I am leaving for vacation to visit my new granddaughter. I will return to the subjects of inflation and affordability when I come back.

Tonight is election night—and, for me and many other supporters of Israel and opponents of antisemitism, a deeply discouraging one.

Comment One

I now expect the next Congress to include roughly 15 Democrats whose rhetoric or positions I regard as effectively pro-Hamas. This is my preliminary assessment rather than a final documented count. When I return, I will define precisely what I mean by “pro-Hamas,” identify the members who meet that definition, and add up the total.

Even many moderate Democrats are hedging their support for Israel through vague statements and mixed votes.

AIPAC’s decision to spend heavily to defeat Tom Malinowski in New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District now looks even more misguided. Malinowski’s defeat helped Analilia Mejia, a candidate who describes Israel’s conduct in Gaza as genocide, win the nomination.

After AIPAC-backed primary loss, Tom Malinowski endorses rival who says Israel committed genocide

Comment Two

Moderate Democrats increasingly say that they support Israel but oppose Benjamin Netanyahu and favor a two-state solution. But October 7 demonstrated the enormous security obstacles standing in the way of such a solution.

A woman who wanted to confront me about Israel once asked, “What do you think of Bibi Netanyahu?” My response was: “What do you think of Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot?”

Both men oppose Netanyahu, but neither treats Israel’s security threats as secondary. Eisenkot is a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces who has broadly supported Israel’s military operations while criticizing Netanyahu’s strategy. Bennett has explicitly said that Israel can no longer permit terrorist organizations to construct extensive military infrastructure along its borders.

This grieving father and former general could challenge Netanyahu

Naftali Bennett says Israel-U.S. alliance is at risk

I do not believe that many of Israel’s American critics would be satisfied with either Bennett or Eisenkot. That suggests that their objection extends beyond Netanyahu himself.

Comment Three

As of tonight’s returns, Melat Kiros appears headed toward victory in Colorado’s 1st Congressional District Democratic primary.

Can we agree that refusing to identify the terrorist firebombing of peaceful Jewish demonstrators in Boulder, Colorado, as antisemitic represents, at a minimum, an indefensible failure of moral clarity?

The attacker targeted a predominantly Jewish gathering supporting the hostages taken on October 7, shouted “Free Palestine,” and attacked participants with incendiary devices and a makeshift flamethrower. One victim later died. Yet Kiros declined to characterize the attack as clearly antisemitic.

Democratic socialist candidate won’t call Boulder attack antisemitic

This is where a substantial part of the Colorado Democratic Party now stands.

Comment Four

Many deep-blue districts that have nominated candidates hostile toward Israel were decided in primaries with turnout far below that of a general election.

In a three-way general-election contest, a viable and well-funded independent candidate who is both anti-Trump and unequivocally opposed to antisemitism could be competitive.

It is too late to place such candidates on the ballot in 2026.

The 2028 effort starts tonight.

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Colorado’s June 30 Democratic primaries in the 1st and 8th Congressional Districts have implications far beyond Colorado. They illuminate two of the most important fault lines in the Democratic Party’s internal conflict between ideological progressives and pragmatic liberals: Israel and Medicare for All.

Israel is by far the more emotionally divisive issue. It raises fundamental questions about antisemitism, terrorism, national survival and whether unequivocally pro-Israel Democrats still have a secure place in the party.

Medicare for All presents a less visceral but equally revealing test: whether Democrats define commitment by adopting the most sweeping slogan or by developing reforms that can be financed, administered, enacted and sustained.

In CO-1, I strongly support Diana DeGette over Melat Kiros. I do not reach that conclusion reluctantly or simply because DeGette is the incumbent. Kiros’s statements about Israel reflect a moral and historical framework that I find unacceptable after October 7.

Her November 2023 letter about Israel formally says that there was no justification for the Hamas attack. But that sentence appears only after an extended argument portraying the massacre as the predictable expression of “violent resistance” to colonial oppression. The letter calls Israel colonial and apartheid, largely removes Hamas’s ideology and agency from the moral accounting, and invokes a passage asking what kind of hateful “gaze” an occupier should expect from the occupied: “We saw this gaze.”

I regard the letter as pro-Hamas in its moral framing and Hamas-apologetic at its core. It does not openly praise Hamas. Instead, it minimizes the organization’s choices and atrocities while devoting far more attention to explaining why Israelis supposedly brought the attack upon themselves. A formal disclaimer does not neutralize the argument surrounding it.

