Colorado — House races

Colorado presents selective third-party opportunities driven less by marginal partisanship than by the risk of polarized nominees on both sides.

CO-03 currently represented by Lauren Boebert is the polarizing incumbent. The district is deeply conservative, but the district was better represented by Ken Buck a more mainstream Republican than Lauren Boebert. It is highly likely that a well prepared center-party candidate would have a better chance of winning this race than a Democrat.

CO-08 remains a highly fluid district with no entrenched partisan identity. The republican incumbent is on the right wing of the party. Again, if Democrats nominate a progressive there is a lot of room for a centrist third party candidate.

Two other districts, CO-04 and CO-05, remain highly competitive and should be monitored closely because primary outcomes could impact feasibility of a third-party run.

California — House races (jungle primary dynamics)

California’s top-two (“jungle”) primary creates opportunities for non-aligned or centrist candidates not by requiring them to win a plurality, but by allowing entry into the general election whenever dominant-party fields splinter sufficiently that no second major-party candidate consolidates the vote.

There are multiple districts in California where a qualified centrist could get in the top 2 and possibly win in November.

California’s top-two primary means a centrist can reach the general election without majority support when the dominant party splinters and the opposing party is structurally weak; in districts such as CA-12, CA-17, CA-30, CA-32, CA-37, CA-47, and CA-51.

Special case: CA-17 (Silicon Valley)

Ro Khanna is not the only Democrat facing potential intra-party competition, but he is distinctive in that his support for a federal wealth tax has generated observable interest among Silicon Valley donors and networks in identifying or backing a challenger.

If Nicholas Finan and any aligned backers were willing to compete explicitly as a centrist alternative rather than as a conventional Democratic primary challenger, CA-17 would represent one of the clearest examples in California of how the jungle primary can convert a splintered dominant-party field into a viable general-election entry point.

Iowa — House races

Iowa combines low media costs, a retail-politics culture, and voter fatigue with national polarization. Structural conditions are favorable, but time to organize and file is becoming the binding constraint.

Most viable: IA-02 (open seat). The absence of an incumbent reduces barriers to entry. Success depends on early organization to consolidate the middle.

IA-03 is conditionally viable if major-party nominees leave the ideological center unoccupied.

IA-01 is constrained by a two-party rematch dynamic.

IA-04 is not viable.

Pennsylvania — House races

The analysis in Pennsylvania centers on three districts, with PA-07 emerging as the most promising opportunity for a centrist candidate under current conditions.

PA-7 is a fundamentally moderate suburban district and Trump’s low approval ratings may hurt the first-term Republican incumbent. Formerly represented by Susan Wild, this district flipped Republican in 2024, probably because of Wild’s inconsistent statements on Gaza. A genuine third-party centrist may have a better opportunity to win this seat than a Democrat who panders to the base. (See this article for example https://freebeacon.com/democrats/rep-susan-wild-calls-herself-very-pro-israel-while-touting-endorsement-from-group-that-slanders-israel-as-apartheid-state/ Use Google to find other examples.)

PA-08 is currently represented by Rob Bresnahan. Despite its history of close general elections, Democratic leadership and primary dynamics in the district remain strongly oriented toward electability and rapid consolidation around a mainstream nominee, most likely Paige Cognetti rather than a more left-leaning or outsider challenger such as Eric Stone. As a result, there is limited unoccupied space in the political center. PA-08 is probably not a strong option for a centrist party unless something genuinely unusual occurs in the Democratic nomination process, such as a fractured primary, an unexpected nominee collapse, or a sharp ideological turn that alienates moderate voters.

PA-12 represented by Summer Lee. Republicans are not competitive in a two-party race, but the Democratic coalition is internally fractured. A centrist or pro-Israel candidacy could potentially consolidate moderates and disaffected Democrats, though this remains more conditional and less immediately promising than PA-07.

New York — House races

Several New York Democratic primaries have become explicit referenda on Israel and Middle East policy, creating the potential for coalition rupture in otherwise noncompetitive general elections.

NY-10 represented by Dan Goldman. Goldman is among the most visible pro-Israel Democrats and has drawn sustained opposition centered on Gaza and Middle East policy. If Goldman were to lose a Democratic primary on this basis, the general election dynamics would change materially. Republicans are not competitive in this district, and if a Republican nominee were to back off or remain minimal, a pro-Israel centrist candidate could plausibly win outright by consolidating moderates, Jewish voters, and pro-Israel Democrats.

NY-12 is an open seat following the decision by Jerry Nadler not to seek reelection. The district is safely Democratic in the general election, which has produced a large and ideologically diverse Democratic primary field with no clear successor or consensus candidate.

Middle East and Israel policy has emerged as a meaningful fault line among Democratic voters in the district. A potentially progressive, anti-Israel nominee could create an opening for a centrist candidate by leaving a cohesive bloc of pro-Israel, moderate, and institutionally minded voters without representation in the general election. Under those conditions, post-primary consolidation should not be assumed, and the district warrants close monitoring as a potential centrist entry point.

NY-15 is currently represented by Ritchie Torres, who has taken a consistently strong and unambiguous pro-Israel position. The Democratic primary opposition is fragmented among multiple progressive challengers who are largely competing with one another rather than consolidating against the incumbent. Under current conditions, the district appears safe for Torres in the primary and safe for Democrats in the general election.

NY-21 is an open seat following the retirement of Elise Stefanik, and both parties are facing crowded, unsettled primaries. On both the Republican and Democratic sides, most prospective candidates appear oriented toward mobilizing their respective party bases in order to survive competitive nomination contests. That incentive structure raises the risk that one party—most plausibly Republicans in a GOP-leaning district—could nominate a candidate whose profile is poorly matched to the general electorate. If either party nominates a perceived extremist or culturally rigid candidate, an opening could emerge for a centrist alternative. As is often the case with open seats, the absence of an incumbent creates volatility; the existence of a center lane depends less on structural ideology in the district than on nomination outcomes and candidate quality.

Wisconsin — House races

WI-03 is likely to feature a conventional two-party rematch. This is not a good opportunity for the center party unless the Democrats nominate someone from the fringe.

Montana — House races

MT-01 is driven by candidate quality rather than partisan fundamentals. A third-party entry would likely function as a spoiler.

