Many observers expect a big Democratic blue wave in 2026. Trump’s low approval rating gives Republicans a substantial headwind: unpopular presidents often fuel midterm losses for their party. Republican waves in 1994 and 2010 and Democratic waves in 2006 and 2018 illustrate how sharply the political balance can shift.

But waves are not inevitable. Democrats gained a net 41 House seats in 2018, while Republicans gained just nine in 2022, securing only a narrow majority despite Biden’s unpopularity.

Does 2026 more closely resemble the 2018 outcome where there was a substantial Democratic wave or 2022 where there was a smaller Republican wave?

My focus is on the two most recent elections because recent elections provide a better comparison for today’s polarized electorate, in which Americans’ close friendships often remain within partisan lines and the rural–urban political divide has widened. These divisions may leave fewer congressional seats genuinely competitive in 2026, limiting the size of a Democratic wave even amid widespread dissatisfaction with Trump.

One of the factors that impacts the size of a potential wave is the composition of the Congress prior to the election. The Republicans had a substantially larger margin entering the 2018 midterm (241 R versus 194 D) than the Democrats had in 2022 (222 D versus 213 R). One of the reasons the Democrats had a much larger pickup in 2018 than the Republicans had in 2022 is that there were many more vulnerable Republicans up for reelection in 2018.

On this measure, 2026 more closely resembles 2022 than 2018. Republicans won a 220–215 House majority in 2024, comparable to Democrats’ 222–213 majority after 2020 and far smaller than Republicans’ 241–194 majority after 2016. Democrats therefore need fewer pickups to regain control, but Republicans’ smaller seat total may also limit the opportunities for a large wave.

A second factor affecting the size of a potential wave—and driving much of the speculation—is presidential approval. Trump’s September 2026 Quinnipiac rating of 33% is substantially below his 44% approval in late October 2018 and Biden’s 40% in late October 2022. Although the figures come from different polling sources and dates, they suggest a considerably stronger presidential headwind for Republicans in 2026.

A third factor, often overlooked, is the opposition party’s standing. Democrats in 2018 and Republicans in 2022 each had 44% favorability in September Gallup polling. In September 2026, Quinnipiac found only 21% approval of congressional Democrats, with 70% disapproval. Job approval and party favorability are different measures, so these figures cannot establish how much weaker Democrats are today. But they suggest a potential obstacle to a blue wave: dissatisfaction with Trump does not necessarily translate into confidence in the Democratic alternative.

These comparisons leave me skeptical that a blue wave is in the bag. Trump’s weakness could expand Democratic opportunities, but the narrow Republican starting majority provides less evidence of an extended delegation waiting to be swept away.

Democrats’ poor performance ratings also raise questions about their ability to attract voters beyond their existing supporters. A Democratic takeover and a large Democratic wave are different outcomes: the former requires only a small net gain, while the latter requires victories across a much broader battlefield. District-level evidence will determine whether that broader opportunity exists.

This skepticism about the likelihood of the blue wave is reinforced by my ongoing analysis of competitive races.

A probabilistic analysis of roughly 70 contested House races points to a narrow Democratic majority. I have also collected data, discussed, and evaluated districts currently held by Democrat with the potential to flip Republican and seats currently held by Republicans with the potential to flip to the Democrats. The sum of the number of potential flips supports the forecast of a very small Democrat majority in the next Congress.

However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the Republicans will retain control of the House of Representatives.

Three factors, candidate selection, adverse coattails, and Republican gerrymandering, appear to be limiting Democratic gains this election year.

First, the Democrats have nominated several progressive candidates in swing districts including but not limited to Matt Little in MN-02, Manny Rutinel in CO-08, Sam Forstag in MT-01, Bob Brooks in PA-07, and William Lawrence in MI-07.

Second, the nomination of several Democratic Socialist candidates in some states or in urban districts could adversely impact the chances of more conservative nominees in the region and the state.

• Zohran Mamdani’s prominence could complicate Democratic campaigns across the New York metropolitan area, particularly in competitive districts with substantial Jewish electorates concerned about Israel and antisemitism. Concern about Mamdani could bolster Lawler in NY-17.

• Melat Kiros could give Republicans campaign material against Democrats in several other districts in Colorado.

• Many Democrats, including Dana Nessel Dana Nessel, are troubled by positions taken by Abdul El-Sayed and this person could potentially weaken support for other Democrats among voters who share those concerns.

• My Minnesota analysis examines whether Republicans could win both the Senate race and MN-02, given the Democratic nominees’ positions.

The concern is that voters may judge individual Democrats partly by the party’s most prominent progressive figures rather than the quality of the local candidate.

Third, Republican gerrymandering could contribute to roughly a dozen Democratic-held seats changing hands; my district-by-district analysis of Democratic seats that could flip Republican provides the details behind that estimate, available to paid subscribers.

My 2026 Midterm Election Resources provides links to papers on the 2026 midterms. People on LinkedIn should subscribe to the newsletter for updates on my economic and political analysis.

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Iowa is a small state with five competitive races:

• Governor: Democrat Rob Sand vs. Republican Zach Lahn.

• U.S. Senate: Democrat Josh Turek vs. Republican Ashley Hinson.

• 1st District: Democrat Christina Bohannan vs. Republican incumbent Mariannette Miller-Meeks.

• 2nd District: Democrat Lindsay James vs. Republican Joe Mitchell for an open seat.

• 3rd District: Democrat Sarah Trone Garriott vs. Republican incumbent Zach Nunn.

The remaining House contest, between Republican Chris McGowan and Democrat Dave Dawson in the open 4th District, strongly favors Republicans.

Republicans currently hold the governorship, both Senate seats and all four House seats.

Trump carried Iowa by roughly 13 percentage points in 2024, but a weak rural economy caused in part by tariffs and high diesel prices could hurt Republicans.

The Senate Race:

Republican Ashley Hinson and Democrat Josh Turek are both credible candidates. The seat is open due to the retirement of Joni Ernst.

Ashley Hinson a former television journalist and state legislator, has represented northeastern Iowa in Congress since 2021. Hinson supports tariffs and restrictions on abortion. She recently broke with the President calling for an end of hostilities with Iran.

Turek, a state representative from Council Bluffs and Paralympic wheelchair-basketball gold medalist, has demonstrated an ability to win in a Republican-leaning district.

Turek’s emphasis on restoring Medicaid funding, protecting Affordable Care Act subsidies and reversing disruptive tariffs reflects a broadly conventional Democratic economic agenda.

The Senate polling is effectively tied. Turek leads by 0.7 percentage points across all nine polls, while Hinson leads by 0.25 points when Marist’s outlying eight-point Turek lead is excluded.

The gubernatorial race:

Democrat Rob Sand, a former prosecutor and Iowa’s twice-elected state auditor, appears to have substantial personal appeal beyond his party. He was the only Democrat to win statewide office in Iowa in 2022.

Republican Zach Lahn, a businessman, farmer and private-school co-founder, is seeking his first public office after defeating Trump-endorsed Congressman Randy Feenstra in the primary.

Polling indicates that Democrats are on course to win the governorship. Sand leads 50.1 percent to 42.9 percent in the RCP average and is ahead in every recent poll.

A victory by Sand the Democrat would not be a total surprise and would not by itself signal an ideological shift in the state. A state’s presidential voting pattern often does not carry over to gubernatorial contests, which are often determined by local issues rather than ideology.

The Competitive House Races

In southeastern IA-01 and Des Moines-centered IA-03, Republicans Miller-Meeks and Nunn are conservatives willing to sometimes break with Trump, recently opposing his Iran war policy. Northeastern IA-02’s Mitchell is more firmly Trump-aligned, defending tariffs and the war.

Democrats Bohannan, James and Trone Garriott are mainstream liberals appealing to the center. Bohannan favors optional Medicare buy-in rather than single-payer; Trone Garriott supports a public option preserving private insurance; James has criticized Biden’s border policies. Their campaigns emphasize affordability and health care rather than sweeping ideological change.

So, the Republican and Democrat candidates in Iowa differ substantially but candidates in both parties are at least attempting to appeal to voters in the center.

Democrats probably need to win at least one of the contested seats in Iowa to take control of the House. Mariannette Miller-Meeks in IA-01 is probably the most vulnerable because her margin of victory has been small in her three previous elections.

Author’s Note: Two of my recent articles, published on Medium, explore interesting election dynamics between Senate and House races in small potential swing states

Maine: The Maine Senate race is one of the most publicized contests in the country. The House race in ME-2 is a potential D to R flip because centrist Jared Golden, the only recent Democrat to win in this rural district, is retiring and former governor Paul LePage is currently the favorite.

Minnesota: The Minnesota Senate race has inexplicably gone under the radar even though the RCP average of polls in the Senate race is a dead heat and the margin in Minnesota in 2024 was much smaller than people realize. The Democrats have nominated a “progressive” in both the Senate contest and the open seat to replace Angie Craig in MN-2 creating a test of the viability of progressive candidates in swing districts.

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Before travel and other obligations take me offline for a while, I am publishing three memos on the 2026 midterm elections.

Two are companion databases: Democratic House Seats Republicans Could Flip in 2026, covering potentially vulnerable Democratic-held districts, and Republican House Seats Democrats Could Flip in 2026, covering potentially vulnerable Republican-held districts.

This third memo provide analysis of this raw data and documents factors which are not fully embedded in baseline forecasts. The central question is why the 2026 contest for control of the House is more uncertain than many blue-wave forecasts suggest.

Comment One: Current Ratings and the Earlier Model Point to a Narrow Democratic Majority

The current watch lists give Democrats the stronger—but still narrow—path to House control. Democrats benefit from 15 Republican-held tossups compared with four Democratic-held tossups. An even division would turn the current 220–215 Republican majority into approximately a 219–216 or 220–215 Democratic majority. Republicans have a slight advantage among seats already leaning toward a flip, with three of their projected gains result from redistricting.

This closely matches my August 29 paper, Who Will Control the House in 2026?, which projected approximately 220 Democrats, 214 Republicans and one Independent. The model also found weaker Democratic prospects in rural districts and cautioned that national events could shift many races together. Both approaches therefore suggest a small Democratic advantage, but one vulnerable to modest forecasting errors.

Comment Two: Why National Polling Looks More Democratic Than the District Ratings

National polling points toward larger Democratic gains than the district-by-district baseline. Democrats hold a substantial generic-ballot lead, while President Trump’s approval rating is below 40 percent. Many analysts view these figures, together with Democratic strength in special elections and the normal midterm difficulties facing the president’s party, as evidence that a blue wave is already developing.

My baseline does not dismiss that evidence. It simply starts with current district ratings, which may not yet fully reflect a changing national mood. The Middle East war, oil prices above $100, rising interest rates and concerns about Trump’s conduct could move many competitive races toward Democrats at the same time.

Specific issues appear to be breaking toward Democrats in different regions. In Iowa and other rural states, higher costs stemming from the Iran war and the economic effects of tariffs have hurt local economies and Republicans are no longer supporting the war with Iran. In Kansas, Trump’s threatened ban on Bombardier aircraft, produced by a Canadian company, threatens 1,500 jobs. In Florida, Republican María Elvira Salazar has warned that the administration’s immigration campaign has “gone too far” and is alienating some voters who supported Trump in 2024.

Comment Three: Democratic Vulnerabilities Remain

Favorable national conditions do not eliminate Democratic vulnerabilities involving cultural issues, candidate selection, or Israel and antisemitism.

• Cultural issues: Controversies involving women’s sports, gender, race and unequal treatment can damage the Democratic brand; repeated hard fouls against Caitlin Clark provide one example.

• Candidate–district fit: Progressive nominees Manny Rutinel in Colorado’s 8th District, William Lawrence in Michigan’s 7th and Sam Forstag in Montana’s 1st appear poorly matched in competitive or Republican-leaning districts.

• Antisemitism and Israel: The affected constituency extends beyond Jewish voters to evangelical Christians, national-security voters, civil-liberties advocates and others concerned about antisemitism or support of Israel.

Dana Nessel’s argument—that Jewish voters should place the interests of the country or the world above concerns about their own security, antisemitism, and Israel—is unlikely to persuade Jewish voters who are highly concerned about antisemitism, strongly support the concept of a Jewish state and differ vigorously from the views on Israel offered by the progressive wing of the party.

Conclusion

The district-by-district baseline points to a narrow Democratic majority of approximately 219–216 or 220–215. It is less favorable to Democrats than many national forecasts because it starts with current race ratings rather than assuming that a blue wave will occur.

That does not mean the blue-wave argument is wrong. The generic ballot, Trump’s approval rating, economic pressures and the normal midterm penalty could move many races toward Democrats at the same time. If that happens, the current ratings will understate Democratic gains.

The reverse is also possible. Candidate quality, cultural issues, rural weakness and concerns about Israel and antisemitism could prevent Democrats from fully benefiting from the national environment.