Kiros’s recent refusal to identify the Boulder firebombing as antisemitic reinforces my concern. The attacker deliberately targeted a predominantly Jewish gathering seeking the return of hostages held by Hamas. He shouted “Free Palestine,” later told investigators that he wanted to kill “Zionist people,” and killed one of his victims. Yet Kiros said she could not know what was in the perpetrator’s heart.

That is not moral nuance. It is ideological blindness.

Medicare for All creates a more complicated comparison because DeGette also says she supports moving toward it. I disagree with her. Replacing most American health financing with a single federal program would require enormous changes in taxation, employment compensation, provider payment, union benefits and existing private and public coverage. It would also concentrate decisions about medical benefits and contested treatments in the federal government, making them more vulnerable to changes in national political control.

But DeGette’s experience distinguishes her from Kiros. DeGette is the ranking Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee and could chair it if Democrats retake the House. She has worked on technically difficult health legislation, including bipartisan measures involving medical research, prescription drugs and Medicare transparency.

That record does not make her correct about Medicare for All. It does demonstrate that she understands Congress as an institution in which progress requires hearings, statutory language, budget estimates, implementation rules and coalitions that extend beyond one ideological faction.

I would prefer that DeGette move away from Medicare for All and consider a more practical alternative. My paper, “A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care,” proposes four mutually reinforcing reforms: catastrophic reinsurance to lower underlying premiums, portable employee-owned coverage, modernization of health savings arrangements and broader use of Medicaid where it provides more protective coverage at lower cost.

DeGette has not endorsed my proposal. But her knowledge and committee position make her far more capable of evaluating such ideas, improving them and incorporating workable elements into legislation. I would rather debate health policy with an experienced legislator who understands implementation than entrust it to a candidate whose politics place ideological certainty above complexity.

CO-8 offers the clearer moderate-progressive choice. Manny Rutinel is not Melat Kiros on Israel. He supports Israel’s existence, a two-state solution and continued military assistance. But Shannon Bird is more firmly situated within the mainstream pro-Israel Democratic coalition and has a much stronger record of practical governing.

Bird served on and ultimately led Colorado’s Joint Budget Committee. The Center for Effective Lawmaking ranked her Colorado’s most effective legislator for the 2023–24 term. She has negotiated budgets and worked on education, housing, health care and affordability. That is the often-uncelebrated work through which political promises become actual programs.

Rutinel’s health-care position has also changed. While seeking the Working Families Party endorsement in 2025, he supported single-payer health care. He now emphasizes Medicaid, Affordable Care Act assistance and a public option. Candidates may reconsider their positions, but voters are entitled to ask whether the newer position represents genuine rethinking or adjustment to the realities of running in a swing district.

Bird does not claim that a single enormous federal bill will resolve every weakness in American medicine. Her approach is more incremental, but incremental does not have to mean timid. Restoring coverage assistance, protecting Medicaid, lowering prescription prices, improving Medicare and developing a workable public option could materially improve people’s lives while creating a foundation for further reform.

The common thread between Israel and Medicare for All is judgment.

Can a candidate condemn Israeli policies without rationalizing terrorism or questioning Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish state? Can a candidate pursue universal access to health care without insisting that only one immensely disruptive financing structure is morally legitimate? Can a legislator recognize complexity, compromise where appropriate and still retain clear principles?

DeGette and Bird have demonstrated a greater capacity to make those distinctions and to get things done.

That matters nationally. Congress is losing Democratic Representative Jared Golden of Maine and Republican Representative Don Bacon of Nebraska, two members from competitive districts willing to resist party pressure and work across ideological lines. A Bird victory in the primary and general election could give the House a new leader in that tradition: liberal on many goals, moderate in temperament, supportive of Israel and capable of building coalitions.

I care deeply about these races because I want the Democratic Party to remain both principled and capable of governing. I support reproductive freedom, an effective social safety net and serious public action where markets fail. I also support Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish democracy and its right to defend itself against terrorism.

I want universal access to affordable health care, but I do not believe the answer is to place nearly the entire health-financing system under one federal program. Moral seriousness requires more than adopting the most sweeping position available. It requires understanding tradeoffs, respecting contrary evidence and designing policies that can survive legislation, implementation and future elections.