Arizona — House races

AZ-01 and AZ-06 are districts where Democrats have lost recent close general elections after nominating progressive candidates, and the 2026 cycle again features splintered Democratic primaries, making these seats additional examples of centrist-party opportunity contingent on Democratic primary outcomes.

Texas — House races

Texas should be excluded from consideration in 2026 due to ballot-access constraints.

Florida — House races

Florida should be treated as non-viable for third-party entry absent a structural shock.

Conclusion

This memo represents a preliminary look at a limited set of races that immediately stand out under current political conditions. It is not a comprehensive national inventory; a fuller mapping can be developed as filing deadlines approach and primary dynamics clarify across states.

In the current political environment, with a newly elected president entering a midterm and a closely divided Congress, conventional expectations would point toward Democrats gaining more than enough seats to regain control of the House, particularly given current polling. However, the statistics in this essay suggest that the leftward drift of the Democratic party could result in the Democrats fall short of their objective of winning back the House of Representatives. This leftward drift of the Democratic party and the existence of some fairly conservative Republicans incumbents in districts with a substantial number of voters either a bit right or a bit left of center could lead to opportunities for a center party.

Ballot-access constraints rule out these races in 2026 and shift relevance to the 2028 cycle, but they also illustrate that in some regions the Democratic Party, not a centrist challenger, is the binding constraint on anti-Republican consolidation.

The caution throughout this memo regarding third-party entry reflects an assumption that a center party would enter races without a fully articulated and distinctive governing agenda. Under those conditions, restraint is appropriate to avoid functioning as a spoiler. That assessment would change if a center party offers a clear, substantive alternative to both major parties—one that addresses concrete policy failures rather than merely offering a more civil tone or technocratic competence. A sharply differentiated platform can enable consolidation rather than fragmentation by giving voters a reason to realign, not simply defect.

Note that a center party effort to gain a relatively modest number of House seats could result in the center party having real political power and could improve the political environment because neither side could elect a speaker without some support from the moderates. The key ingredient for the emergence of a such a liftoff is a positive, constructive agenda that contrasts clearly with the reactive status quo currently offered by both major parties. Go to the memo Neither Party is Solving the Household Debt Problem for a discussion of how the center party could do a better job solving four challenges impacting finances of American household -- obtaining affordable health insurance coverage, reducing student debt, saving for retirement, and assuring the solvency of Social Security.

This memo will be expanded to include other states and updated as filing deadlines approach and primary dynamics evolve.

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Key findings

• Iowa has shifted from electing four Democrats to the U.S. House in 2018 to holding four Republican seats today.

• The prevailing 2026 baseline is three seats that lean or are likely Republican and one seat that is safely Republican.

• IA-01 is a rematch of remarkably close previous races.

• IA-02 is an open seat that leans Republican.

• IA-03 is extremely competitive may highlight a MAGA candidate against a centrist Democrat.

• IA-04 appears safely Republican.

• Independent candidates could plausibly appeal to Iowa voters given low campaign costs, a tradition of ticket-splitting, fatigue with polarized politics, and voter concern about ideological nominees.

• No credible centrist campaigns appear to be forming in IA.

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Introduction:

Iowa is a retail-politics state. Door-to-door contact, county-level credibility, repeat exposure, and local media matter more than national branding. Media markets are relatively inexpensive, which reduces the advantage of national money and raises the value of field operations and candidate familiarity. The electorate is overwhelmingly white and older than the national median, a structure that has constrained Democratic performance as the national party message emphasizes constituencies that are small in Iowa.

The Democratic Party’s decision to de-prioritize Iowa in presidential nominating calendars weakened long-term organizing pipelines, volunteer morale, and candidate recruitment.

Presidential-nomination success does not translate reliably to congressional outcomes because House primaries and general elections feature older, habitual voters who emphasize general-election survivability and local fit while presidential primaries have wider turnout.

IA-01 — Eastern and Northeast Iowa

Status: incumbent-held Republican seat.
Likely nominees: Mariannette Miller-Meeks and Christina Bohannan.

This district is a rematch of remarkably close previous races, including contests decided by margins so small they required recount-level scrutiny. That record demonstrates that Democrats can compete here while also underscoring the advantages of incumbency built through persistence, donor loyalty, and turnout discipline. The rematch dynamic simplifies coalition building for the Democratic nominee and reinforces name recognition on both sides. Meeks is the favorite because she is the incumbent, but Bohannan could win in a blue wave election.

IA-02 — Eastern Iowa

Status: open seat following the incumbent’s decision to run for Senate.

This is the most volatile race structurally, but the volatility does not equal competitiveness parity. Without an incumbent, candidate quality and message matter more, yet the district’s fundamentals still lean Republican. If Democrats nominate a broadly acceptable candidate, the race resembles a traditional open-seat contest that favors Republicans by a modest margin. If Democrats nominate a more ideologically sharp candidate, the absence of a true centrist independent means dissatisfied moderates have no consolidating alternative, increasing fragmentation rather than producing a three-way realignment.

IA-03 — Central Iowa and Des Moines

Recent results here were close, and the incumbent is beatable under the right conditions. The district blends a Democratic-leaning metro core with suburbs and exurbs that have trended right. Democratic success requires a nominee who maximizes Polk County turnout while limiting suburban losses. Democrats appear poised to nominate a centrist candidate, which keeps the district plausibly in play and preserves a credible path to defeating the incumbent in a favorable environment.

IA-04 — Western and Northwest Iowa

This district is structurally Republican and not competitive at the congressional level. Democratic nominees typically run to advance issues rather than to win, and there is no independent or centrist presence capable of changing that equilibrium. Republican primaries matter more than the general election, unless there is a huge blue wave.

The centrist and independent question

Iowa presents several conditions that could support a centrist or independent candidacy: low media costs, a voter culture that values pragmatism, fatigue with polarized parties, and anxiety about ideologically extreme nominees. An open seat like IA-02 would be the natural venue. Under Iowa law, independent and non-party candidates must file nomination papers during the general-election window in late summer (July 27 to August 22, 2026), which places a premium on early organizational groundwork well before formal filing.