The best way to read the forecast is current district ratings point to a narrow Democratic majority, while national conditions open the door for larger Democratic gains.

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I am going offline for a bit because of travel and other obligations, but before I do, I am publishing three related essays about control of the House. Two present the underlying race-by-race data. This second data essay examines Democratic-held seats that Republicans could capture in 2026; the companion essay examines Republican-held seats that Democrats could capture. A third essay will explain what the two lists currently imply about House control and how they can be used to track the election.

Bottom line. This revised memo identifies 35 Democratic-held House seats that could move to Republicans in 2026. Six currently favor Republicans, four are tossups, five lean Democratic and seventeen are longer-shot Republican opportunities rated likely Democratic. Three additional seats—LA-06, TN-09 and TX-09—appear effectively certain to flip Republican because of redistricting.

Rating note. Except where otherwise indicated, the ratings in this memo are from the 270 toWin consensus forecast as of September 16, 2026. The consensus combines ratings from multiple election forecasters, including the Cook Political Report. The “Safe Republican after redistricting” designations for LA-06, TN-09 and TX-09 are my assessments rather than published consensus ratings. Ratings describe the current competitiveness of each race and should not be interpreted as precise probabilities.

House races in alphabetical order

AL-02 Rhett Marques R and Shomari Figures D

Likely Republican. Boundary changes have converted Figures’s Black Belt seat from a Democratic anchor into one of the clearest Republican pickup opportunities. Marques begins with the structural advantage, so the principal question is whether Figures can build enough crossover support to overcome the new district’s Republican tilt.

Subscriber note: The full analysis below examines 35 Democratic-held seats, with candidate matchups, race ratings, and the factors shaping Republican pickup opportunities. Subscribe for this research and more analysis of elections, economic policy, and personal finance. Use this coupon for 50% off an annual subscription—$30 for the year.

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An alphabetical watch list for subsequent analysis

I am going offline for a bit because of travel and other obligations, but before I do, I am publishing three related essays about control of the House. Two present the underlying race-by-race data. This first data essay examines Republican-held seats that Democrats could capture in 2026; the companion essay examines Democratic-held seats that Republicans could capture. A third essay will explain what the two lists currently imply about House control and how they can be used to track the election.

Bottom line. Among the 30 potential Democratic pickups, the September 16 consensus rates eight as Lean Democratic, fifteen as Tossups, two as Lean Republican and five as Likely Republican. Alaska is counted separately because Bill Hill is an independent rather than a Democrat; the consensus currently rates the Republican-held Alaska seat Likely Republican.

Rating note. The categories in this memo are from the 270 toWin consensus forecast as of September 16, 2026. That consensus aggregates multiple election forecasters, including the Cook Political Report; the ratings are not my proprietary probabilities. In this Republican-held-seat list, Lean Democratic means a Democratic pickup is favored, Tossup means neither party has a clear advantage, Lean Republican means a Republican hold is favored and Likely Republican identifies a longer-shot Democratic pickup opportunity. Ratings describe current competitiveness and may change as the campaign develops.

Purpose. This memo identifies 31 Republican-held House seats that could change hands in 2026: 30 potential Democratic pickups and one independent pickup opportunity in Alaska. The districts are presented in alphabetical order rather than ranked by probability.

Next step. The short descriptions explain why each race merits attention. A subsequent analysis will organize the seats into logical subsets based on competitiveness, geography, candidate fit and the broader political questions each contest can help answer.

Independent exception. AK-AL remains on the list because Republican Nick Begich faces independent Bill Hill after Democrat Matt Schultz suspended his campaign and endorsed Hill. A Hill victory would not be a Democratic pickup, but it could still affect control of the House.

House races in alphabetical order

AK-AL Nick Begich R and Bill Hill I Independent pickup opportunity

Likely Republican. Democrat Matt Schultz suspended his campaign and endorsed independent Bill Hill. Alaska remains analytically distinctive because its nonpartisan top-four system and ranked-choice general election make party labels a less complete guide than in the other districts.

Subscriber note: The full analysis below examines 31 Republican-held seats, including 30 potential Democratic pickups and an independent pickup opportunity in Alaska. It includes candidate matchups, race ratings, and the factors shaping each contest, with links to additional reporting. More memos drawing on this race-level data are coming soon. Use this coupon for 50% off an annual subscription—$30 for the year.

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Pennsylvania could play a central role in determining control of the House, with four competitive Republican-held districts and a popular Democratic governor leading the statewide ticket.

Key Findings

· PA-07 and PA-08, both narrowly flipped by Republicans in 2024, are the clearest tests of the national environment.

· One Democratic pickup among PA-07, PA-08 and PA-10 would be important; winning two would make Pennsylvania a major contributor to a House majority.

· PA-10 is less useful as a national indicator because it depends heavily on the unusual contrast between Scott Perry and Janelle Stelson.

· PA-01 is the most difficult Democratic target because Brian Fitzpatrick substantially outperformed the presidential ticket in 2024.

· Democrats have nominated mostly centrist or pragmatic candidates who may benefit from Governor Josh Shapiro’s potential coattails.

Here are concise summaries of the four races.

PA-01: Fitzpatrick’s brand faces a strong test

Pennsylvania’s First District includes Bucks County and part of Montgomery County. Biden won it in 2020, and Harris narrowly carried it in 2024, yet Republican Brian Fitzpatrick defeated Ashley Ehasz by nearly 13 points after surviving the 2018 Democratic wave.

Fitzpatrick, a former FBI agent and federal prosecutor, has represented the district since 2017 and chairs the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus. He supports Ukraine and election reform, opposed Trump’s expansion of the Iran war and voted against the final 2025 tax-and-spending law because of its Medicaid provisions. He also supported extending ACA subsidies.

Democrat Bob Harvie taught social studies for 26 years before serving in Falls Township government and winning two countywide elections. A pro-labor Democrat, he defeated a progressive primary opponent while emphasizing affordability and incremental health-care reform.

Harvie is also challenging Fitzpatrick over data centers. He wants a moratorium until protections are established for utility customers, water supplies and communities, while criticizing Fitzpatrick’s support for federal industry incentives and an Amazon project in Falls Township. Their campaign has become personal, with disputes over debates and a federal contracting investigation that Harvie says does not involve him.

Fitzpatrick’s bipartisan reputation remains formidable. Because Harris carried the district while Fitzpatrick won decisively, his defeat or a small victory margin would indicate a large Democratic night.

PA-07: A Working-Class Fight in the Lehigh Valley

Pennsylvania’s Seventh District covers the Lehigh Valley, including Allentown, Bethlehem and Easton, alongside warehouses, suburbs and rural Carbon County. Biden carried it narrowly in 2020; Trump won by about three points in 2024. Republican Ryan Mackenzie nevertheless defeated Democratic Representative Susan Wild by only about one point.

Mackenzie, an NYU graduate with a Harvard MBA, worked for the Labor Department and served 12 years in the Pennsylvania House. He is a conventional Trump-aligned conservative who supported the 2025 tax-and-spending law but broke with Republican leaders to support extending ACA subsidies.

Democrat Bob Brooks did not attend college or previously hold office. A former Bethlehem firefighter, he now leads Pennsylvania’s firefighters union. His economic-populist campaign emphasizes wages, unions, health care and higher taxes on wealthy individuals and corporations while also stressing border security and public safety. His endorsements range from Governor Josh Shapiro and the Blue Dog PAC to Bernie Sanders and the Working Families Party. J Street and the Jewish Democratic Council back Brooks; AIPAC supports Mackenzie.

Both candidates favor tighter oversight of data centers, reducing that issue’s partisan importance. Mackenzie portrays Brooks as too far left; Brooks calls Mackenzie Trump’s “lapdog.” Because Mackenzie won narrowly and ran behind Trump, PA-07 could change parties without a Democratic wave.

PA-08: A Local Candidate Tests a Republican Shift

Pennsylvania’s Eighth District includes Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, former coal communities, the Poconos and extensive rural territory. Trump carried it by about nine points in 2024, but Republican Rob Bresnahan defeated six-term Democrat Matt Cartwright by only 1.6 points.

Bresnahan, a University of Scranton graduate, ran his family’s electrical-contracting company and developed real estate before entering Congress. He supported Trump’s 2025 tax-and-spending law and opposed withdrawing American forces from hostilities with Iran, but broke with Republican leaders on ACA subsidies, federal employees’ bargaining rights and insulin costs.

Democrat Paige Cognetti has a Harvard MBA and experience in international development, investment management and state government. She won Scranton’s mayoralty as an independent after a corruption scandal and later became a Democrat. During her administration, Scranton left three decades of state financial oversight and regained an investment-grade credit rating. Her campaign emphasizes competent government, abortion rights, broader health coverage, unions and fiscal management.

Cognetti attacks Bresnahan over congressional stock trading and data centers. Bresnahan advocated a trading ban but continued making numerous trades through advisers. He promotes data-center investment while supporting local zoning authority and owning related investments. Cognetti opposes pending projects because of their possible effects on utilities and taxpayers.

Cognetti’s local record gives Democrats a plausible route despite the district’s Republican presidential preference.

PA-10: Perry and Stelson Meet Again

Pennsylvania’s Tenth District includes Harrisburg, York, growing suburbs and conservative rural communities. Trump carried it by about five points in 2024, but Republican Scott Perry defeated Democrat Janelle Stelson by only 1.2 points—roughly 5,000 votes. The race is a tossup.

Perry, an Army National Guard combat veteran and former construction-business owner, previously chaired the House Freedom Caucus. He is a strong Trump ally who supported efforts to overturn the 2020 election and backed the 2025 tax-and-spending law, including its Medicaid provisions.

Stelson spent nearly four decades as a television journalist, giving her exceptional districtwide recognition. A Republican until 2023, she campaigns as a centrist Democrat supporting abortion rights, Medicaid, the Affordable Care Act, NATO and continued aid to Ukraine and Israel. She has criticized an open-ended war with Iran.

Foreign policy provides a sharp contrast. Perry opposes extensive commitments to Ukraine and NATO. Although politically supportive of Israel and military pressure on Iran, he voted against the 2024 Israel aid package because of his opposition to foreign spending, putting him at odds with AIPAC.

Independent Isabelle Harman has no apparent path to victory but could siphon anti-Perry votes. This genuine battleground will be close. Stelson is unusually well suited to the district, and her victory would likely strengthen the House’s centrist caucuses.

Concluding Thoughts: PA-07 and PA-08 are the bellwethers for control of the House. Eight is Democrats’ cleanest pickup opportunity; Seven is a knife-fight. Ten turns on candidate-specific wildcards. And One is the dam breaker: Fitzpatrick probably does not lose unless a blue wave is sweeping across the country.

Crucial House Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

• September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

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I am publishing a bit late today because I needed to complete this finance note comparing a 10-year Treasury with a utility ETF. I can’t quit the day job—yet.

Author’s note: Economic and Political Insights is a multi-topic publication covering politics, economic policy and personal finance. Readers with similarly diverse interests can receive a 50 percent discount on an annual subscription, reducing the first-year price to approximately $30.

Many of the races profiled in this series feature at least one candidate who appears mediocre, excessively ideological or badly matched to the district. Virginia’s Second District offers a welcome exception. Both candidates have served in the military and Congress—and compiled strong records in both institutions. Jen Kiggans spent ten years as a Navy helicopter pilot before becoming a geriatric nurse practitioner. Elaine Luria served for twenty years as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer and eventually commanded approximately 400 sailors.

Luria represented the district for four years, from 2019 through 2022. Kiggans defeated her in 2022 and has represented the district since January 2023. The 2026 contest is their rematch.

The Second District occupies the southeastern corner of Virginia. It includes Virginia Beach, the Eastern Shore, Suffolk, Franklin, and portions of Chesapeake, Isle of Wight and Southampton County. Its combination of suburban communities, rural areas, coastal economies and military installations makes it one of the country’s most distinctive battleground districts.

The military is embedded in the region’s economy and culture. Joint Base Little Creek–Fort Story is located within the district, while Naval Station Norfolk and several other major installations sit nearby. Veterans and active-duty military families form an unusually large portion of the electorate.

The district is also one of the most evenly divided in the country. Joe Biden carried it by approximately two points in 2020. Donald Trump carried it in 2024 by only about two-tenths of a percentage point, 49.5 to 49.3 percent. Virginia Democrats attempted to redraw the district to make it more favorable to their party, but the Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the process in May. The election will therefore be conducted under the existing map.

Kiggans earned a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Boston University and then entered the Navy. She served for ten years as a helicopter pilot, flying H-46 and H-3 helicopters and completing two deployments to the Persian Gulf. After leaving active duty, she used the GI Bill to earn nursing degrees from Old Dominion and Vanderbilt and became a board-certified adult-geriatric nurse practitioner. She served in the Virginia Senate from 2020 until her election to Congress in 2022. Her husband is a retired Navy F/A-18 pilot.