DeGette and Bird do not agree with me on everything. But they are much more likely to translate Democratic values into durable results. CO-1 will test whether Democrats reject a politics that rationalizes Hamas violence and struggles to recognize antisemitism at home. CO-8 will test whether voters elevate a proven bridge-builder who could help replace the practical leadership Congress is losing.

Together, these races will say a great deal about whether the Democratic Party intends to govern—or merely to signal.

Appendix A: Melat Kiros, Israel and the Historical Record

Kiros’s November 7, 2023, letter was written in response to law firms that had condemned antisemitism, Islamophobia and threats on university campuses. She objected especially to their characterization of calls for Israel’s elimination as antisemitic.

The letter does contain a sentence saying there was no justification for October 7. But the organization of the argument matters. Before reaching that disclaimer, Kiros describes Zionism as colonialism, calls Israel an apartheid state and says that people whose land is taken and whose existence is threatened inevitably “resist with violence in kind.” She then describes October 7 as an “obvious symptom” of violent resistance to colonialism and invokes the “gaze” passage.

That is why I view the letter as Hamas-apologetic despite its formal condemnation. Its moral structure shifts Hamas from perpetrator to symptom. Hamas’s antisemitic ideology, deliberate targeting of civilians, hostage-taking and independent political agency receive little attention. Israel and Zionism are treated as the originating cause from which nearly all subsequent violence follows.

The historical account is also one-directional. Kiros refers to violence inflicted by the Israeli government and settlers “since 1917,” although Israel did not exist until 1948. Violence during the British Mandate was not simply committed by Zionists against passive Palestinians. Jews were killed in the 1920 Jerusalem disturbances and the 1921 Jaffa riots. In 1929, Arab mobs murdered 67 Jews in Hebron, destroyed an ancient Jewish community and attacked Jews in Safed. Across the 1929 violence, 133 Jews were killed.

Jewish underground organizations later committed terrorism and atrocities, and Palestinians suffered mass displacement and loss during the 1948 war. But the broader context also matters. Palestinian Arab leaders and the surrounding Arab states rejected the United Nations partition plan, and after Israel declared independence, armies from five Arab countries invaded with the objective of defeating the newly established Jewish state.

The Palestinian exodus had multiple causes. Some Palestinians were expelled by Jewish or Israeli forces; others fled combat, fear, atrocities or the collapse of local leadership; and in some places Arab authorities ordered or encouraged evacuation. It is therefore too simple either to attribute the entire refugee crisis to Israeli expulsion or to claim that Arab armies generally told Palestinians to leave.

Both histories must be confronted. But a narrative that excludes the massacre of Jews before Israel’s creation—and omits the Arab rejection of partition and invasion of the new state—cannot credibly explain the conflict as an uninterrupted chain of Palestinian resistance to Israeli violence.

The apartheid accusation also requires greater precision than Kiros provides. Serious concerns exist about Israeli rule, settlements and unequal legal systems in the West Bank. Those issues should not be minimized. But Israel’s Arab citizens vote in national elections, serve in the Knesset and judiciary, and maintain extensive religious institutions. Public information appears in Arabic as well as Hebrew and English. Hundreds of mosques operate in Israel, and state-recognized Sharia courts exercise binding jurisdiction over important Muslim personal-status matters—authority that Sharia councils in the United Kingdom do not possess.

Those realities do not prove that discrimination is absent. They do demonstrate why treating Israel proper as an exact equivalent of apartheid South Africa is misleading and why the circumstances of Arab Israeli citizens must be distinguished from those of Palestinians living under occupation.

The colonial description is incomplete for another reason. A large portion of Israel’s Jewish population descends from communities in the Middle East and North Africa, many of whose members arrived as refugees or were displaced from Arab and Muslim-majority countries. Gadi Eisenkot, currently a serious contender to replace Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister, is the son of Moroccan Jewish immigrants. His emergence does not resolve the Palestinian question, but it illustrates why Israel cannot accurately be reduced to a white European colony imposed on the Middle East.

Finally, there is the Boulder attack. Kiros initially declined to identify it as antisemitic even after the attacker targeted a predominantly Jewish hostage-support gathering, shouted a pro-Palestinian slogan and told investigators that he wanted to kill Zionists. Even progressive Democratic leaders who agreed with Kiros on many other issues criticized her response.