Credible success would require early organization, substantial fundraising, county-by-county ballot-access execution, and a clear, unifying brand. At present, no well-funded, explicitly centrist effort is organizing at scale anywhere on the Iowa House map. Existing independents do not consolidate the political middle and are more likely to fragment dissatisfaction. The absence of a true centrist candidacy—particularly in an open district—appears to be a missed opportunity, leaving a potentially receptive electorate without a vehicle.

As a result, the center remains unoccupied, and close races default to two-party dynamics that favor Republicans. Iowa’s House landscape in 2026 therefore remains tilted Republican: IA-01 and IA-03 are competitive by Iowa standards, IA-02 is open but still structurally Republican, and IA-04 is not in play. The theoretical opening for a centrist alternative exists, but without organization it remains unrealized.

Iowa’s House landscape in 2026 remains tilted Republican. IA-01 and IA-03 are competitive by Iowa standards, IA-02 is open but still structurally Republican, and IA-04 is not in play. The theoretical opening for a centrist alternative exists, but without organization it remains unrealized.

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· The state that has remained Republican at the statewide level since the Ann Richards era, despite repeated Democratic claims that Texas is on the verge of turning blue, claims that consistently fall short at the ballot box.

· Early filing deadlines eliminate meaningful independent or third-party alternatives, meaning that once nominees are chosen, voters have little recourse even if both choices are polarizing

· Many Texans appear to vote reliably Republican not because of enthusiasm for the Republican band but more because of dislike of the Democrat option.

· The 2026 Senate primary process could lead to the nomination of both a Democrat and Republican on the political extreme.

· A mid-decade redistricting may increase the number of Republican seats but the new map also increases the number of House seats in play.

U.S. Senate (2026)

There is a real possibility that the two 2026 nominees for Senate in Texas will be from the extremes of both parties, if Jasmine Crockett becomes the Democrat nominee and Ken Paxton the Republican one. This outcome leaves centrists in Texas without a voice in the general election contest for Senator.

In the Democratic primary, Rep. Jasmine Crockett has consolidated support among progressive activists through aggressive, highly visible criticism of former President Donald Trump. Her rhetoric—often framing Trump and his supporters as a direct threat to democracy—plays effectively with a Democratic primary electorate but is poorly aligned with the broader Texas electorate, where Trump remains popular and Republican identification is strong.

Crockett has also endorsed progressive positions such as abolishing or sharply reducing funding for immigration enforcement and has taken strongly critical positions toward the Israeli government in the context of the Gaza conflict, positions that place her well to the left of the Texas median voter and invite nationalization of the race.

These positions are likely to dominate a general election narrative. Republicans would have little difficulty portraying Crockett as hostile to law enforcement, dismissive of border enforcement, and aligned with the most critical elements of the pro-Palestinian movement at a time when Texas voters remain broadly supportive of Israel. Even where her statements emphasize humanitarian concerns, the cumulative effect is to anchor her candidacy on cultural and foreign-policy issues that test poorly in statewide Texas contests.

Veteran Democratic strategist James Carville has publicly warned that Crockett’s political style prioritizes viral moments and personal brand-building over broad electoral appeal, arguing that such an approach may win attention and a primary but is ill-suited to winning statewide in a conservative-leaning state. That critique echoes quieter concerns among Democratic operatives that Crockett could plausibly win a low-turnout primary while struggling to assemble the cross-partisan coalition required to compete in a Texas general election.

State Rep. James Talarico brings a profile that aligns unusually well with the kind of coalition Democrats would need to compete statewide in Texas. His background as a public school teacher is a tangible political asset in a state where education remains a high-trust profession, particularly in rural communities that have grown uneasy with aggressive private-school voucher and school-choice initiatives advanced by Gov. Greg Abbott. While Abbott’s education agenda has energized conservative activists, it has also generated backlash among rural Republicans who see local public schools as civic anchors and are skeptical of policies that could drain funding or weaken small districts.

Talarico’s teaching experience allows him to speak credibly to those concerns without sounding ideological or confrontational. Combined with his low-key demeanor, faith background, and emphasis on affordability and service, he presents a political style that is culturally legible to conservative and Republican-leaning voters even when they disagree with him on policy.

Unlike more nationalized Democratic figures, Talarico does not project as a partisan combatant; his appeal is rooted in competence, restraint, and moral seriousness. In a state that has been solidly red for decades, that posture may not be sufficient on its own—but it is meaningfully better suited than a confrontational progressive profile to attracting rural voters, soft Republicans, and independents who are uneasy with both ideological extremes.

Republicans face a very different internal choice. Sen. John Cornyn is one of the most experienced and institutionally powerful Republicans in Congress. Having served more than two decades in the Senate, Cornyn is among the chamber’s senior members and has held some of the party’s most consequential leadership roles, including Senate Republican Whip, where he was responsible for vote-counting, message discipline, and floor strategy. Earlier in his tenure, he chaired the National Republican Senatorial Committee, playing a central role in shaping the GOP’s Senate majority strategy.

Substantively, Cornyn’s committee assignments reflect both trust and influence. He has long served on the Judiciary Committee, where he helped shape conservative legal priorities and federal judicial confirmations, as well as the Finance Committee, giving him leverage over tax, trade, and entitlement policy. His service on the Intelligence Committeeplaces him within a small group of senators trusted with national security oversight. Collectively, these roles make Cornyn one of Texas’s most effective conduits for federal influence, constituent services, and policy outcomes.

From both a governing and electoral perspective, forcing Cornyn out would be a major unforced error. Substantively, Texas would be trading seniority, committee power, and leadership reach for uncertainty. Politically, Cornyn represents the safest available option for holding the seat in the general election: low-drama, well-funded, and difficult to caricature. While his style may frustrate segments of the Republican base that prize confrontation, removing a seasoned institutional actor in favor of a more volatile nominee would unnecessarily increase general-election risk and weaken Texas’s position within the Senate.

Attorney General Ken Paxton is among the most polarizing figures in Texas politics, combining strong support from the Republican base with an unusually long record of controversy and hard-line policy choices.

In 2023, Paxton was impeached by the Texas House of Representatives, including by members of his own party, on charges stemming from allegations that he abused the powers of his office to benefit a political donor, retaliated against whistleblowers, and engaged in improper conduct. Although he was acquitted by the Texas Senate, the trial aired extensive testimony from former aides and senior officials, reinforcing public perceptions of ethical risk even as it failed to meet the high bar for conviction.