Luria graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1997 and served for twenty years. A nuclear-trained surface warfare officer, she operated nuclear reactors and completed deployments to the Middle East and Western Pacific. She was among the first women in the Navy to spend an entire career serving on combatant ships. Luria attained the rank of commander and led Assault Craft Unit Two, a combat-ready organization of approximately 400 sailors, before retiring in 2017. She subsequently founded the Mermaid Factory, a small Virginia business.

Both candidates have made credible efforts to work across party lines. Luria belonged to the New Democrat Coalition and the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus. Kiggans belongs to the Republican Governance Group and Republican Main Street Caucus and has collaborated with Democrats on veterans’ affairs, health care and government funding. She also supported the bipartisan 2023 debt-ceiling agreement and was the only Virginia Republican to vote to expel George Santos.

On defense and foreign policy, both have records that I find reassuring. Kiggans supported aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Luria called for a larger Navy, criticized Democratic defense proposals as inadequate and warned that the United States was not preparing sufficiently for competition with China. In 2021, she was the only House Democrat to oppose simply repealing the 2002 authorization for the use of military force in Iraq. She argued that Congress should replace it with an updated authorization rather than create a vacuum.

Health care presents the sharpest domestic difference. Kiggans recently appeared with CMS Administrator Mehmet Oz to promote $122 million in rural-health funding for Virginia. Luria has criticized Kiggans for supporting Republican legislation that reduced projected Medicaid spending and did not extend the enhanced ACA subsidies. These issues are particularly important to rural hospitals, many of which depend heavily on Medicaid revenue.

On broader economic policy, however, both have generally supported their parties’ agendas. Neither has broken decisively with her party on a major domestic initiative or adopted the pragmatic third-party economic agenda I have advocated. Even in this unusually strong field, there remains room for improvement.

I will be watching this race closely on election night. A Luria loss would signal both a narrower path for Democrats to retake the House and diminished prospects for centrists to influence the party’s future.

Author’s note: Economic and Political Insights is a multi-topic publication covering politics, economic policy and personal finance. Readers with similarly diverse interests can receive a 50 percent discount on an annual subscription, reducing the first-year price to approximately $30.

Crucial Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

• September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

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Texas has received considerably more national attention than Minnesota because Ken Paxton’s nomination has given Democrats an unusual opportunity in a traditionally Republican state. Minnesota deserves greater scrutiny because it appears to be a more competitive political environment than Texas.

· Kamala Harris carried Minnesota by only 4.2 percentage points in 2024, while Donald Trump carried Texas by 13.7 points.

Minnesota remains a blue state and Texas a red one, but the most recent presidential results place Minnesota considerably closer to the partisan midpoint.

Minnesota’s open Senate race is shaped by three powerful headwinds.

· Peggy Flanagan must persuade centrists that her agenda is meaningfully different from the socialist one.

· Peggy Flanagan must explain or at least discuss the extensive fraud in state-administered social-service programs during the Walz–Flanagan administration.

· Michele Tafoya must persuade voters that electing her would not simply provide another vote for Trump.

Peggy Flanagan

Flanagan has served as Minnesota’s lieutenant governor since 2019. A citizen of the White Earth Nation, she previously served on the Minneapolis Board of Education and in the Minnesota House of Representatives. If elected, she would become the first Native American woman to serve in the United States Senate.

Flanagan enters the general election after defeating U.S. Representative Angie Craig 59.0% to 39.4% in the DFL primary. Craig offered a more centrist argument based on her record of winning a competitive House district. Their principal differences included:

· Health care: Flanagan supports Medicare for All; Craig favored a public option.

· Immigration: Flanagan attacked Craig’s vote for the Laken Riley Act and called for tearing ICE apart and rebuilding it.

· Israel and campaign support: Flanagan criticized Craig’s support from groups associated with AIPAC, has claimed that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, and took a more restrictive position on military assistance to Israel.

· Governing record: Craig blamed the Walz–Flanagan administration for failing to prevent extensive fraud in state social-service programs.

Flanagan’s decisive victory confirmed the strength of Minnesota’s progressive DFL coalition. Although she rejects the democratic-socialist label and stops short of some of the DSA’s most radical proposals, she embraces much of its immediately actionable agenda.

Her general-election question is whether Craig’s more moderate and suburban-oriented voters will remain with the party.

Flanagan’s record as lieutenant governor creates another vulnerability. Extensive fraud occurred in state-administered social-service programs during the Walz–Flanagan administration. Flanagan has emphasized that Governor Walz took the lead in responding, while Craig accused her of refusing to accept responsibility. Minnesota lieutenant governors have few independent statutory duties, and there is no evidence that Flanagan personally administered the affected programs. But she was publicly presented as Walz’s governing partner for most of their time in office, making it difficult for her to claim the administration’s accomplishments while separating herself completely from its failures.

That question is complicated by a documented rift between Flanagan and Walz. The two rarely appeared together during the past year and a half, and Walz declined to endorse her in the DFL primary.

Michele Tafoya

Tafoya is a first-time candidate but a familiar public figure. She spent decades as a sports broadcaster, most prominently as an NFL sideline reporter for NBC. After leaving full-time sports broadcasting, she became a conservative commentator.

Tafoya won the Republican primary with 52.1%, defeating convention-endorsed former Navy SEAL Adam Schwarze, who received 24.0%, and 2024 Senate nominee Royce White, who received 11.2%.

Her majority demonstrated the value of statewide name recognition and showed that her abortion-rights position and acceptance of the 2020 election were not disqualifying among Republican primary voters. It did not, however, establish how much distance she is prepared to put between herself and Trump in the general election.

Tafoya entered the campaign as the Republican with the greatest statewide name recognition. She has emphasized government fraud, public safety, immigration enforcement, manufacturing and political accountability. Her principal Minnesota-focused argument is that the DFL administration failed to prevent large-scale fraud in publicly funded programs. Because Flanagan has served as lieutenant governor throughout the Walz administration, Tafoya argues that she shares responsibility for those failures.

Tafoya differs from much of the national Republican Party on some questions. She describes herself as pro-choice and has said there is room in the Republican Party for supporters of abortion rights. She accepts the result of the 2020 presidential election and distinguishes between illegal immigration and legal immigration. She has also said that she is running her own campaign rather than serving as an extension of Trump.

Those differences coexist with significant areas of alignment. Tafoya said she would welcome Trump’s endorsement. She has defended his economic record, supported his military policy toward Iran and generally aligned herself with Republican arguments on immigration enforcement. When asked whether Trump should be permitted to impose tariffs unilaterally, she declined to take a position.

Tafoya’s challenge is therefore not simply to establish that she is personally different from Trump. Voters will also want to know how she would vote when his policies conflict with Minnesota’s agricultural, manufacturing or institutional interests—and whether she can offer practical alternatives on health care, climate change and Middle East peace, where neither the Trump agenda nor the democratic-socialist agenda is likely to produce sufficient progress.

Flanagan gives Tafoya openings, particularly on health care and Israel. Medicare for All is neither politically feasible nor adequately attentive to the cost and disruption of replacing employer-sponsored insurance. Yet simply defending the Republican record is not enough: the health-care system remains unaffordable for many families, and the expiration of the enhanced ACA subsidies has made matters worse. Tafoya needs an alternative that expands coverage while controlling costs. I have proposed one in “A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care.”

Flanagan’s description of the Gaza war as genocide and her support for restricting weapons to Israel may also place her outside the comfort zone of many Minnesota voters, particularly Jewish Democrats. Progressive denunciations that minimize Israel’s security concerns do not bring peace closer; they can encourage Palestinian leaders to believe that continued resistance will eventually deprive Israel of American support. Representative Haley Stevens recently made a similar point, questioning what Senator Bernie Sanders’s increasingly strident rhetoric had accomplished for Middle East peace. (Fox News report)

Tafoya should also ask whether Flanagan’s spending commitments are sustainable as Social Security and Medicare approach trust-fund depletion and automatic reductions in scheduled benefits. The argument that Congress needs pragmatic problem-solvers—not one more ideological senator—as it confronts these looming cuts is compelling.

Trump’s tariffs provide another test of Tafoya’s independence. They are especially consequential in Minnesota because Canada is the state’s largest trading partner, purchasing roughly $5.5 billion in Minnesota exports annually. Some Republicans have broken with Trump on this issue: Colorado Representative Jeff Hurd was one of six House Republicans who voted to terminate Trump’s tariffs on Canada.

Tafoya’s support for legal immigration establishes part of her position, but it does not answer the separate controversy surrounding the Trump administration’s ICE tactics. Opposition to those actions gives Democrats a powerful tailwind. Demonstrating that she is more reasonable than Flanagan may therefore not be enough; voters will also want to know where Tafoya’s own limits lie.

At the same time, Tafoya can identify Trump policies she supports and propose building upon them. She could favor expanding federal contributions to Trump Accounts so that more children begin adulthood with meaningful savings, while extending the tax relief for tips beyond its scheduled expiration. That would allow her to demonstrate independence without defining independence as opposition to Trump on every issue.

Minnesota could therefore become an overlooked competitive race. Flanagan’s progressive positions and the fraud controversies surrounding the Walz administration create genuine vulnerabilities.

Politics should be about more than creating contrasts. It should include a serious discussion of how the country moves forward. Tafoya can make this a race if she shows not only where she differs from Trump, but also what she would do differently—and how her alternatives would produce more progress than either Trump’s program or Flanagan’s.

I would also like to see Tafoya go further by advocating fiscally responsible improvements to health care and student debt along the lines I have outlined in my own work. With fewer than 60 days before the election, complex proposals may appear politically inconvenient. But asking when it is convenient to introduce a difficult policy is rather like asking when it is convenient to have a baby. If the problem is real and the work is necessary, perpetual postponement is not a solution.

Sources

· Minnesota Secretary of State: August 11, 2026 U.S. Senate primary results

· Peggy Flanagan campaign platform, including positions on Israel, health care, student loans and immigration

· Minnesota Public Radio comparison of Flanagan and Craig

· Minnesota Star Tribune comparison of Flanagan and the DSA

· NOTUS interview with Michele Tafoya

· Minnesota Public Radio report on the Craig–Flanagan debate and fraud

· Minnesota Star Tribune report on the Flanagan–Walz rift

· Jewish Insider report on Flanagan, Craig, AIPAC and Democratic divisions over Israel

· Jewish Telegraphic Agency assessment of Flanagan’s Israel positions and differences from Abdul El-Sayed

· Minnesota Public Radio profile of the Flanagan–Tafoya general-election matchup

Crucial Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

• September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

Author’s Note: I am working on a series the Race of the Day, which appears most days with some gaps for when I must finish a consulting or policy task. Go here for a discussion of the race in NY-17 between Conley and Lawler. For readers interested in my broader policy agenda, see If I Were Speaker: A Tax Reconciliation Agenda, which lays out proposals on health care, student debt, capital gains taxation and retirement policy. Also, this post on the fiscal cliff, which will next be reached right before a funding crisis impacting Social Security is a must read for any future Senator or staff member.

I’m also offering new paid subscribers for only a short while a 50% off their first-year coupon. Paid subscriptions support this work and provide access to my more detailed policy and economic analysis.

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New York’s 17th District should be almost tailor-made for centrist politics. Instead, Republican Mike Lawler and Democrat Cait Conley—two candidates with substantial résumés and relatively moderate profiles—are increasingly fighting a nationalized campaign centered on Donald Trump, Democratic socialists and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

The district sits immediately north of New York City and includes all of Rockland and Putnam counties and parts of Westchester and Dutchess counties. It is affluent, highly suburban and politically competitive. The district also contains a significant Jewish population, including large Orthodox and Hasidic communities in Rockland County.

Its recent electoral history illustrates just how competitive it is. Lawler first won the seat in 2022 by defeating Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee chairman Sean Patrick Maloney, 50.3–49.7. In 2024, Kamala Harris narrowly carried the district, roughly 50–49, while Lawler simultaneously defeated former Democratic congressman Mondaire Jones 52.2–45.9. Lawler is one of only three House Republicans representing districts Harris carried in 2024.

Two unusually substantial candidates

Lawler is a lifelong Hudson Valley resident and Manhattan College graduate with degrees in accounting and finance. Before Congress, he served in the New York State Assembly, as deputy town supervisor in Orangetown and as executive director of the New York Republican Party. In Congress, he serves on the House Financial Services and Foreign Affairs committees.

His legislative record deserves more attention than the campaign’s daily partisan combat sometimes suggests. Lawler has worked on housing, financial regulation and other bread-and-butter issues. Six bipartisan housing bills he authored were incorporated into the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, which passed Congress overwhelmingly and became law this summer. The measures address subjects including middle-class housing, public-housing accountability, housing accessibility and community development. He has also worked across the aisle on financial and retirement issues.