People have a legal right to express even harsh, offensive and anti-Zionist views. But free speech is not immunity from moral evaluation. Nor does the First Amendment compel a private law firm to retain an employee whose public statements it concludes are incompatible with the judgment, values or client responsibilities expected of its attorneys.

Sidley Austin had the right to fire Kiros. Voters have the same right—and obligation—to judge what her letter reveals about her fitness for Congress.

Appendix B: Why Medicare for All Is the Wrong Test of Democratic Commitment

The objective of universal or near-universal health coverage should not be confused with support for one specific financing structure.

A Medicare for All system would move most health spending onto the federal budget and require correspondingly large new revenues. Households might pay less in premiums and out-of-pocket costs, but those savings would be accompanied by major changes in taxes and compensation. Employers would no longer sponsor insurance in its current form, requiring difficult decisions about whether existing employer contributions would be converted into wages, taxes or savings.

Provider payment creates another unavoidable tradeoff. Private insurers frequently pay hospitals and physicians substantially more than Medicare. Paying Medicare-like rates could reduce national health spending, but abrupt reductions would impose major pressure on hospitals and medical practices. Paying substantially higher rates would reduce disruption but greatly increase the federal cost of the program.

A single federal payer would also concentrate authority over benefits, reimbursement and medical necessity. That could produce consistency and administrative savings, but it would magnify the consequences of elections. A future administration hostile to reproductive care, gender-related treatment or other contested services would exercise enormous influence over nearly everyone’s coverage.

The practical alternative is not complacency. The existing system leaves too many people uninsured or exposed to unaffordable premiums, deductibles and medical debt.

My proposal would use catastrophic reinsurance to reduce underlying insurance costs rather than relying entirely on back-end subsidies. It would make employer contributions portable so that coverage follows the worker rather than the job. It would reform health savings arrangements to help moderate-income households manage deductibles, and it would use Medicaid more broadly where it is less expensive and more protective than heavily subsidized private coverage.

These reforms could be enacted separately, tested and adjusted. They preserve choice while directly addressing identifiable market failures.

The relevant distinction is therefore not between politicians who care about universal coverage and those who do not. It is between those who treat Medicare for All as a test of ideological virtue and those willing to do the difficult work of designing a health system that is affordable, administratively workable and politically durable.

On that test, DeGette’s legislative experience and Bird’s record of practical governance make them better choices.

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Additional Reading

Letter by Kiros

https://medium.com/@melatakiros/dear-us-law-firms-77ec63e838af

Universal Health Care Proposal by Bernstein

I. The 2026 Primaries and the Politically Homeless Middle

At this writing, the results of the June 23 congressional primaries are not yet known. But the contests have already revealed something important about the direction of New York’s Democratic Party. These are not traditional battles between liberals and conservatives. Nearly all the leading candidates are liberal on abortion, labor rights, LGBTQ protections, immigration, taxation and the social safety net. In NY-7, even candidates opposing Mamdani-backed Claire Valdez hold strongly progressive positions. In NY-10 and NY-13, the most consequential dividing line is Israel and whether candidates will join Mamdani’s effort to move the congressional delegation toward the democratic-socialist left.

Mamdani has endorsed Brad Lander against Representative Dan Goldman, Valdez for the open NY-7 seat and Darializa Avila Chevalier against Representative Adriano Espaillat. He described the American Israel Public Affairs Committee as one of the “monsters” preventing the birth of a new political world and subsequently defended that language. He did not expressly call every AIPAC donor a monster. But political organizations are made up of people, and much of AIPAC’s support comes from Jewish Americans who believe that Israel’s survival and a strong American-Israeli relationship are legitimate political objectives. Dehumanizing an organization inevitably reaches the citizens who support it.

I am what might be called a card-carrying AIPAC supporter. I also favor a pragmatic path toward improved universal health coverage, protection of Medicaid, more portable insurance and targeted assistance that helps borrowers eliminate student debt earlier in life. Yet under the political vocabulary Mamdani has introduced, support for those liberal economic objectives does not matter. Because I support AIPAC and Israel, his rhetoric places people like me among the “monsters.”