As Attorney General, Paxton has pursued an aggressively ideological agenda that has placed Texas at the forefront of national conservative legal battles. He played a central role in enforcing and defending Texas’s near-total abortion ban, including legal strategies that deter providers from offering care even in medically complex cases. Paxton has also led multistate lawsuits challenging federal immigration enforcement, environmental regulations, and administrative authority, often framing policy disputes as existential conflicts with the federal government. These actions have elevated his national profile and energized conservative voters but have also positioned him well to the right of the general Texas electorate, particularly suburban and business-oriented Republicans.

Electorally, Paxton has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to survive scandals and win statewide by consolidating grievance-driven and ideological voters. At the same time, his record ensures that a general election campaign would center less on partisan policy differences and more on judgment, institutional integrity, and the appropriate use of public power. That dynamic creates higher volatility than a conventional Republican nominee and introduces material downside risk in a general election, even in a state that remains structurally favorable to the GOP.

Rep. Wesley Hunt provides Republicans with a third option. A West Point graduate and former Army Apache helicopter pilot, Hunt combines military credentials with service on committees relevant to Texas’s economic interests, including energy and small business. While he currently trails Cornyn and Paxton, his presence increases the likelihood of a runoff and prolongs internal conflict, potentially weakening the eventual nominee.

The central Senate reality is that Texas Democrats remain heavy underdogs. Republicans have not lost a statewide race since Ann Richards. Any Democratic upset would require a nominee who minimizes ideological caricature and shifts voter attention toward competence, character, and Republican risk rather than partisan identity.

Author’s Note

Economic and Political Insights is running a weekly focus on the 2026 political races and how electoral outcomes intersect with real-world economic policy. The prior installment examined New York.

My broader work focuses on economic and financial policy affecting households, with particular attention to health care, student debt, retirement savings, and Social Security. A recent essay argues that neither political party is adequately addressing the economic pressures facing families.
https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/neither-party-is-solving-the-household

I also publish practical personal-finance guidance aimed at helping readers make better saving, investing, and planning decisions, often saving many times the cost of a subscription.
https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/personal-finance-in-the-real-world

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U.S. House (2026)

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How to read it

• Key Developments summarize the facts shaping the landscape.

• Key Insights assess probabilities, second-order effects, and underappreciated risks.

New York Political Insights Memo

Polarization, Israel, and the shrinking center

Key Developments — Summary (Free)

• Elise Stefanik exited the New York governor’s race, underscoring the structural difficulty Republicans face statewide.

• Israel has emerged as a central dividing line in multiple New York Democratic House primaries.

• Progressive challengers aligned with the Mamdani wing are contesting establishment Democrats in several safe seats.

• Republicans remain noncompetitive in these districts, but certain primary outcomes could have broader electoral consequences.

Related Reading

This memo builds on themes explored in my pinned essay, “Neither Party Is Solving the Household Debt Problem,”which examines how ideological rigidity and political incentives are producing worse outcomes across health care, student loans, and retirement—regardless of which party is in power.

👉 https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/neither-party-is-solving-the-household

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Maine’s 2nd Congressional District is one of the most competitive districts in the United States. It has a long record of split-ticket voting and casts its own electoral vote for President. In 2024 it gave its one electoral vote to Trump and elected Jared Golden, a truly independent Democrat to the House.

Golden frequently broke with Democrats, especially on spending fights and government shutdown brinkmanship. His willingness to defy his own leadership was central to his credibility in the district. That lane—pragmatic, skeptical of both parties, locally focused—is now unoccupied.

The current field of candidates seeking both the Democratic and Republican nomination for governor is weak. On the Democratic side, neither Matt Dunlap or Jordan Wood have Golden’s independent streak or ability at either policy analysis or politics. Dunlap has a long record and is viewed as competent but not inspiring. Wood has more energy but is considerably too liberal for the district.

On the Republican side Lepage, the former governor is considered polarizing due to his record as governor. Clark an army veteran with an impressive resume has no substantial political record and is harder to assess.

This combination—an open seat, an electorate that rewards independence, and a field of major-party candidates each mismatched in different ways—creates a rare opening. ME-2 voters have repeatedly shown they will reject national party narratives and support candidates who project authenticity, moderation, and a willingness to buck their own side.

None of the four current candidates fills the “Golden mold”: the pragmatic, non-ideological problem-solver who speaks fluently to working-class Mainers and is visibly not captured by national partisanship.

A qualified, articulate third-party or independent candidate with real ties to the district could immediately differentiate themselves by occupying that lane.

The district uses rank-choice voting. Under ranked-choice voting, a candidate does not need to win a traditional plurality—only to be the broadly acceptable alternative. A centrist has an advantage in rank-choice voting in a three-way race.

Maine’s 2nd District is winnable for a well-qualified, locally rooted, third party candidate. The centrist party needs to start recruiting and doing the work to get their person on the ballot ASAP.

Authors Note: I am going offline for several days. Readers interested in the 2026 contests should go to this article on the viable path for a third-party candidate. Readers interested in personal finance in the real world can find substantial information on my post. My most recent investment post compares TGT and WMT.

I will be offline until December 14 because of real world events. See you then.

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This memo seeks to identify congressional districts in my adopted home state of Colorado that are conducive to third-party centrist challengers for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. A previous memo advanced the argument that the most immediate path for a third party to become a viable political force and influence policy was through competing for seats in the House of Representatives, not the Senate or the presidency.

The analysis recognizes that the national political environment is extremely volatile, and events over the next year will determine the number of opportunities for a third party in Colorado and elsewhere. These events include:

• worsening inflation and unemployment,

• a second government shutdown and/or higher health insurance costs due to expiration of the premium tax credit,

• additional actions by an impulsive president, both foreign and domestic,

• a sharp movement of the Democratic Party to the left, evidenced by increased “progressive” challenges to incumbent Democrats.

Factors determining the viability of a third-party candidate in the current political environment include -- whether the seat is currently open, whether the incumbent or the incumbent’s party has been entrenched for a long time, whether recent margins have been close, and whether there are meaningful intra-party disagreements inside the district.