In other words, whatever one thinks of Lawler politically, lack of substance is not really the issue.

Conley has an equally striking, although very different, résumé. A fourth-generation Hudson Valley native, she graduated from West Point in the top 2 percent of her class, spent 16 years on active duty in the Army and deployed overseas six times, including service in Iraq and Afghanistan. She later attended graduate programs at Harvard and MIT and served in counterterrorism roles on the National Security Council and at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

Conley also had to win a competitive Democratic primary. Five Democrats made the June ballot. She won 48.9 percent of the vote, comfortably defeating Rockland County legislator Beth Davidson, who received 31.4 percent, and Effie Phillips-Staley, who finished third with 15.1 percent. Lawler was unopposed for the Republican nomination.

If both are centrists, why doesn’t the campaign sound centrist?

That may be the most interesting question in this race.

Conley appeared on CNN Sunday and said she would support articles of impeachment against Hegseth, calling him a hazard to American national security. Given her military and national-security background, her criticism of Hegseth is hardly surprising, and I understand the sentiment. But poor performance—even in a position as crucial as secretary of defense—is not by itself sufficient grounds for impeachment. The Constitution establishes the standard as “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

House Democrats who have already introduced impeachment articles against Hegseth allege specific misconduct, not simply incompetence. But based on the case Conley made Sunday, I remain unconvinced that removal through impeachment follows simply from the argument that Hegseth has performed badly or endangered national security through poor judgment. Turning criticism of Hegseth into an impeachment argument inevitably moves the discussion into much more partisan territory.

Republicans, meanwhile, are trying to tie Conley to New York’s increasingly influential socialist left. Conley has said she will not campaign with figures such as Mayor Zohran Mamdani or Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, but she has stopped short of a broader repudiation of the Democratic Socialists of America. That distinction could matter in suburban New York, where the recent success of Mamdani and other candidates associated with the socialist left gives Republicans an obvious line of attack.

Lawler has the mirror-image problem. He has repeatedly presented himself as an independent-minded Republican and can point to a bipartisan legislative record and occasions when he has challenged Trump, including during negotiations over the SALT deduction. Yet Lawler is scheduled to speak at this week’s Republican midterm convention in Dallas alongside a heavily Trump-oriented lineup. Trump himself is scheduled to address the convention, whose organizers have made mobilizing Trump voters a central objective.

So what do we have here? Lawler, a candidate who can’t or won’t break ties with Trump, and Conley, a candidate who can’t or won’t fully separate herself from the socialist left.

NY-17 is a curious contest: two candidates whose biographies and records suggest moderation and substantive governing experience, but whose campaigns are increasingly being pulled toward national partisan conflict. The two candidates in WA-3 appear to have done a better job asserting their independence from their parties than the two candidates in NY-17.

Author’s Note: For readers interested in my broader policy agenda, see If I Were Speaker: A Tax Reconciliation Agenda, which lays out proposals on health care, student debt, capital gains taxation and retirement policy.

I’m also offering new paid subscribers for only a short while a 50% off their first-year coupon. Paid subscriptions support this work and provide access to my more detailed policy and economic analysis.

Crucial Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

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I skipped yesterday’s Race of the Day to finish a finance article. Today I return closer to home: Colorado’s 8th Congressional District, just north of Denver, where I live.

Colorado’s 8th is the state’s newest congressional district, created after Colorado gained an additional House seat following the 2020 census. It runs from the northern Denver suburbs through Adams and Weld counties toward Greeley, combining a large Latino population and Democratic-leaning suburbs with more Republican agricultural communities farther north. Hispanics or Latinos made up 38.5% of the district’s population when the current lines were drawn.

And competitive hardly begins to describe it.

This is only the district’s third congressional election.

In 2022, Democrat Yadira Caraveo, a physician and former state legislator, became its first representative, defeating Republican Barbara Kirkmeyer 48.4% to 47.7%.

Two years later, Republican Gabe Evans defeated Caraveo 49.0% to 48.2%. In both elections, the winner received less than 50% and prevailed by less than one percentage point.

Once again, CO-08 is among the country’s most closely watched House races, featuring two very different candidates.

Gabe Evans, the Republican incumbent

Evans, 40, has a résumé rooted in the military, law enforcement and emergency response.

He spent 12 years in the Army and Colorado Army National Guard, flew Black Hawk helicopters, served during Operation Enduring Freedom, and commanded aviation units involved in Colorado wildfire response and search-and-rescue missions. He then spent more than a decade with the Arvada Police Department, rising to lieutenant. Evans and his wife also operate a family farm in Weld County.

Politically, Evans has supported President Trump on many major issues and was endorsed by Trump in both 2024 and 2026. Evans, however, rejects the characterization that he follows the administration in lockstep. He points to bipartisan legislation and his membership in the Problem Solvers Caucus, while identifying several areas where he has disagreed with Trump administration policy.

Manny Rutinel, the Democratic challenger

Manny Rutinel, 31, could hardly have followed a more different path.

Raised by a single immigrant mother, he worked at McDonald’s, studied economics and microbiology, earned a master’s in applied economics from Johns Hopkins and a Yale law degree, and worked as an economist for the Army Corps of Engineers before entering the Colorado legislature.

Rutinel also has a long record of political and issue activism.

As a University of Florida student in 2014, he participated in a demonstration connecting police brutality in Ferguson with the treatment of Palestinians in Gaza. The demonstration included Students for Justice in Palestine among its organizers. Rutinel’s campaign has said he was never affiliated with SJP and attended the demonstration to protest police brutality in the United States.

At Yale in 2019, Rutinel joined protesters who entered the field during the Harvard-Yale football game to demand that the universities divest from fossil fuels. He was charged with disorderly conduct; the charge was later dropped. His work at Yale also concentrated heavily on animal and environmental law, including proposals to use carbon-offset credits to encourage farmers to transition from animal agriculture toward plant production.

Those positions are potentially significant in a district containing major oil-and-gas production as well as substantial agricultural interests. Weld County has historically accounted for the overwhelming majority of Colorado crude-oil production.

Rutinel has since changed several positions. As recently as July 2025, he supported banning fracking, canceling student debt and creating a single-payer health-care system. During this campaign, he has opposed a fracking ban, rejected blanket student-debt cancellation and favored exploring a public option rather than Medicare for All.

Karl Rove highlighted this vulnerability in his July Wall Street Journal column, “Socialists Spell Trouble for Democrats,”arguing that progressive primary victories may be relatively painless in deep-blue districts but create different political challenges elsewhere. Rutinel was among the Colorado candidates Rove discussed.

Rutinel did not simply inherit the nomination. Democratic primary voters had a sharply different alternative.

Former state Rep. Shannon Bird presented herself as the pragmatic candidate with a record of bipartisan legislating. She had served seven years in the Colorado House and chaired the powerful Joint Budget Committee. The independent Center for Effective Lawmaking ranked Bird the most effective Colorado state legislator in the 2023–24 legislative session.

Yet Democratic voters chose Rutinel overwhelmingly: roughly 61–62% to Bird’s 34%, with military veteran Evan Munsing receiving about 5%. Rutinel ran as the more progressive candidate, while Bird emphasized a more moderate political profile and argued that it would appeal to unaffiliated and swing voters.

That result occurred alongside other progressive victories in Colorado’s June primaries, most notably Melat Kiros’s defeat of longtime Denver Rep. Diana DeGette. Republicans have since openly attempted to tie Rutinel and other Colorado Democrats to Kiros.

Libertarian Dave Wood is also running. In a district whose first two elections were decided by only a few thousand votes, third-party voting bears watching. In 2022, the Libertarian candidate received more than 9,200 votes while Caraveo’s margin over Kirkmeyer was about 1,600 votes; in 2024, two minor-party candidates together received more than 9,000 votes while Evans’s margin over Caraveo was about 2,500.

Colorado 8 provides a striking contrast with my September 4 Race of the Day, Washington’s 3rd District.

Both are closely divided districts, but Washington 3 produced two candidates with relatively moderate political profiles. Colorado 8 produced a Republican who has supported Trump on many of the administration’s major priorities and a Democrat whose earlier positions on several issues were substantially to the left of those he now emphasizes.

That raises a larger question with broader 2026 implications:

Why do some closely divided districts nominate candidates oriented toward the political center, while others produce much sharper ideological choices?

President Trump’s current standing gives Democrats an issue they are trying to exploit nationally and in Colorado 8. Recent polling also shows substantial dissatisfaction with Trump among Latino voters in the district. At the same time, Rutinel’s decisive primary victory over a more moderate Democratic alternative makes Colorado 8 an unusually useful test of whether a candidate with a distinctly progressive political history can assemble a winning coalition in one of the country’s most evenly divided districts.

Author’s Note: For readers interested in my broader policy agenda, see If I Were Speaker: A Tax Reconciliation Agenda, which lays out proposals on health care, student debt, capital gains taxation and retirement policy.

Crucial Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

• September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

I’m also offering new paid subscribers for only a short while a 50% off their first-year coupon. Paid subscriptions support this work and provide access to my more detailed policy and economic analysis.

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Washington’s 3rd District is a strong place to begin this series: it is genuinely competitive and, this cycle, the two candidates who advanced are serious, relatively moderate figures. Trump carried the district 50.3–47.0 in 2024, yet Democrat Marie Gluesenkamp Perez defeated Republican Joe Kent 51.7–47.9 after winning by less than a point in 2022. Cook rates WA-03 R+2 and the race a Toss Up.

Perez is an unusual Democrat: a Reed College economics graduate who co-owned an auto-repair and machine shop with her husband before entering Congress. Republican John Braun is also formidable: Washington Senate minority leader, president of a family-owned emergency-vehicle manufacturer, retired Navy captain, and a University of Washington electrical-engineering graduate with an MBA and master’s degree in manufacturing engineering from the University of Michigan.

The immediate question is who wins. But WA-03 is interesting for another reason. After Republicans twice nominated the more polarizing Kent, this year voters have two credible candidates who appear reasonably close to the district’s political center.

Washington uses a top-two primary, with all candidates on the same ballot. Braun finished first with 39.7%, Perez received 36.4%, and progressive Democrat Brent Hennrich took 16.7%. Democratic candidates collectively received 54.8% of the vote, compared with 42.8% for Republicans. That looks encouraging for Perez—but Hennrich has said he will not support her in November. Perez needs many voters on her left without losing the crossover appeal that has kept her in office.

This week showed how difficult that balancing act can be. Perez and Jared Golden angered Democratic leaders by helping Republicans pass a procedural rule. Two days later, Perez again broke with most Democrats, supporting legislation restricting certain federal funding for universities participating in boycotts of Israel. Only 33 Democrats supported the bill; 167 opposed it, including Hakeem Jeffries.

For me, the underlying issue is fundamental. An AJC/Hillel survey found that 42% of current or recent Jewish college students said they had experienced antisemitism on campus. I do not believe American universities receiving federal support should institutionally boycott Israel—a country built to a remarkable degree by immigrants and refugees. I discuss that history in Israel as Refuge: Ethiopia and Melat Kiros—Selective Focus.

Perez is therefore a useful canary in the coal mine. Jeffries is already facing unease on his left, with a growing group of Democratic nominees declining to commit to supporting him for Speaker. Yet he may also need independent-minded Democrats such as Perez to win the majority in the first place. If Democrats capture the House narrowly without enough members like her from competitive districts, the caucus could tilt further left—and Jeffries’s own position could become more vulnerable. If Perez wins, meanwhile, he may have to govern with members whose political survival depends partly on bucking the party leadership. Either way, the coalition that could make Jeffries Speaker may also make the House extraordinarily difficult for him to manage.

WA-03 matters because it could help decide control of the House, could impact the vote for Speaker, and because in this cycle voters have a choice between two strong, relatively moderate candidates.

Crucial Races

• Four Pennsylvania House Races That Could Help Decide the Majority

• September 11 — Virginia’s Second District

• September 9 — Minnesota Senate

• September 7 — New York’s 17th District

• September 6 — Colorado’s 8th District

• September 4 — Washington’s 3rd District

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Abstract

This paper develops a race-by-race forecast of control of the U.S. House after the 2026 election. Using AI-assisted judgmental probabilities for 68 potential seat changes, each contest is modeled as a Bernoulli event and aggregated into a national baseline forecast. The baseline produces an expected Democratic gain of approximately five seats and an expected House of about 220 Democrats, 214 Republicans, and one Independent, with Democrats having roughly a 77 percent probability of reaching 218 seats under an assumption that race results are independent.