The atmosphere surrounding Goldman’s campaign illustrates the danger. Poetica Coffee served Goldman and his young daughter without initially recognizing him. The shop later refunded his purchase, announced that it did not serve “genocide enablers,” suggested that his money probably came from AIPAC and told him never to return. Mamdani eventually said that the online post went beyond ordinary political disagreement, but he stopped short of an unambiguous condemnation. A mayor who wishes to govern the entire city should have been able to say plainly that political disagreements do not justify publicly humiliating and excluding a Jewish congressman from a neighborhood business.

A relatively small number of voters in several low-turnout, safely Democratic primaries may therefore determine not only who represents New York City, but what the Democratic Party appears to stand for nationally. Candidates selected in these districts will become prominent congressional voices, while Republicans across the country will use their statements to define Democrats running in far more moderate states and districts. The consequences will extend well beyond New York.

My differences with the progressive wing also extend far beyond Israel. My paper A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care supports broader and more continuous coverage while rejecting both Republican retrenchment and the disruptive replacement of nearly all existing insurance with Medicare for All. My Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt rejects both indiscriminate debt cancellation and a repayment structure that leaves borrowers indebted into middle age or retirement. The Four Economic Questions argues that government must acknowledge scarce resources, fiscal trade-offs and the consequences of every spending decision.

These are governing questions. Too much of the progressive movement instead offers slogans, moral accusations and performative politics without workable transition plans, durable financing or serious consideration of unintended consequences. I have reluctantly concluded that the Democratic Party, as presently constituted and increasingly influenced by this movement, is not capable of governing responsibly. It is more interested in demonstrating ideological purity than in designing policies that can be enacted, financed and sustained.

II. Why It Is Too Late for 2026

New York does not categorically prohibit a defeated primary candidate from continuing on another ballot line. The candidate must ordinarily have secured that line before the primary. Independent nominating petitions for the 2026 general election had to be filed between May 19 and May 26, almost a month before the June 23 primary.

A defeated Democrat also has no general right to seize an existing minor-party nomination after the votes are counted. A lawful substitution requires a recognized vacancy and compliance with additional election-law procedures. A write-in campaign remains technically possible, but it is not a realistic substitute for appearing on the printed ballot.

Goldman and other non-Mamdani candidates may still win. The structural lesson remains unchanged. A centrist who loses the Democratic primary without securing another line beforehand has no practical route back onto the November ballot.

For 2026, the opportunity has passed.

III. New York’s Third-Party Precedent

New York has a long history of consequential minor-party candidacies. The clearest precedent is James L. Buckley’s 1970 Senate victory. Running on the Conservative Party line, Buckley won a three-way contest with approximately 39 percent of the vote, defeating Democratic nominee Richard Ottinger and Republican incumbent Charles Goodell.

Buckley was not a centrist, but his victory demonstrated the relevant electoral principle. When the two major-party nominees leave a substantial portion of the electorate politically homeless, a well-organized third candidate can win New York with a plurality.

IV. The 2028 Centrist Imperative

Centrists must begin building a statewide political organization now. It will need a recognizable identity, legal counsel, financing, professional petition operations, congressional-district organizations and a credible process for selecting candidates. Most important, its candidates must commit to the independent line from the outset rather than treating it as insurance after losing a Democratic primary.

The first objective should be to return safely Democratic House seats to pragmatic representation by appealing to moderate Democrats, pro-Israel liberals, independents and center-right voters who cannot support either democratic socialists or many Republican nominees.

The second objective should be the 2028 Senate election. If Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez seeks and wins the Democratic nomination, a credible centrist could compete against her and the Republican nominee in a three-way race. The centrist would not need 50 percent. A coalition of politically homeless Democrats, independents and moderate Republicans could win a plurality.

Mamdani’s movement understands that political power belongs to those who organize before the election. In 2026, centrists waited to learn whether they had lost the Democratic primaries before considering alternatives. In 2028, they must stop asking the Democratic Party to take them back and place their own candidates on the ballot from day one.

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By upgrading to a paid subscription, you get a speech which succinctly explains The Third-Party Economic Platform.

The speech today:

1. Provides a complete, multi-sector policy platform spanning healthcare, student debt, education, and retirement.

2. Establishes a unique rhetorical lane that rejects both Republican gridlock and progressive overreach.

3. Introduces an innovative, market-driven K-12 “Course Choice” framework to disrupt institutional monopolies.

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Thank you all for being here.

We are standing at a crossroads—not just in this district, but across our entire nation.