Four Colorado districts — CO-1, CO-2, CO-6, and CO-7 — present steep challenges for any centrist or third-party effort. The reasons are clear:

• The 2024 results showed Democratic incumbents winning by comfortable, often substantial margins.

• Republicans have shown little interest in contesting these seats, recruiting few strong challengers or investing meaningful resources.

• Each incumbent is well aligned with the district’s median voter and faces no serious primary threat.

• There is no evident ideological vacuum or dissatisfied voter bloc large enough to support an outsider candidacy.

Summary

CO-1 (Diana DeGette): Deep-blue Denver; Republicans noncompetitive.
CO-2 (Joe Neguse): Boulder-based progressive electorate; minimal GOP presence.
CO-6 (Jason Crow): Safely Democratic; Crow already occupies the pragmatic center-left lane.
CO-7 (Brittany Pettersen): Suburban district trending Democratic; GOP disengagement persists.

While political conditions can always change, the current landscape in these four districts offers few immediate opportunities for a centrist challenger in 2026.

Potentially Contestable Districts

The following four districts — CO-3, CO-4, CO-5, and CO-8 — are the most important to watch in Colorado.

Congressional District (CO-3)

Colorado’s 3rd District is Republican leaning but has been closely contested. Lauren Boebert left the district after barely winning in 2022. Jeff Hurd, a Republican closer to the center, won a close race in 2024. The Democrats should nominate a centrist for another close contest in 2026. It may be difficult for a centrist to position themselves from the other two candidates but many voters in this district are unhappy with the extremes of their party

Congressional District (CO-4)

Colorado’s 4th District remains strongly Republican, but its internal dynamics are less settled than the partisan label suggests. Rep. Lauren Boebert is the incumbent but she was opposed by more than 50 percent of Republican primary voters in a crowded 2024, field.

The Democratic primary contest appears to be a close contest between Eileen Laubacher a centrist and Trisha Calvarese a progressive. A centrist candidate has a strong chance if Democrats nominate Calvarese.

Congressional District (CO-5)

Colorado’s 5th District is dominated by the Republican Party, and its ideological center of gravity sits firmly on the conservative side. Incumbent Jeff Crank, aligned with national movement-conservative and MAGA-adjacent organizations, secured his position by consolidating institutional right-wing support and faces no significant primary opposition in 2026 but a quarter of Republican primary voters opposed him 202m in 2024

On the Democratic side, the field is unusually large — Zurit Horowitz, Jessica Killin, Justice Lord, Joe Reagan, Jamey Smith, and Michelle Tweed — though Killin stands out for her early fundraising strength and establishment backing. The district leans republican and a centrist candidate might be more viable than the Democrat.

Congressional District (CO-8)

Colorado’s 8th District, created in 2022, has oscillated between the parties and features a demographically and ideologically mixed electorate. Republican incumbent Gabe Evans faces only nominal primary challengers, while the Democratic primary is considerably more active.

State Representatives Shannon Bird and Manny Rutinel are the leading contenders, with Bird presenting a pragmatic, centrist profile and Rutinel reflecting more activist, progressive instincts. Additional entrants — including Evan Munsing and State Treasurer Dave Young — add further ideological variation.

Neither party is fully entrenched in this District. A smart well-funded centrist would have a substantial chance of winning this district.

Conclusion

The current political environment suggests that centrist candidates in Colorado are most viable in districts where one or both major parties nominate figures outside the ideological mainstream — for example, a strongly MAGA-aligned Republican or a progressive or relatively untested Democratic nominee.

Centrist candidates are viable in four districts – CO 3, CO 4, CO 5, and CO 8. CO 3 is the most difficult race for a third-party centrist. CO-4, CO-5, and CO-8 are highly fluid. All three districts have an extremely conservative Republican incumbent. A third party centrist would immediately become viable if the Democratic party nominee is a progressive.

National dynamics could dramatically reshape the landscape. Should both major parties continue to exhibit dysfunction — through fiscal standoffs, government shutdowns, intraparty conflict, and an inability to reach durable policy agreements – opportunities for centrist third party candidates could expand and elections could be framed as a referendum on the viability of the two major parties.

A centrist party would need to articulate a positive, comprehensive governing agenda that distinguishes its approach clearly from both Republican and Democratic orthodoxies, especially on economic policy. Remember James Carville’s famous advice – “It’s the economy stupid.”

Future Work

This analysis of the political environment in Colorado is a first step. Additional statewide studies and a master file of all 435 races behind a paywall will be available soon.

I am also developing a comprehensive national third-party domestic policy agenda which will clarify how a centrist movement can differentiate itself substantively from both major parties. This agenda will build upon and integrate themes from a number of my existing policy posts on economic reform.

· See How the 2024 Tax Law Quietly Reshaped Debt for Young Doctors.

· See A Brief Note on the ACA Subsidy Debate.

· See The Life Cycle Inconsistency at the Center of U.S. Saving Policy.

The goal is to create a coherent set of resources so that people in the middle of the political spectrum can once again have a voice and our nation will move forward in a better direction.

Although today’s post focuses on politics, much of my work also covers real-world personal finance—how taxes, benefits, healthcare rules, and debt shape the decisions households actually face. Personal finance content can be obtained at the post below.

👉 https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/personal-finance-in-the-real-world

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More importantly, this revision sharpens the core lesson of the original paper: dissatisfaction alone will not build a viable third party. Voters may be alienated, but alienation does not create movements—purpose does. Centrists cannot win by merely offering themselves as a refuge from polarization or as a protest against dysfunction. They must stand forcefully for something concrete. The organizing principle proposed here is simple and overdue: restoring the financial security of American households. That means making affordable health care permanent, reforming student debt to reduce lifetime burdens, ensuring access to real retirement saving, and—most urgently—fixing Social Security before delay makes reform brutal instead of manageable. Without that mission, centrism is just posture; with it, it becomes a governing program.

This paper therefore argues not for a symbolic third party, but for an operational one. It cuts through abstraction and focuses on what actually matters: winning competitive House seats. Using recent election results, it identifies where change is possible, which voters are movable, and how a new political force can be built from Congress outward—rather than from the presidency down.

Key Findings

• America needs a viable centrist third party because the two major parties have shown they are no longer capable of effective governance and no longer reflect the preferences of the large, politically moderate majority.