The analysis then examines two factors that could produce substantial departures from the baseline: (1) a larger-than-expected blue wave associated with President Trump’s low approval rating, and (2) Democratic weakness in rural and exurban districts that proves greater than the baseline already incorporates. Regression analysis shows that the baseline itself assigns Democrats substantially lower probabilities of success in the most rural districts; the question is whether actual Democratic performance will be weaker still.

The paper’s principal contribution is therefore not simply its prediction of the final House composition. It provides the race-by-race probabilities underlying that prediction, statistically examines one potential source of systematic forecast error, and identifies four sets of contests that should provide early evidence that the baseline is failing—and in which direction. A complete appendix reports the probability assigned to every race included in the model.

Executive Summary

We model 68 possible seat changes: 60 races identified as key contests and 8 additional redistricting-driven or effective seat changes. Each race is treated as a Bernoulli event—a seat either flips or it does not—with the probability assigned in our race-by-race forecast. Expected flips can be summed without assuming independence. For the variance calculation and the probabilities of House outcomes, however, we make the simplifying assumption that race outcomes are independent.

· Expected R→D flips: 17.62

· Expected D→R flips: 13.23

· Expected Democratic net gain from direct R→D and D→R flips: 4.39 seats. Including Independent-related seat changes, the expected Democratic gain is 5.04 seats.

· After adjusting for possible seats held by Independents, expected total seat changes are 31.70, with a variance of 12.48 and a standard deviation of 3.53 seats.

· The expected new House is approximately 220 Democrats, 214 Republicans, and 1 Independent.

What follows is the part of the forecast that I think is most useful. The national number alone does not tell us where the model could be wrong. Regression analysis shows that the baseline already assigns Democrats substantially weaker prospects in the most rural districts. The paid analysis asks whether that adjustment is large enough, examines the statistical evidence behind it, identifies four election-night tests that could signal either a substantially larger Democratic wave or greater-than-expected Democratic weakness, and provides the complete race-by-race probability ledger underlying the national result.

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• Democratic socialist gains are driven mainly by domestic economic concerns, not Israel.

• Heavy spending in Democratic primaries is often an inefficient response.

• AIPAC should emphasize education and selective candidate support.

• Deep-blue districts need a viable center-left alternative in general elections.

• A small third-party bloc could matter greatly in a closely divided Congress.

The Democratic socialist and allied progressive left has scored a series of striking victories in 2026. Most of the Democratic Socialist victories in Democratic primaries occurred in deep-blue districts where the winner of the primary is currently guaranteed to win in the general election.

These races include: CO-1—Melat Kiros, beat longtime incumbent; PA-3—Chris Rabb, won Philadelphia seat; NY-7—Claire Valdez, socialist-backed victory; NY-10—Brad Lander, defeated Dan Goldman; NY-13—Darializa Avila Chevalier, defeated incumbent; NJ-11—Analilia Mejia, won Sherrill seat; NJ-12—Adam Hamawy, Gaza surgeon wins; MI-13—Donavan McKinney, defeated incumbent; and CA-14—Aisha Wahab, faces Melissa Hernandez in both August special and November general elections.

The progressive left has also produced candidates in less overwhelmingly Democratic states and districts including: Abdul El-Sayed MI, Troy Jackson ME, Manny Rutinel CO-8, William Lawrence MI-7, and Sam Forstag MT-1. These races test whether the progressive left can win beyond deep-blue electorates.

I have some comments on the reasons for the debacle and some suggestions on how groups like AIPAC and DMFI should proceed both in the current and future election cycles.

First, there must be a recognition that the world does not revolve around Israel. The rise of the progressive left probably has much more to do with intense frustration over health insurance, economic opportunity, and income and wealth inequality. Democratic socialists have responded with proposals such as Medicare for All and aggressive redistribution that are often impractical but highly appealing to the relatively small share of voters who participate in Democratic primaries—often roughly 20 percent of the eventual general-election electorate.

Republican candidates with the party’s record on cutting SNAP benefits and premium subsidies for health care are not competitive in many districts, regardless of the Democrat’s position towards Israel. In deep-blue districts, however, winning that primary usually means winning the seat, allowing strongly anti-Israel socialists to enter Congress even when their broader views may not represent the district’s general-election electorate. I understand this outcome because many voters even if they disagree with the Democrat’s view on Israel differ from the Republican party on a wide variety of issues including immigration, health care, economic policy, the growing isolationism and most of all concerns about President Trump.

The long-term answer therefore cannot simply be spending more money in Democratic primaries. Deep-blue districts need a pragmatic progressive or center-left alternative in the general election, something neither the Republican nor Democratic party can provide. The long-term solution to the declining political support for Israel is the creation of a viable political party with a pragmatic approach to governing and a reasonable approach to Israel.

The short-term options for AIPAC and DMFI in the 2026 cycle are relatively narrow because the die has largely been set for the fall election. In some cases, AIPAC support has backfired, as in the NJ 11 primary, where their intervention led to the nomination of a more radical Democrat. In Michigan the expenditures for Stevens may have weakened El-Sayed but there were less expensive ways to accomplish this.

AIPAC needs to move away from support of individual candidates and towards a broader education effort about the conflict and the world. In the current cycle, AIPAC should explain why terrorism and the history of the intifadas have made an Israeli Palestinian settlement so difficult, distinguish legitimate criticism of Israeli governments from efforts to delegitimize Israel, and confront Iran’s role in supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region—including the brutal repression of the Iranian people themselves. These educational efforts do not always have to be tied to an individual race.

Some 2026 candidates in both parties do deserve AIPAC support both because of their support for Israel and the views of their opponent. These candidates include Melissa Hernandez (D), CA-14; Janelle Stelson (D), PA-10; Eileen Laubacher (D), CO-4; Paige Cognetti (D), PA-8; Elaine Luria (D), VA-2; Don Davis (D), NC-1; Marie Gluesenkamp Perez (D), WA-3; Emilia Sykes (D), OH-13; Bobby Pulido (D), TX-15; Tom Barrett (R), MI-7; Gabe Evans (R), CO-8; Aaron Flint (R), MT-1; and Brent Taylor (R), TN-9.

The most important long-term problem is preventing Democratic socialists in deep-blue districts from becoming permanently entrenched in Congress. These candidates are often nominated in primaries dominated by activists and involving only around 30 percent of the voters who will participate in the general election. Yet once they win the Democratic nomination, the political composition of these districts makes election in November almost automatic. These candidates cannot be beaten in the Democratic primary. The only way to beat the candidates is the construction of a pragmatic and progressive third-party which champions economically efficient and progressive solutions.

The potential universe of deep-blue districts where a pragmatic progressive alternative could compete is considerably larger than the handful in which democratic-socialist candidates were elected this term. A substantial bloc of Democrats in the current Congress supports policies associated with the party’s progressive wing, including Medicare for All, major elements of the Green New Deal, and increasingly critical positions toward Israel. The relevant question is not whether a pragmatic-progressive alternative could win every such race; it plainly would not. The question is whether it could win enough of them to matter.

Even if an independent or third-party candidate had only about a one-in-six chance of prevailing in a competitive three-way race, victories in even a handful of deep-blue districts could upend the existing political calculus. In a House in which control may depend on only a few seats, such candidates could become pivotal to determining the majority and could demonstrate that winning the Democratic primary no longer guarantees election in November.

The problem will be more acute in 2028 and spread to even more Senate and House seats. Schumer is likely to be challenged in New York and Bennet is likely to be challenged in Colorado, actions that will endanger two pro-Israel Democrats.

The most effective way to stop the increase of socialist anti-Israel candidates from entering Congress is not beating them in primaries where most voters are progressive but beating them in the general election by fielding a pragmatic fiscally conservative progressive. The rationale for an organization built around the idea of a Democratic Majority for Israel is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Pro-Israel Democrats deserve support, but there is no longer a dependable pro-Israel majority within the Democratic Party.

On July 15, 103 House Democrats voted for Thomas Massie’s amendment eliminating $3.3 billion in annual assistance to Israel, compared with 98 Democrats opposed, and 10 voting present. Democratic leadership itself divided, with Hakeem Jeffries opposing the amendment and Katherine Clark supporting it.

The decision of centrist Democrats to oppose Israel is couched in terms of opposing Netanyahu and the current government and support for a two-state solution. But these votes do not reflect the recent history where Palestinians turned their backs on Oslo, started violent Intifadas, and then initiated October 7.

The movement by Democrat centrists away from Israel is an attempt to placate the growing anti-Israel wing of the party. Melat Kiros has described October 7 as an “inevitable consequence” of apartheid and occupation while denying that this justified the attack. Darializa Avila Chevalier defended attending a pro-Palestinian demonstration on October 8, 2023, and supports a one-state solution. Abdul El-Sayed has called Israel’s conduct genocide and apartheid, favors ending U.S. military aid, and has repeatedly resisted directly affirming Israel’s right to exist specifically as a Jewish state.

Centrist Democrats seem increasingly unwilling to draw boundaries around such rhetoric. Buttigieg, Newsom, Whitmer, Slotkin and Stevens have now all endorsed El-Sayed after he won the nomination. There must be some point at which principle overrides party loyalty. As the old saying goes, lie down with dogs and you get fleas.

I cannot simply migrate to the Republican Party. I find much of its immigration policy gratuitously cruel, oppose its large reductions in Medicaid and food assistance, and disagree with combining those cuts with very large tax reductions. CBO estimates that the 2025 reconciliation law will reduce Medicaid spending by about $1.2 trillion and SNAP by $211 billion through 2035 while greatly expanding immigration enforcement.

I would however if I was a resident of Michigan vote for Mike Rogers and if I was a resident of Maine vote for Susan Collins.

On foreign policy, the growing isolationism of Thomas Massie, Rand Paul, Marjorie Taylor Greene and influential voices such as Tucker Carlson creates another reason for concern. Trump remains more supportive of Israel, but his foreign policy is unpredictable and his commitment to supporting the Iranian people has been inconsistent.

An AIPAC backed third party can win by uniting people in the center in both deep blue and deep red districts and in swing districts where voters do not want either Republican or Democratic party rule. This approach will give substantive results as early as 2028 when a relatively small number of successful third-party candidates could control the balance of power in the House of Representatives and maybe also the Senate.

Author’s Note: One place to start would be recruiting candidates with credible answers to the domestic problems that are driving voters toward the socialist left—for example, candidates willing to support the practical health-care reforms outlined in A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care. Amazon Kindle edition. This book is linked to other policy proposals on student debt, retirement income and taxes. I appreciate your support.

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One month after the October 7 massacre, Melat Kiros published an open letter attacking the position taken by more than 100 major law firms on antisemitism and Israel. Sidley Austin reportedly asked Kiros, then an associate at the firm, to remove the letter. She refused and was fired—an event that helped redirect her from corporate law into progressive politics and ultimately a run for Congress.

The letter deserves to be considered in three parts. First are its familiar anti-Israel arguments: claims that are, in my view, misleading or wrong but are widely made and can be debated. Second are its more inflammatory conclusions about October 7, Zionism and Israel’s continued existence—the portions that help explain why the letter had such serious professional consequences. Third is the larger question of utility. Even apart from whether its claims are correct, does Kiros’s rhetoric offer any plausible path toward peace, coexistence or a workable political settlement?

Much of the letter consists of standard anti-Israel fare. Kiros describes Israel as a colonial and occupying power, characterizes its treatment of Palestinians as apartheid and argues that its military response after October 7 constituted disproportionate force and collective punishment. Many people hold some or all these views, and each deserves serious discussion. But Kiros presents them as settled conclusions while offering, at best, an extraordinarily selective account of the conflict.

Israel is not simply a European colonial outpost populated by descendants of foreign settlers. A large share of Israeli Jews are descended from people who fled or were driven from communities elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Around half of Israel’s Jewish population has roots in Arab or other Muslim countries, where ancient Jewish communities have now almost entirely disappeared. Their experience does not fit comfortably within a simple story of European colonizers displacing an indigenous population.

Nor does Kiros’s colonial account adequately acknowledge the role of Britain—the actual imperial power governing Palestine. At precisely the moment Jews were desperately attempting to escape Nazi persecution, Britain sharply restricted Jewish immigration. Jews fleeing for their lives were prevented from reaching Palestine, and many refugees and Holocaust survivors were forced to attempt entry clandestinely. That history does not erase Palestinian suffering, but it greatly complicates Kiros’s portrayal of Zionism as little more than an imperial project imposed upon the region.

The apartheid accusation is especially unpersuasive when applied indiscriminately to Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries. Get off an airplane in Israel and one immediately encounters a multilingual country: Hebrew, Arabic and English appear together on many airport, road and public signs. Arab citizens vote, form political parties, serve in the Knesset, work as physicians and university professors, and have served as judges, including on Israel’s Supreme Court.