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Matt Dunlap’s victory in the Democratic primary for Maine’s 2nd Congressional District offers an unusually clear illustration of both the advantages and the peculiarities of ranked-choice voting.

Dunlap appeared to be running third in early election-night returns. But those returns were incomplete. Once all first-choice votes were counted, the official first round was:

• Joe Baldacci: 24,966

• Matt Dunlap: 22,933

• Jordan Wood: 22,712

• Paige Loud: 8,194

Baldacci finished first, but with less than one-third of the vote. Because no candidate received a majority, the ranked-choice process began.

Loud was eliminated first. After her ballots were transferred to each voter’s next available choice, the remaining candidates stood at:

• Baldacci: 25,923

• Dunlap: 25,681

• Wood: 25,377

Only 546 votes separated first place from third.

More importantly, Dunlap led Wood by just 304 votes.

Wood was therefore eliminated. His supporters strongly preferred Dunlap to Baldacci: 10,243 of Wood’s ballots transferred to Dunlap, while 6,632 transferred to Baldacci. Another 8,502 Wood ballots did not contain a continuing preference for either finalist.

The result was:

• Matt Dunlap: 35,924

• Joe Baldacci: 32,555

Dunlap won with approximately 52.5 percent of the votes remaining in the final round.

That explains how Dunlap won. But it does not fully capture how close the race came to following an entirely different path.

The Decisive 304-Vote Margin

Suppose that 153 voters counted for Dunlap at the decisive stage had instead supported Wood.

Each switched vote would subtract one from Dunlap and add one to Wood, changing the difference between them by two votes. A shift of 153 voters would therefore have erased Dunlap’s 304-vote advantage and placed Wood narrowly ahead.

The approximate totals would then have been:

• Baldacci: 25,923

• Wood: 25,530

• Dunlap: 25,528

Dunlap—not Wood—would have been eliminated.

The later preferences of Dunlap’s supporters would then have determined whether Baldacci or Wood won the nomination.

Wood would have entered that hypothetical final round only 393 votes behind Baldacci. Among Dunlap ballots that ranked remaining candidate, Wood would have needed to receive only 394 more transfers than Baldacci to move ahead.

That would not have required an overwhelming preference for Wood. A relatively even division, tilted modestly toward Wood, could have made him the nominee.

Would Wood Have Won?

There are reasons to believe that Wood would have had a strong chance.

Wood, Dunlap and Loud all ran to Baldacci’s left and supported Medicare for All. They also criticized the Democratic establishment’s support for Baldacci. When Wood was eliminated, his supporters preferred Dunlap to Baldacci by a substantial margin.

It is therefore plausible that Dunlap’s voters would have reciprocated by preferring Wood to Baldacci.

But the available totals do not prove that conclusion.

Voters do not rank candidates solely along a left-to-right ideological scale. Biography, geography, age, political experience, personality and perceptions of electability can all affect second choices.

Dunlap and Baldacci were both familiar Maine officeholders with strong roots in the Bangor–Old Town area. Dunlap had served as secretary of state, state auditor and a state legislator. Baldacci was a lawyer, former Bangor city councilor and state senator.

Wood, by contrast, was a younger former congressional staffer from Auburn who had worked as chief of staff to California Representative Katie Porter. Some Dunlap voters may have been ideologically closer to Wood but culturally or institutionally more comfortable with Baldacci.

The public round totals show how Wood’s voters divided between Dunlap and Baldacci. They do not show how Dunlap’s voters would have divided between Wood and Baldacci.

The appropriate conclusion is therefore not that Wood certainly would have won. It is that Wood might well have won, and that an extraordinarily small change in the vote would have tested a completely different final matchup.

What This Says About Ranked-Choice Voting

Ranked-choice voting is often described as a system that identifies the candidate with the broadest support.

In one important sense, it accomplished that goal. When Dunlap and Baldacci became the finalists, Dunlap received most of the ballots that continued into the final round.

But ranked-choice voting does not compare every candidate directly against every other candidate.

It follows a sequence. The lowest candidate is eliminated in each round, and that elimination determines which comparison occurs next.

The Maine count eventually compared Dunlap with Baldacci. It never produced a Wood–Baldacci final or a Wood–Dunlap final.

Wood’s 304-vote deficit prevented those comparisons from taking place.

The outcome was therefore path dependent. A very small change in the elimination order could have created a different final pairing and possibly a different winner.