• Third parties historically fail at the presidential level because they cannot win Electoral Votes. Statewide Senate elections are extremely expensive. Barriers to entry are much smaller in the House than in the Senate.

• The likelihood of a centrist third party candidate winning election is substantially higher in open seats and recently flipped seats where the incumbent is not entrenched.

• Gerrymandering will increase the number of districts where a centrist third-party challenger has a real opportunity to win because all candidates must appeal to new voters and because the process of making additional districts competitive can increase the voice of independent voters in multiple districts being rearranged.

• Centrist candidates have an increased chance of victory when parties nominate extreme candidates. Many centrist Republican feel voiceless when their nominee is MAGA and many Democratic centrists feel voiceless when their nominee is progressive.

• Two of the most favorable districts in 2026 are ME-2 and NE-2, with eight additional competitive seats examined in the full paper. A full assessment of all 435 races will be available shortly.

• The centrist party that wins only 5 to 10 seats could literally pick the new speaker of the House if neither party takes a clear majority of seats.

The Viable Path for the Immediate Emergence of a Third Party

America’s two-party system has reached a point where its failure is no longer episodic but systemic, a conclusion underscored in the preceding essay, The Case for a Third Party Now.

https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/179674614?referrer=%2Fpublish%2Fhome

• Health Care: Republicans work to weaken Medicaid and the ACA exchanges—the only option for people without employer coverage—while Democrats failed to make premium tax credits permanent, leaving affordability as temporary policy rather than structural reform.

• Student Debt: Republican reforms increase borrower complexity and burden, while Democratic mass-forgiveness and “free college” proposals are fiscally unbounded—leaving no serious path to long-term, system-level reform.

• Retirement Security: Recent legislation expanded benefits for workers already in the system but did virtually nothing for the tens of millions without access to employer-based retirement plans.

• Social Security: Both parties delay inevitable reform—Republicans rejecting revenue increases and Democrats rejecting benefit adjustments—ensuring the eventual fix will be more painful and destabilizing.

The inability of Democrats and Republicans to confront core economic challenges—student debt, health-care affordability, retirement insecurity, and the looming Social Security shortfall—reflects a deeper political paralysis driven by ideological extremes, institutional erosion, and a Congress incapable of basic governance.

As the political center collapses and millions of pragmatic voters find themselves without a political home, the emergence of a credible third party is no longer a theoretical aspiration but an urgent necessity. This essay lays out a realistic path for making that alternative a governing force—not someday, but now.

The most realistic path towards the quick formation of a third party, which wields real influence and power starts, not with a presidential campaign or costly Senate efforts, but with winning seats in the House of Representatives, where barriers to entry are relatively low.

A genuinely centrist, solutions-oriented third party could win a meaningful number of seats in the House of Representatives as early as 2026. The House—not presidential or Senate races—is the most strategic and realistic point of entry.

This essay lists six reason why the effort to retake America must start in the House of Representatives

Reason 1: Third Party efforts to obtain the presidency almost always fizzle

The last time a “third” political party was successful was the emergence of the Republican party in the 1850s. It did not result in a three-party system because the Whigs quickly disintegrated.

Third parties seldom have a meaningful impact on presidential election outcomes or even win any electoral votes.

From 1892 to 1968, only six third-party or independent presidential candidates won any Electoral Votes: James B. Weaver in 1892 (22 EVs), Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 (88 EVs), Robert La Follette in 1924 (13 EVs), Strom Thurmond in 1948 (39 EVs), Harry F. Byrd via unpledged electors in 1960 (15 EVs), and George Wallace in 1968 (46 EVs).

From 1972 to the present, several major third-party or independent candidates mounted national campaigns—including John Anderson, Ross Perot, Ralph Nader, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Jo Jorgensen, and others—but none won a single Electoral Vote.

Reason 2: Senate Races Are Extremely Expensive

Senate races are now so expensive that a new party would burn an enormous share of its scarce resources on a single statewide race—especially in big states like Texas or politically pivotal ones like Georgia and Iowa.

In Texas, the 2018 Cruz–O’Rourke race cost just over $125 million in candidate spending alone. In 2020, Sen. John Cornyn spent more than $36 million on his reelection campaign; that figure excludes much of the outside spending that also poured into the race. Realistically, a truly competitive Texas Senate effort today implies something like $75–100 million once candidate and outside spending are combined.

Georgia shows the same pattern. The 2020–21 Ossoff–Perdue Senate race became the most expensive Senate contest in U.S. history, with over $468 million in total spending by candidates and outside groups. Raphael Warnock’s race in the same cycle also involved candidate spending in the hundreds of millions across primary, general, and runoff stages.

Even a mid-sized state like Iowa now sees eye-watering figures. The 2020 Ernst–Greenfield race involved roughly $259 million in total candidate and outside spending. By contrast, the front-line IA-01 House race that same year saw the two candidates raise just over $9 million combined.

Nationwide, the average cost of winning a House seat is now around $3 million, while a typical Senate race can cost ten times that—before counting outliers like Georgia.

For a new centrist third party, the tradeoff is stark. Forgoing a single marquee Senate race (e.g., Texas at $75–100 million) frees enough resources to finance 25–30 well-funded House campaigns.

Reason 3: Challengers Have a Decent Shot in Open House Seats

The 2024 election results confirm that Open seats dramatically reduce the power of incumbency.

When the two newly created redistricting seats (AL-2 and NC-6) are properly counted as open, the numbers become:

• Open seats: 46 total

• Open seats that flipped: 8 → 17.4% flip rate

• Incumbent seats: 389 total

• Incumbent seats that flipped: 11 → 2.8% flip rate

Statistically, open seats were over six times more likely to change hands.

This pattern is consistent with past cycles:

• In 2018, there were 52 incumbents not seeking reelection (plus 7 vacant seats).

• In 2022, there were 49.

Every open seat is a rare opportunity where a new party can compete on equal footing. A centrist party could focus almost exclusively on open seats in its first cycle and still make significant gains. As of November 2025, 38 incumbents have already announced they will not seek reelection in 2026, a number which will increase as we near the primary season.

Reason 4: Political Gerrymandering Can Create More Opportunities for a Third Party

Although gerrymandering is often condemned for entrenching partisan control, its side effects frequently create openings for non-traditional candidates.