Muslim religious life is not prohibited or driven underground. Israel contains hundreds of mosques, and Muslim citizens have access to a state-recognized system of Sharia courts that decides marriage, divorce, alimony, paternity and other personal-status matters. These are unusual features for a country supposedly organized around the systematic exclusion of its Arab population.

Cross-country comparisons are difficult, and substantial economic disparities remain between Arab and Jewish citizens within Israel. Even so, Arab citizens of Israel appear broadly on par economically with citizens of other Arab countries in the region and better off than those in several neighboring states. They possess citizenship, voting rights, political representation, religious institutions and access to an independent court system. Inequality and discrimination deserve criticism, but they are not synonymous with apartheid, and Israel bears little resemblance to South Africa’s former system of legally mandated racial separation and political exclusion. The comparative economic position of Arab Israelis is an interesting subject that merits fuller treatment in a separate comment.

Conditions in the West Bank present a more difficult case because Palestinians there live under varying combinations of Israeli military control and Palestinian Authority administration without Israeli citizenship. The Oslo process was intended to replace that arrangement gradually with Palestinian self-government and a negotiated settlement, but it failed. In my view, much of the responsibility lies with Palestinian and broader Arab leaders who repeatedly rejected an achievable partial settlement coupled to a promise of more to come.

The claim that Israel used excessive force after October 7 is also widely held and cannot simply be dismissed. The scale of Palestinian civilian suffering was immense. Yet Kiros gives little attention to the absence of any easy Israeli response after Hamas murdered civilians, seized hostages, embedded itself within Gaza and promised further attacks. Israel faced choices among terrible alternatives: leave Hamas in power, negotiate under the pressure of mass hostage-taking, or conduct a military campaign in one of the world’s most densely populated urban environments. One can criticize how Israel fought the war without pretending that it had an obvious, humane and risk-free solution available.

The portions of Kiros’s letter that most clearly set it apart—and likely explain the reaction of Sidley Austin’s partners—begin with her argument that violent Palestinian resistance is the predictable consequence of colonialism and occupation. Many people accuse Israel of occupation, apartheid or excessive force. Far fewer, especially one month after October 7, applied a theory of anticolonial violence so directly to the murder and kidnapping of Israeli civilians.

Kiros invokes an anticolonial passage associated with Jean-Paul Sartre, describes October 7 with the words “We saw this gaze,” and says the massacre “did not occur in a vacuum.” The invocation is especially peculiar because Sartre himself was, at least in a qualified sense, a Zionist: he welcomed Israel’s creation as a legitimate expression of Jewish national independence, even as he later advocated recognition of Palestinian national rights. Although Kiros calls the attack unjustifiable, her surrounding rhetoric portrays it as the foreseeable response of an oppressed population to its occupier. To many readers, this sounds less like historical context than a partial rationalization of terrorism.

She then places Hamas’s massacre and Israel’s military response side by side as unjustifiable acts. A law firm did not have to oppose criticism of Israel to view this as extraordinarily poor judgment. While victims were still being identified and hostages remained in Gaza, Kiros moved quickly from condemning the massacre to explaining why Israel had supposedly brought it upon itself.

There is nevertheless an uncomfortable truth beneath the rhetoric: this conflict has produced violence, trauma and hatred on both sides. Every day on my LinkedIn feed, I encounter another account of an October 7 atrocity or of an earlier attack on Jews in Palestine, often beginning with the 1929 Hebron massacre. Kiros presents Palestinian violence almost entirely as a response to Israeli oppression, but history is not that simple. For every violent act against Palestinians cited in her letter, I can point to a violent act committed against Jews.

Kiros briefly endorses a single state in which Jews and Palestinians possess equal rights, but she never explains how either people could reach that destination. How would Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups be disarmed? Who would prevent Iran and its regional proxies from exploiting the new state or turning Palestinian territory into another front against Israel? Who would protect Jews and Palestinians from communal violence, terrorism or an attempted seizure of power? Why would Israelis—surrounded by hostile forces and newly traumatized by October 7—surrender the sovereignty, army and secure refuge that exist precisely because Jews historically could not depend on others to protect them? Kiros does not confront these questions because her letter reads less like an effort to solve the conflict than an opportunity to assign blame and vent anger.

The history of failed negotiations is more complicated than Kiros suggests, but Palestinian leaders have repeatedly declined to accept an attainable partial settlement and continue negotiating from there. Rabin accepted the Oslo process, under which Israel recognized the PLO and transferred substantial governing authority to the Palestinian Authority. Barak and the Clinton Parameters contemplated a sovereign Palestinian state in Gaza and most of the West Bank, supplemented by land swaps; Clinton later described Arafat’s failure to close the deal as a terrible mistake. In 2008, Olmert offered Abbas a state based broadly on the pre-1967 lines, territorial exchanges, a connection between Gaza and the West Bank, a division of Jerusalem and international administration of the holy sites. Abbas did not accept the proposal, and Olmert warned that another comparable offer might not appear for 50 years. After October 7, even that prediction may look optimistic.

Some form of Swiss-style federation or confederation may ultimately offer a better long-term answer than either permanent occupation or an artificial effort to divide every road, settlement and holy place. Such a system might combine autonomous Jewish and Palestinian cantons or states with shared federal institutions, local control over civil affairs and joint responsibility for infrastructure, economic policy and external security. But it would first require a viable Palestinian governing authority capable of enforcing the law, controlling armed groups, resisting Iranian interference, accepting Jewish national rights and honoring agreements. Equality cannot be created merely by declaring one state; it must rest on functioning institutions, credible security arrangements and at least a minimum level of mutual trust.

Kiros’s letter contributes nothing to that process. By presenting Palestinian violence principally as a response to Israeli oppression, questioning Israel’s legitimacy and offering no credible transition from conflict to coexistence, her screed pushes both peoples farther from compromise. Venting may attract political supporters, but it is not a peace plan.

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· Republican-aligned organizations hold nearly twice as much cash as Democratic-aligned organizations.

· Trump’s political operation controls the largest concentration of political money.

· Crypto, AI and pro-Israel organizations now rival the major party committees.

· Cash balances alone understate the influence of groups such as EMILY’s List and Democratic Majority for Israel.

This memorandum examines the financial status of 25 nationally significant federal political war chests and what those balances suggest about the 2026 elections.

The 25 Largest Political War Chests

1. MAGA Inc. — Trump-aligned super PAC — $400.6 million

2. Senate Leadership Fund — Republican Senate super PAC — $238.6 million

3. Congressional Leadership Fund — Republican House super PAC — $141.8 million

4. Republican National Committee — National Republican Party committee — $128.5 million

5. Fairshake — Cryptocurrency-industry super PAC — $127.0 million

6. Senate Majority PAC — Democratic Senate super PAC — approximately $126 million

7. Democracy PAC II — Soros-family-funded Democratic super PAC — $121.6 million

8. National Republican Congressional Committee — Republican House campaign committee — $92.7 million

9. House Majority PAC — Democratic House super PAC — $89.9 million

10. United Democracy Project — AIPAC-affiliated electoral super PAC — $80.3 million

11. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee — Democratic House campaign committee — $79.0 million

12. Americans for Prosperity Action — Koch-network conservative super PAC — $65.3 million

13. Democracy PAC — Soros-family-funded Democratic super PAC — $64.5 million

14. Never Surrender — Trump leadership PAC — $60.9 million

15. National Republican Senatorial Committee — Republican Senate campaign committee — $55.9 million

16. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee — Democratic Senate campaign committee — $41.0 million

17. Leading the Future — Artificial-intelligence-industry super PAC — $31.0 million

18. Progressive Turnout Project — Democratic voter-mobilization organization — $25.5 million

19. LCV Victory Fund — Environmentalist Democratic-aligned super PAC — $19.5 million

20. Democratic National Committee — National Democratic Party committee — $16.3 million

21. Club for Growth Action — Conservative economic-policy super PAC — $11.4 million

22. Working for Working Americans–Federal — Labor-backed super PAC — $8.2 million

23. Working Families Party PAC — Progressive electoral organization — $7.7 million

24. Everytown Victory Fund — Gun-control advocacy super PAC — $6.9 million

25. VoteVets — Democratic-aligned veterans organization — $5.6 million

The list ranks nationally significant party committees, super PACs, leadership PACs and electoral organizations within the universe examined by this memorandum. It is not intended to include every corporate, labor, trade-association or professional PAC registered with the Federal Election Commission.

The figures generally represent cash on hand as of June 30, 2026. Senate Majority PAC remains an approximate figure because the reported amount may involve recent filings or related organizational funds that are not yet fully reflected in the FEC’s processed summary data.

This analysis excludes fundraising conduits such as ActBlue and WinRed because they primarily process contributions for other committees rather than control the money as a discretionary political war chest. It also excludes nonprofit organizations that may spend heavily on issue advertising but do not publicly report directly comparable federal cash balances.

Comments

Comment 1. Trump’s Financial Dominance

MAGA Inc.’s war chest of more than $400 million is unprecedented for a candidate-aligned super PAC. Combined with the separate Never Surrender fund, President Trump and his political allies control an extraordinary pool of resources that gives them substantial influence over Republican primaries, general elections and the party’s future direction.

Comment 2. Republicans Hold the Financial Advantage

The Republican-aligned organizations listed above hold approximately $1.20 billion, compared with roughly $612 million for Democratic-aligned groups—an advantage of nearly two to one. The Republican financial advantage extends well beyond the official party committees and increasingly resides in allied organizations that can shape both primary and general election outcomes.

These totals exclude special-interest organizations that are not consistently aligned with one party, including the cryptocurrency-funded Fairshake, AIPAC’s United Democracy Project and the AI-focused Leading the Future.

Comment 3. Democrats Are Missing from the Top Five

No Democratic-aligned organization appears among the five largest political war chests. AIPAC’s United Democracy Project, with $80.3 million, also holds slightly more cash than the DCCC, the Democratic Party’s principal House campaign committee.

Comment 4. Technology Money Has Become a Major Force

Crypto and AI organizations on the list hold approximately $158 million combined. That gives technology interests a larger political war chest than any individual Democratic Party committee.

Comment 5. AIPAC Remains Financially Formidable

AIPAC’s United Democracy Project retains $80.3 million despite spending roughly $30 million on Haley Stevens’s apparently unsuccessful Michigan Senate primary campaign. The Michigan intervention may have failed to stop Abdul El-Sayed, but it still demonstrates AIPAC’s ability to impose enormous costs on candidates it opposes and leaves the organization well financed for competitive November races.

AIPAC is more likely to intervene where an Israel-critical Democrat is running in a genuinely competitive race. The clearest possibilities include the Senate races in Michigan and Maine and several contested House seats, including CA-14, CA-22, CO-8, PA-10 and MI-7. AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups, including Democratic Majority for Israel, have also halted or suspended support for some lawmakers in response to their votes for the Massie amendment restricting assistance to Israel.

Comment 6. Cash on Hand Does Not Measure the Entire Political Network

EMILY’s List and Democratic Majority for Israel illustrate the limits of ranking organizations solely by their bank balances. EMILY’s List raised approximately $38 million and spent nearly $40 million during the cycle but held only $2.8 million on June 30. DMFI PAC raised $5.7 million, spent $5.5 million and retained approximately $1 million.

Their absence from the top 25 is therefore appropriate for a cash-on-hand ranking, but it should not be interpreted as evidence that they lack influence over Democratic nominations, fundraising and candidate positioning. Endorsements, donor networks and the ability to raise and spend money quickly can matter as much as the balance reported on any single filing date.

Conclusion

The 2026 money hierarchy shows a Republican financial advantage, an extraordinary concentration of resources around Trump and a growing role for specialized interests outside the formal party structure. The organizations with the largest bank accounts will not determine every election, but they will have substantial power to decide which candidates receive support, which face opposition and which issues dominate the campaign.

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• Democratic-socialist candidates won several deep-blue primaries with support from only a small share of the districts’ general-election voters.

• A pragmatic center-left independent could potentially unite unaffiliated voters, Republicans and conventional Democrats.

• A small independent bloc could hold substantial leverage in a closely divided House, including in the election of the Speaker.

• Shimon Blau’s qualification for the CO-1 ballot provides the first test of this strategy, although he remains a long shot.

The 2026 primaries have created a genuine opening in several of the country’s safest Democratic congressional districts. Five democratic-socialist or movement-left candidates defeated more conventional Democrats or captured seats previously held by them:

• Colorado 1: Melat Kiros defeated 15-term incumbent Diana DeGette.

• New York 7: Claire Valdez won the open seat of retiring liberal Nydia Velázquez.

• New York 10: Brad Lander defeated Dan Goldman.

• New York 13: Darializa Avila Chevalier defeated Adriano Espaillat.

• Pennsylvania 3: Chris Rabb won the nomination in one of the nation’s most Democratic districts.

These candidates are not identical, but the results mark a clear movement toward democratic socialism, activist politics and, in several races, a much more hostile position toward Israel and American military support for it.

However, primary voters are not identical to general election voters. A Bipartisan Policy Center analysis of nationwide voter files found that unaffiliated voters averaged 23 percent of general-election electorates but only 10 percent of primary electorates; primary voters were also five years older on average. Brookings found that Democratic and Republican primary voters alike regarded themselves as more ideological than the general-election voters in their districts.

The district-level numbers on turnout reinforce the point:

• New York 7, 10 and 13: Only 67,000 to 84,000 ballots were cast in each Democratic primary. The winners received 32,790 to 55,060 votes, equal to roughly 15 to 20 percent of the votes cast in the corresponding 2024 general elections.

• Colorado 1: Kiros received 83,685 votes, about 24 percent of the 345,639 votes cast in the district in 2024.

• Pennsylvania 3: Rabb’s 65,775 primary votes equaled 19 percent of the district’s 2024 general-election vote.

State rules determining who is eligible to vote in a primary partly determine the difference in composition between primary and general election electorates. New York and Pennsylvania have closed primaries where only voters registered to a party can participate. Colorado allows registered Independents to vote in the primary of their choice.

None of this invalidates the victories or proves that the nominees would lose a referendum on their programs. It does show that the primary did not establish the existence of broad electorate support for Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, abolition of ICE, or the new left’s position on Israel.

In a one-party district, many November voters support the Democratic nominee because the Republican alternative is unacceptable, not because they endorse every element of the nominee’s agenda.

A Republican, especially a modern Republican, will not win in these districts. A pragmatic, center-left independent may nevertheless have a path to victory.

She could seek most Republican voters, a large share of unaffiliated voters and enough conventional liberals, pro-Israel Democrats and fiscally cautious progressives to form a majority.

The candidate could remain liberal on abortion, civil rights, environmental protection, health-care access and the safety net while offering economically feasible policies, support for Israel and less ideological politics.

The potential constituency for this hypothetical third-party candidate extends beyond the five 2026 races. Long-serving Democrats in safe or strongly Democratic seats—including Katherine Clark in Massachusetts, Chellie Pingree in Maine, Frank Pallone in New Jersey, Adam Smith in Washington and Brad Sherman in California—now vote well to the left of the national electorate.

Voteview’s congress-by-congress estimates indicate that several, particularly Pallone, Smith and Sherman, have moved materially left during their careers. A credible center-left movement could eventually test whether these districts’ broader electorates have moved as far as their dominant Democratic primary electorates.

The claim that congressional politics are inevitably binary – vote for Jeffries or Johnson for speaker -- overlooks the potential power of an independent block. Recent elections for House Speaker demonstrate the potential leverage held by a small number of independents in the House.

Kevin McCarthy required 15 ballots in January 2023, and the House required four more ballots to elect Mike Johnson that October. In January 2025, Johnson won 218–215, with one vote cast for Tom Emmer. One additional vote for another named candidate would have prevented Johnson from winning on that ballot.

The Constitution does not require the Speaker to be a member of Congress. Representatives may vote for any individual. I, David Bernstein, the author and publisher of this blog could legally be elected Speaker of the House. This will be the plot of my new Netflix TV series, stay tuned.

The possibility of an independent Speaker, combined with an alternative platform that differs substantially from both the Republican and Democratic agendas, provides the rationale for an independent candidacy. Such a candidate must offer more than opposition to the movement left; the campaign needs a coherent governing program capable of attracting voters who are dissatisfied with both parties.

I have begun developing such a platform and have made substantial progress on four issues: health insurance, student debt, retirement saving and capital-gains taxation. Democratic proposals in these areas too often promise benefits that cannot realistically be financed or sustained. Republican approaches frequently acknowledge legitimate fiscal and economic problems but respond with repeal without an adequate replacement, abrupt benefit reductions, or policies that shift excessive risk onto households least able to bear it. The proposals are summarized, with links to the complete papers, in Four Policy Papers for a Third-Party Economic Agenda.

The first test of the hypothesis that a third-party candidate can win in a deep-blue district will occur in CO-1. On July 24, the Colorado secretary of state determined that 1,918 of the signatures submitted by Shimon Blau were valid, exceeding the 1,500 required and placing him on the November ballot. Blau describes himself as socially liberal and fiscally conservative and entered after Kiros’s victory. Blau is a late entrant and remains a long shot but now that we understand the contours of the Democratic-Socialistic threat I expect more such candidacies in 2028 as the Democratic-Socialist threat spreads and becomes more evident earlier in the process.

Sources and Method

Primary-electorate composition: Bipartisan Policy Center, “The Effect of Open Primaries on Turnout and Representation” (2024).

Primary voters and ideology: Brookings, “The 2018 Primaries Project: The Ideology of Primary Voters.”

New York rules and results: New York State Board of Elections registration deadlines and 2026 unofficial primary returns.

Colorado primary participation: Colorado Legislative Council, “Primary Election Law” (2026), and secretary of state ballot-return data reported after the primary.

Congressional ideology: Voteview, congress-by-congress Nokken-Poole first-dimension estimates; career comparisons calculated from the current member dataset.

Blau ballot qualification: The Colorado Sun, July 24, 2026.

Election comparisons use the winning 2026 Democratic primary vote divided by total votes cast in the corresponding 2024 U.S. House general election. Percentages are rounded; 2026 results are current through July 24, 2026.

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Why should AIPAC spend so much on this primary when the Republican nominee Mike Rogers is relatively moderate, at least to the extent where any Republican can be described as moderate, and strongly supportive of Israel.

The unacceptable outcome is Senator Abdul El-Sayed.

El-Sayed’s response to the March attack on Temple Israel in West Bloomfield helps explain that concern. He unequivocally condemned the attack, declared that antisemitism had no place in the community and said there was “never a justification” for attacking innocent people or a house of worship. But he then repeatedly invoked the phrase “hurt people hurt people,” emphasized that the attacker had recently lost relatives in an Israeli airstrike and argued that events 6,000 miles away could produce violence in Michigan. The FBI subsequently described the attacker as Hezbollah-inspired and Israeli intelligence claims the attackers brother was a commander in Hezbollah.

His more recent remarks have been still more explicit. El-Sayed has described Israel as a “rogue state,” accused it of genocide and apartheid, previously equated the Israeli government’s evil with that of Hamas, and repeatedly refused to say that Israel should continue to exist as a Jewish state. When asked whether he supported one state or two, he said that was not his choice to make.

American Jews are routinely expected to restrain Israel, criticize its government and prove that their attachment to it does not override their American obligations. Comparable pressure is rarely placed on Arab or Muslim political leaders to moderate rhetoric denying Jewish self-determination or attributing anti-Jewish violence to Israel; in El-Sayed’s case, the rhetoric has intensified as the campaign has progressed.

AIPAC therefore has a legitimate reason to oppose him. The question is when.

Defeating El-Sayed in the primary would send a clear warning that a Democrat who crosses a particular political line may never reach the general election. But it would also create a dangerous political outcome. Michigan Democrats are badly divided, and in my view either Democratic nominee is likely to lose to Rogers.

If Stevens wins the primary after nearly $50 million in outside intervention and then loses in November, progressives will claim that AIPAC and other centrist organizations purchased the nomination, rejected the candidate preferred by Democratic voters and still lost the seat. The defeat would be a disaster not only for centrist Democrats but also for AIPAC’s influence within the party.

An El-Sayed nomination followed by a general-election defeat would produce a much clearer result. The progressive wing would have chosen the nominee and would bear responsibility for losing a competitive Senate seat. The defeat would be a blunt message to the Democratic Party: nominate candidates who alienate Jewish voters and other supporters of Israel, and Republicans may win elections even in a state like Michigan where the current governor and both senators are Democrats.

The least risky strategy for AIPAC would therefore be to stay out of the Democratic primary. If El-Sayed wins the nomination, AIPAC and its allies could then spend heavily to destroy him in the general election.

That approach would prevent AIPAC from being blamed for a Stevens defeat, force progressives to defend their own candidate before the full Michigan electorate and still produce an acceptable senator—either Stevens or Rogers. The only risk is that El-Sayed might win, not an impossible outcome in a year where the overall political outlook increasingly resembles the one that existed in 2006 and 2018 two blue-wave years.

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· Ideological primaries are producing more polarized congressional nominees.

· Party-brand drag may hurt otherwise well-matched candidates in competitive districts.

· Extreme rhetoric can drown out economic issues that favor Democrats.

· The political environment generally favors Democrats, but the party’s shift left may squander that advantage.

· A more ideological Congress will be less capable of bipartisan governing.

· Continued political paralysis will make resolution of problems like Social Security less likely.

At first glance, the setup for the 2026 midterm elections looks like a textbook environment for a historic Democratic “blue wave,” mirroring the backlash cycles of 2006 and 2018.

The nation is bogged in an unpopular and poorly executed military engagement overseas and the Administration has administered a harsh deportation policy resulting in ICE agents killing several innocent people. Inflation and interest rates are rising, young adults can’t afford houses, older adults aren’t selling homes. While unemployment is low the new entrants to the workforce are having a hard time finding jobs and long-term unemployment is high.

A recent Fox News Poll suggests that Democrats are well positioned for success in November 2026.

“Voters say Democrats can better handle income inequality (+22 points), healthcare (+21), inflation (+10), the economy (+9), and foreign policy (+7). Republicans hold the advantage on crime (+7 points), while government spending (Democrats +3) and national security (R +2) are more evenly divided. On immigration, the GOP had an 8-point edge in April. Now, Democrats are preferred by one point.”

Under normal political gravity, these compounding missteps would guarantee a sweeping rebuke at the ballot box.

However, the political landscape is far more polarized than in 2006 or 2018. As ideological polarization intensifies, the escalating conflict between each party’s fringe and center is having a significantly more adverse impact on the electoral prospects of Democrats than Republicans.

This memo assesses recent 2026 primary elections to forecast likely control of the Senate and House in 2027. In addition, this memo considers how the election will impact the ideological center of the new Congress and its ability to effectively conduct the nation’s business.

The Senate:

While Republicans face competitive headwinds nationally, their internal cohesion gives them a major structural advantage in high-stakes Senate contests. GOP voters remain broadly aligned on key pillars—low taxes, deregulation, border enforcement, and alignment on foreign policy.

Trump by putting his thumb on the scale replaced two highly respected conservative Senators Cornyn in Texas and Cassiday with more loyal and more MAGA replacements. These two changes assure that the 2027 Republican caucus in the Senate will be more MAGA and less willing to compromise than the current one.

The replacement of Cornyn by Paxton puts Texas in play. Louisiana remains safely red with Letlow as the nominee.

The Democratic party has come together around a qualified candidate in most contested Senate races with two exception Maine and Michigan.

In Maine, rallying around former logger Troy Jackson following Graham Platner’s collapse trades one vetting failure for another, pitting an aggressive populist with documented anger-management baggage and a hard-left platform directly against Susan Collins’ appeal to moderate women.

In Michigan, the Democratic Party is so deeply divided by the bitter Gaza-centered contest between Abdul El-Sayed and Haley Stevens that Republican Mike Rogers is in strong shape regardless of who wins the primary.

I expect the Democrats will lose both the race in Maine and the race in Michigan.

Democrats appear poised to flip North Carolina and could flip the Senate in a blue wave, but I believe the most likely outcome for this election cycle is a Senate with the same Democrat/Republican composition as the current Senate.

The House:

The House of Representatives to be seated in January 2027 will be more ideological and more polarized than the current House.

Progressive, democratic-socialist, and populist insurgents have expanded their footprint, primarily by winning primaries in safe Democratic districts but also by moving into a few rural or genuinely competitive seats. The most prominent examples include Chris Rabb in Philadelphia’s PA-3, Analilia Mejia in New Jersey’s formerly suburban Republican NJ-11, Brad Lander, Claire Valdez, and Darializa Avila Chevalier in New York’s NY-10, NY-7, and NY-13, and Melat Kiros defeating Diana DeGette in Denver’s CO-1.

Republican primaries have produced a parallel movement toward Trump-aligned and hardline populist candidates. Steve Toth defeated Dan Crenshaw in TX-2. Gun-rights YouTuber Brandon Herrera secured the TX-23 nomination after Tony Gonzales withdrew following a personal scandal. Trump-backed David Flippo won in NV-2, while former baseball player Mark Teixeira won in TX-21. These results show Republican voters replacing independent-minded or national-security-oriented conservatives with candidates less likely to challenge the president or party leadership.

Thomas Massie was a somewhat different case. His defeat by Ed Gallrein reflected not simply an ideological shift within the party, but a highly personal rupture between Massie and Donald Trump. Trump made Massie’s removal a priority and ultimately prevailed, demonstrating the danger Republican incumbents face when they openly defy him—even when their dissent is grounded in long-standing conservative or libertarian principles.