First, when map-drawers try to “un-pack” or “re-balance” districts, they often pull swing or independent voters out of safe districts and inject them into competitive ones. The result can be two newly volatile districts instead of one safer seat.

Second, mid-decade map changes often trigger retirements, as incumbents refuse to run in unfamiliar territory or face primaries against other incumbents. Every retirement increases the supply of open potentially competitive seats.

Third, even incumbents who stay must reintroduce themselves to tens of thousands of new voters. During these “transition cycles,” partisan loyalties weaken, and centrist candidates can gain traction by appealing to voters who dislike both major parties.

This dynamic is accelerating. California’s Prop 50 replaced the independent commission’s map with a legislature-drawn map expected to create more competitive Democratic-leaning seats. Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida have all undergone or are undergoing aggressive mid-decade redraws.

Gerrymandering does not just distort representation; it produces volatile districts where a pragmatic third party can win.

Reason 5: Statewide Wins Usually Require Prior Political Experience

Statewide elections typically reward candidates with existing political careers. The House is the pipeline.

In the nine open Senate seats in 2024:

• Seven of the 18 nominees were sitting U.S. House members.

• All seven won their Senate races:

  • Ruben Gallego (AZ)

  • Adam Schiff (CA)

  • Lisa Blunt Rochester (DE)

  • Jim Banks (IN)

  • Elissa Slotkin (MI)

  • Andy Kim (NJ)

  • John Curtis (UT)

House service is a dominant pathway to the Senate. A third party must build a House bench prior to seeking power in the Senate.

Reason 6: Increased Polarization Is Creating “Orphaned” Voters

American polarization now routinely produces general-election matchups that leave large numbers of voters politically homeless. Republicans often nominate MAGA-aligned candidates who are out of step with suburban professionals and center-right independents. Democrats increasingly advance deeply progressive candidates who do not reflect the preferences of moderate or culturally traditional voters—even within the Democratic coalition.

Suburban districts where Biden won but Republicans hold the House seat—AZ-01, CA-27, NY suburbs—exhibit consistent voter dissatisfaction. Other districts, like PA-12, place moderate Democrats in a bind because their party nominates candidates to the left of the district median while Republicans are too weak to provide an alternative.

Structural forces deepen the problem. Texas has not elected a Democrat statewide since 1994, meaning Republican primaries are the only meaningful contests—heightening ideological pressure. Florida has transformed from the nation’s battle ground to a reliably Republican state. There are moderate or traditional Republican controlled districts in Florida, Texas and in some other western states, which won’t swing to the Democrats but could swing to a new centrist party.

An increase in the number of “progressive” Democrats challenging centrist Democratic House incumbents will both increase incumbents and possible contestable races for centrist candidates in the general election.

Motivated by Zohran Mamdani’s mayoral victory, progressives are now mounting or contemplating primary challenges to pro-Israel Democratic incumbents in at least four New York congressional races -- NY 6, NY 10, NY 13, and NY 15. However, Mamdani himself according to exit polls only won around one third of the Jewish vote. Typically, around two-thirds to three-fourths of Jewish voters vote for the Democratic candidate.

If anti-Israel progressives capture these districts in the primaries, the general election could open space for a centrist alternative in seats that are otherwise solidly left of center.

Voters who both strongly support Israel, and other progressive items have a huge dilemma if the Democratic candidate moves away from Israel. These candidates could be swayed by a pro-Israel candidate offering supporting pragmatic solutions but could stay home if there are only two options.

As polarization pushes both parties toward their ideological edges, more districts end up nominating candidates who do not reflect the values of the communities they seek to represent. These “orphaned middle” represent a growing opportunity for a centrist alternative. The increase in the number of progressive interventions in the Democratic nomination process could quickly expand alternatives for a new centrist alternative option.

Reason 7: The House Is the Strategic Weak Point—And the Ideal Launchpad for a Third Party

The modern House of Representatives is the clearest proof that the two-party system can no longer govern itself. The last two Congresses have shown that neither major party can hold together even 50 percent of its own members long enough to choose a Speaker without chaos. McCarthy required fifteen ballots—something not seen since before the Civil War—only to be toppled by a handful of his own colleagues. Mike Johnson became Speaker only after every other option collapsed, and he governs under the same constant threat. When selecting a leader looks like a weeks-long hostage situation, the system is telling us something: the House is ungovernable under the current two-party arrangement.

But this dysfunction is also the opening. In a chamber where neither party can reach 218 on its own, small blocs hold enormous leverage. A third party with even five to ten pragmatic members could become the crucial swing coalition—and internal bargaining could lead to that bloc picking the Speaker, even without holding many seats. In a divided House, the indispensable coalition doesn’t have to be large; it just has to be unified.

This isn’t political fantasy. It’s one of the few scenarios that matches the math of the modern House. It may sound like a Netflix political drama—but it’s now a real possibility.

Ten Most Favorable House Districts for a Centrist Challenger

· ME-2 (Maine’s 2nd District): Jared Golden narrowly held the seat in 2024, winning 50.35% to 49.65% in a deeply rural, right-leaning district that will be an open race in 2026.

· NE-2 (Nebraska’s Omaha District): Don Bacon won re-election in 2024 with just over 50% in a Biden-carried district; with Bacon retiring, this becomes one of the most competitive open seats in the nation.

· CA-45 (California’s 45th): Democrat Derek Tran flipped this suburban Orange County district in 2024 by a razor-thin 50.10% to 49.90%, revealing extraordinary volatility.

· MI-7 (Michigan’s 7th): Republicans captured this open seat in 2024, flipping it after a tightly fought race; remains highly competitive in a politically divided region.

· CA-27 (California’s 27th): The district remains competitive despite GOP resilience; Biden carried it by double digits in 2020, underscoring its underlying swing nature.

· NY-22 (New York’s 22nd): A Democratic flip in 2024 in a historically competitive upstate seat, ensuring another contested race in 2026.

· PA-7 (Pennsylvania’s 7th): Republicans flipped this Lehigh Valley district in 2024 in another narrow contest, placing it squarely back on the national battlefield.

· PA-8 (Pennsylvania’s 8th): Republicans narrowly defeated incumbent Matt Cartwright in 2024; long a battleground, it remains one of the closest seats in the state.