The departures of Jared Golden and Don Bacon eliminate two of Congress’s rare cross-party survivors and further accelerate the disappearance of members willing to distance themselves from their national parties.

The political and economic environment still gives Democrats a plausible path to a wave election, but Democrats enter the election substantially more divided on a range of issues. Republicans had serious internal disagreements over the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, but nearly all of them ultimately voted for final passage: only Thomas Massie and Brian Fitzpatrick joined the Democrats in opposition.

The sharpest and perhaps least bridgeable Democratic division involves Israel and Gaza. Much of the progressive wing describes Israel’s conduct as genocide and demands an end to military assistance. Some party moderates, including some Jewish Democrats, have responded by becoming increasingly critical of Israel to hold the coalition together. In July, 103 House Democrats voted for an amendment that would have cut $3.3 billion in Israeli security assistance, demonstrating that the division is no longer confined to a handful of Squad members.

Democrats face two electoral problems in their effort to retake the House. In some districts, they have nominated a candidate whose positions are well to the left of the median voter; elsewhere, a locally suitable candidate may be defined by more ideological nominees in the party, sometimes within the same television market.

The clearest examples of nominee mismatch are Matt Dunlap in ME-2, a progressive Medicare-for-All supporter replacing the more independent Jared Golden; Sam Forstag in MT-1, an AOC-backed union populist contesting a Republican-leaning western Montana district; Manny Rutinel in closely divided CO-8, whose strong biography may be offset by rhetoric about stopping ICE from “terrorizing” communities; and Randy Villegas in CA-22, a Sanders- and AOC-endorsed progressive who defeated a more moderate Democrat in a conservative Central Valley battleground. These candidates may have compelling local biographies, but they have less room for ideological error in districts concerned with agriculture, energy, immigration, firearms, rural hospitals, and the cost of environmental regulation.

The more widespread problem is not nominee mismatch. It is party brand drag. The party brand problem may adversely impact Democrats in Colorado and in northeast states including NY, NJ and PA.

Party-brand drag occurs when candidates are judged not only by their own records and positions but also by the most visible or controversial members of their party. The danger for Democrats is that inflammatory rhetoric about Israel, Hamas, American foreign policy, or defunding ICE and the police may drown out economic issues on which the party is better position.

The Fox News poll found the public currently has a lot confidence in Democrats than Republicans on the economy. Even Medicare for All may not be a huge negative for many voters frustrated with health care, although, I suspect the Green New Deal is problematic in rural areas. Regardless, rhetoric that appears anti-American or sympathetic to terrorism can be used against Democratic candidates almost anywhere.

In Colorado, Democrats have nominated several candidates whose backgrounds appear well suited to difficult districts. Dwayne Romero in CO-3 is an Army veteran, businessman, former local official, and former state economic-development director. Eileen Laubacher in CO-4 is a retired Navy rear admiral and former National Security Council official. Jessica Killin in CO-5 is an Army veteran and former congressional chief of staff who has built a serious campaign in a historically Republican Colorado Springs district.

Melat Kiros is helping define the Democratic field well beyond CO-1, complicating the campaigns of Democrats in CO-3, CO-4, CO-5, and even competitive CO-8. Romero, Laubacher, and Killin have military, business, and public-service backgrounds that could appeal to independents, veterans, and Republicans dissatisfied with Trump, but congressional elections are increasingly nationalized.

Republicans do not need to prove that these candidates share Kiros’s support for Medicare for All, abolishing ICE, a Green New Deal, and ending military aid to Israel; they need only argue that electing any Democrat will strengthen a House caucus increasingly influenced by politicians who do. As a result, every Colorado Democratic nominee may be forced to defend or distance themselves from positions developed for overwhelmingly Democratic Denver but far less popular elsewhere in the state.

The same problem threatens several districts in northeastern states – NY, PA and NJ. Democrats need to run up the score in this region if they are going to take back the House.

The same party-brand problem threatens the northeastern districts Democrats must win—or defend by substantial margins—to retake the House, including NY-3, NY-4, NY-17, and NY-19; PA-1, PA-7, and PA-8; and NJ-7. Republicans will use the victories of Brad Lander, Claire Valdez, and Darializa Avila Chevalier in New York City, Chris Rabb in overwhelmingly Democratic PA-3, and Analilia Mejia in NJ-11 to argue that even moderate suburban Democrats would strengthen a party increasingly influenced by democratic socialists, anti-ICE activists, and critics of Israel.

These safe-seat nominees may never appear on a battleground district’s ballot, but their statements will circulate through regional media and Republican advertising in races such as Laura Gillen’s NY-4, Lawler’s NY-17, the Lehigh Valley’s PA-7, northeastern Pennsylvania’s PA-8, and Rebecca Bennett’s NJ-7—all currently among the region’s most competitive contests.

Concluding Thoughts:

James Carville’s rule remains relevant: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Most Americans are voting on prices, wages, health care, immigration, energy costs, and the competence of government—not on which side can demonstrate the greatest ideological devotion to Israel or the Palestinians. Yet Kiros sometimes appears to be campaigning to represent Ramallah.

My two concerns, based on observations from this election cycle, are that too much of the Democratic Party prefers ideological purity to building a durable governing coalition, while too much of the Republican Party’s MAGA wing prizes loyalty to Donald Trump over independent judgment, compromise, and workable policy. A Democratic Party devoted to moral performance and a Republican Party devoted to personal loyalty may energize their most committed activists, but both will struggle to govern a divided country effectively.

The Congress seated in January 2027 will be more ideological, polarized, and less capable of governing than the current one. The disappearance of cross-party members, combined with the growth of the progressive left and the MAGA right, will make durable compromises on health care, taxes, energy, immigration, and entitlement reform increasingly difficult. Administrations will rely more heavily on reconciliation, executive orders, and regulations that are reversed whenever power changes hands. It is not likely the new Congress will consider the policy recommendations on health care, student debt, retirement and taxes outlined in my four-book policy series.

Political paralysis is perilous for the country, especially on Social Security. Allowing the trust funds to approach depletion and then imposing abrupt benefit cuts is not a responsible option, yet continued delay makes that outcome more likely. Each year of inaction narrows the available choices and makes a gradual, balanced solution more difficult.

The danger extends beyond Social Security. Federal debt continues to rise, while many households approach retirement with inadequate savings, high health-care costs, or student debt extending into later life. These problems require long-term reforms rather than emergency legislation. Increasing polarization raises the risk that Congress will postpone action until the remaining solutions are more painful, expensive, and unfair.

Author’s Note

If The Household Balance Sheet: A Third-Party Economic Program for Health Care, Student Debt, Retirement Security, and Capital Gains and other books in the policy series generate $10 million in sales revenue, I will interpret that as evidence of a vast, previously undetected constituency for pragmatic policy—and reluctantly run for office. Until then, buying, reviewing, and recommending the series is a far less disruptive way to support the movement.

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Troy Jackson is poised to replace Graham Platner as the Democratic nominee against Susan Collins. According to a detailed Washington Post investigation into Jackson’s temperament and more importantly for voters in Maine, the Bangor Daily News, his six years as Maine Senate president included yelling, cursing, table-pounding and a now-famous flying water bottle.

One female senator was reportedly screamed at from inches away after refusing to change her vote. Another Democratic leader allegedly ordered Jackson out of her office after he cursed, shouted and became aggressive during an argument over gun legislation. Jackson’s campaign disputes some details and denies that he physically intimidated anyone, while acknowledging occasions when his frustration got the better of him.

This raises an obvious question: What happens when this populist former lumberjack debates Susan Collins, a 73-year-old senator whose public manner resembles a grandmother patiently explaining that everyone may have dessert after finishing the peas?

Perhaps Democrats should not wait to find out. Jackson’s campaign should hire a 4-foot-11 actress to pose as a timid, soft-spoken and relentlessly irritating female staffer. Her assignment would be to correct him in public, disagree with him at inconvenient moments and begin every conversation with the words, “Actually, Troy.”

If Jackson can endure six months of this without shouting, pounding furniture or sending a beverage airborne, he is ready for Susan Collins. If he cannot, better to discover that in a campaign office than during a televised debate.

Progressives should also abandon the comforting fiction that misogyny is exclusively a right-wing condition. Older left-wing men can be wonderfully egalitarian in the abstract—and considerably less enlightened when an actual woman contradicts them.

The 2020 confrontation between Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren offered a useful example. After Sanders publicly denied Warren’s account of a private conversation, she confronted him: “I think you called me a liar on national TV.” We cannot know precisely what Sanders said privately, but Warren was clearly correct about the effect of his denial. Many Sanders supporters immediately treated his certainty as proof and portrayed Warren as dishonest, calculating or hysterical.

The larger joke is Maine Democrats’ candidate selection. Primary voters chose Graham Platner over Gov. Janet Mills. After Platner collapsed, party delegates rallied around another older male populist with substantial baggage.

Maine Democrats apparently agree that a woman cannot beat Susan Collins. Their solution is to keep finding men who might lose to her.

Collins must be terrified—or at least trying very hard not to smile.

Authors Note: www.EconomicMemos.com deals with economic policy, personal finance, investments and even politics. Please explore, and if you like politics, also read this article about the myth of the small donor.

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It is a compelling story. It is also completely fake.

A fascinating piece in Tablet Magazine detailing the rise of “American Priorities”—a massive new pro-Palestine Super PAC—has officially blown this narrative to pieces. The group, which pledged to dump over $10 million into the 2026 midterm cycle to back anti-Israel candidates and unseat incumbents, isn’t being funded by bake sales or campus lunch-money donations. It is backed by deep-pocketed Silicon Valley multi-millionaires, specifically former executives from the tech and mobile advertising giant AppLovin, alongside other elite tech founders.

The arrival of American Priorities exposes a series of uncomfortable truths that the political left has spent a decade trying to hide.

1. The Small-Donor Myth Is Dead

First, let’s discard the romantic illusion that any serious political faction operates solely on grassroots pocket change. The “small-donor” narrative has always been more of a marketing strategy than a financial reality. Building a national political infrastructure, buying airtime, running sophisticated digital operations, and mounting primary challenges against entrenched incumbents requires serious, heavy-duty capital.

When progressives need to scale up their operations to compete at the highest levels, they don’t just rely on recurring monthly donations from college students. They do exactly what everyone else does: they court wealthy tech executives, venture capitalists, and elite mega-donors who can write six- and seven-figure checks to supercharge a PAC. The AppLovin-backed influx of cash proves that big money is not a partisan vice; it is the baseline currency of modern political warfare.

2. The Progressive Double Standard

This brings us to the staggering hypocrisy of the progressive establishment. For cycles on end, progressive candidates and organizations like Justice Democrats have treated outside political spending as an absolute moral failure. They have scolded rivals, demanded pledges to reject corporate PAC money, and framed any campaign benefiting from independent expenditure groups as inherently corrupt.

Yet, as the Tablet piece illustrates, when a well-funded Super PAC like American Priorities steps in to spend $1 million in North Carolina or drop $2 million in New Jersey to advance an anti-Israel, progressive agenda, the moral outrage mysteriously evaporates. Suddenly, the nuances of campaign finance become highly acceptable. Candidates claim “no involvement” with the PAC while reaping the massive benefits of its ad buys and ground games. The left’s grievance with big money, it turns out, was never actually about the presence of money in politics—it was entirely about who the money was being used to support.

3. The Selective Vilification of AIPAC

Nowhere is this hypocrisy more glaring—or more dangerous—than in the selective vilification of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). For the past few cycles, progressive rhetoric has uniquely fixated on AIPAC’s political spending, describing it in terms that border on conspiratorial. AIPAC money is routinely characterized not merely as political opposition, but as a dirty, foreign, subverting force buying up American democracy.

When we look at the facts, this obsessive, singular fixation on pro-Israel money reveals a disturbing double standard. Political spending is ubiquitous. Labor unions, environmental groups, tech oligarchs, and now massive pro-Palestine Super PACs like American Priorities all spend tens of millions of dollars to influence elections.

To suggest that money spent by pro-Israel Americans is uniquely corrupt, while millions of tech-advertising dollars weaponized against Israel is just “participating in the process,” crosses a clear line. It taps into ancient, antisemitic tropes about wealthy Jewish cabals buying political outcomes. The reality is simple: the anti-Israel side of the aisle is playing the exact same high-stakes, big-money game. They are utilizing super PACs, courting tech elites, and flooding the airwaves.

The Bottom Line

The story of AppLovin’s executives financing American Priorities should forever change how we talk about campaign finance. It proves that there are no uniquely pure actors in modern American politics. Everyone uses money. Everyone uses PACs. The next time a progressive politician rails against the corrupting influence of outside spending, look at who is funding their defense. The myth of the pure grassroots crusade is officially over.

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