· CA-13 (California’s 13th): Democrats flipped this Central Valley district in 2024, but the electorate remains evenly divided, ensuring continued competitiveness.

· CO-8 (Colorado’s 8th): Republicans flipped this fast-growing suburban district in 2024, positioning it as a top-tier battleground in 2026.

A centrist political movement could realistically contest all ten of these districts with a total of $20 million, or roughly $2 million per race, a relatively modest investment by modern campaign standards.

Next week, I will present a full blog with deeper analysis of potential battlegrounds for a centrist party — examining all 435 House districts.

Conclusion

This paper has outlined why a centrist third party is increasingly necessary, examined the structural reasons third-party presidential bids fail, and argued that Senate races are too expensive for a fledgling third party. Barriers to entry are relatively low for House contests where credible centrist candidates could win. We show that a third party could obtain great influence, even de-facto control of the House if neither major party wins an outright majority.

Rising polarization is creating a growing class of politically homeless voters, but dissatisfaction alone is not enough to build a viable third party. Political movements do not succeed merely by rejecting what exists; they succeed by standing clearly and forcefully for something better. The Republican Party did not emerge in the 1850s simply as an alternative to the status quo—it organized urgently and unapologetically around ending slavery. A successful third party today must show the same level of moral seriousness and policy clarity, not around a single institution, but around a single goal: restoring the financial security of American households. That means building a platform centered on affordable health care, manageable student debt, genuine retirement security, and a solvent Social Security system—and pursuing those goals as relentlessly as prior movements fought for freedom. Without that affirmative mission, a third party will remain a protest; with it, it can become a governing force.

Authors Note: This essay is a second in a a series of essays on the need for and the potential path to power for a centrist third party.

You can learn about and support this effort by becoming a paid subscriber to this blog. Use this coupon.

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https://www.wsj.com/opinion/zohran-mamdani-and-the-jews-new-york-israel-middle-east-hamas-antisemitism-554b40cf?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAh5xMt2fcav2BDivJLh1OxrM_HAZj6vadDd06q35JlcgL_HqYCTTv8EsZ6VQOQ%3D&gaa_ts=68606bbf&gaa_sig=Lmp6i3UqbAxz_F3Tm2bjCUt8g9sSsfmle7sjSHZ9QuQN5h1iIwfKhkViRlq0Fw-hIXldlK1LylZE6WvouP-U6g%3D%3D

Introduction:

The New York mayoral Democratic primary is on Tuesday June 24, 2025. This inaugural post in the politics section of the Economic Decisions blog examines the contours of the race, the potential impact of the race on antisemitism and the safety of Jews in New York, and the future of the Democratic party.

Contours of the Race: The Democratic primary for mayor of New York, on June 24, 2025, features eleven Democratic candidates. The two front runners in the race are the former governor Andrew Cuomo and state Assemblyman Democratic Socialist Zohran Mamdani.

The New York mayor’s primary is based on a first-across-the post rank choice voting system. The rules as discussed in Google AI are as follows.

In New York City mayoral elections,

ranked choice voting (RCV) is used in primary and special elections.

Here's how it works:

• Voters rank candidates in order of preference, up to five choices.

• All first-choice votes are counted first.

• If a candidate receives more than 50% of the first-choice votes, they win immediately.

• If no candidate gets over 50% in the first round, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated.

• The votes from those who chose the eliminated candidate as their first choice are then distributed to their second choice.

• This process continues round by round, eliminating the last-place candidate and redistributing votes based on the voters' next choices, until one candidate receives over 50% of the active votes and wins.

Eric Adams won the 2021 primary in the final round with 50.4 percent of the vote.

RCV elections are difficult to poll because voters are imprecise in their statement of preferences for the person who is not their first choice.

Hassidic Jewish groups in New York are asking voters to leave Mamdani off the list of candidates that should be ranked.

“Progressive” groups are asking voters to leave Cuomo off the list of candidates that should be ranked.

The current Marist poll has Andrew Cuomo winning the race in the seventh round of voting.

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The New York mayor’s race epitomizes the struggle between the centrist and progressive wings of the party. Both candidates are extremely flawed.

Andrew Cuomo resigned from the governorship in disgrace because of sex scandal. Zohran Mamdami has a fiscal agenda that would put substantial fiscal pressure on the city.

Mamdani’s views on Israel and Palestine, as espoused in the Bulwark Interview, are defining the race.

Mamdani stated that the expression “globalize the intifada captured “a desperate desire for equality and equal rights in standing up for Palestinian human rights.” He defended the use of the word by intifada by arguing that the U.S. Holocaust Museum had used it describe the 1944 Warsaw uprising against Nazi Germany.

The decision by Mamdani to use an example from the Holocaust to defend his stance on the question of the intifada reveals a lot about this candidate’s priorities and mindset.

By contrast, Representative Dan Goldman, a Jewish Democrat stated Intifada is “well understood to refer to the violent terror attacks against Israeli civilians that occurred during the First and Second Intifadas.”

Mamdani vehemently denies he is antisemitic and states that he would protect Jews from antisemitic acts, however, details are more important than general statemnts. The more pertinent questions involve the steps and procedures Mamdani would or would not take or allow to protect Jews if he became mayor of a city with 1.2 million Jews.

The election of Mamdani as Mamdani as mayor would affect the ability of the NYPD to remove belligerent protestors from college campuses, the procedures used to protect Jewish institutions, and even the extent to which alleged crimes against Jews were prosecuted or dismissed.

Mamdani could lose the primary run in the general election as a third party candidate and win in a four-way race. There is no rank choice voting in the general election and a candidate with 40 percent could become the next mayor.

Democrats are losing ground in New York. Biden won New York with over 60 percent of the vote. Harris won with 55.1 percent of the vote.

A recent poll has AOC leading Schumer by double digits in a state wide primary for the Democratic nomination for the Senate. There is also a lot of talk about AOC running for President. AOC versus a Republican is at best a coin toss in deeply blue New York state.

A lot is on the line in the June 24, Democratic primary for mayor of New York.

Authors note: Most of the articles on this blog are about policy and finance not politics.

Go here for an article on the big, beautiful bill.

Go here for an article on how to save for college.

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