That is not necessarily an argument against ranked-choice voting. Every electoral system has rules that become decisive in close contests.

Under ordinary plurality voting, Baldacci would have won despite receiving less than one-third of the first-choice vote. Ranked-choice voting instead produced a nominee supported by most of the active final-round ballots.

But the phrase “majority winner” requires some qualification. It does not always identify the only candidate who could have assembled a majority. It identifies the candidate who assembled a majority after a particular sequence of eliminations.

Matt Dunlap won under Maine’s established rules. Yet a shift of fewer than two-tenths of 1 percent of the ballots could have eliminated him—and might have made Jordan Wood the Democratic nominee.

November: A Two-Candidate Race—For Now

Dunlap will now face former Republican Governor Paul LePage in the general election.

The contrast is unusually sharp.

Dunlap has identified Medicare for All as one of the policies he intends to advance. LePage, during his years as governor, repeatedly opposed Medicaid expansion and resisted implementing it even after Maine voters approved expansion in a statewide referendum.

That leaves substantial political space between the two candidates.

It is disappointing that voters currently have no centrist or pragmatic option to succeed Jared Golden, whose political appeal rested in part on his willingness to depart from national party orthodoxy. The district is now being offered a much sharper ideological choice at a time when many voters may prefer continuity, moderation and practical problem-solving.

A pragmatic independent could reject both the Republican impulse to reduce public health care assistance and the Democratic proposal to replace most existing insurance with Medicare for All. Such a candidate could support improved universal coverage while preserving private insurance, state exchanges, employer contributions and individual choice.

That middle-ground position is developed in my recent speech, Beyond Medicaid Cuts and Medicare for All. It is written for an independent or third-party congressional candidate running against a Republican who favors reducing health care assistance and a Democrat who supports Medicare for All.

Maine’s 2nd District would appear to offer a particularly interesting setting for such a candidacy.

The relevant standard is not whether an organized minor party has nominated someone. Organized third parties rarely win congressional elections. The more important question is whether a credible individual—with a substantive career, a strong local reputation and the personal standing to compete with the major-party nominees—could finish among the top two.

Under Maine’s ranked-choice system, such a candidate would not necessarily be a spoiler.

Suppose a credible independent finished second in first-choice votes. The third-place major-party candidate would be eliminated, and that candidate’s later preferences could propel the independent to victory.

The Democratic primary demonstrated the basic mechanism. Dunlap did not begin in first place. He won because he survived the elimination round and then received enough support from Wood’s voters to pass Baldacci.

A third candidate in November could follow a similar path—but only by reaching second place. A candidate finishing third would be eliminated and could affect the result only through the later preferences of that candidate’s supporters.

At present, however, no third candidate has qualified for the printed ballot in Maine’s 2nd Congressional District. The official nonparty candidate list contains no congressional candidate, and neither the Green Independent Party nor the Libertarian Party nominated one.

A declared write-in candidate can still enter by August 25. Such a candidacy would trigger ranked-choice voting in the federal race, but the candidate would face the enormous disadvantage of having no name printed on the ballot. Building the recognition and organization needed to finish second as a write-in would be exceptionally difficult.

Unless such a candidate emerges, November will be a direct Dunlap–LePage contest, and no ranked-choice redistribution will be required.

LePage enters the general election with significant advantages. He carried the 2nd District during his unsuccessful statewide campaign for governor in 2022, and Donald Trump carried the district by approximately nine points in 2024. National Republicans regard the open seat as one of their strongest opportunities to gain a Democratic-held district.

Dunlap must unite a Democratic electorate that was deeply divided in the primary while persuading independent voters that his progressive positions are compatible with the needs of a politically mixed and largely rural district. His success in attracting Wood’s later-choice voters demonstrates an ability to assemble a coalition within the Democratic primary. In a two-person general election, however, there may be no later rounds and no transferred votes to rescue either candidate.

The primary showed how a few hundred votes can determine not only who survives a ranked-choice count, but which political coalition is given the opportunity to form a majority. The general election will determine whether Dunlap can build a broader coalition against one of Maine’s best-known—and most polarizing—political figures.

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The following speech is written for a third-party candidate running for Congress who proposes a pragmatic path toward improved universal health coverage in the United States. It contrasts that approach with a Republican agenda centered on reducing federal health care assistance and a Democratic opponent who supports replacing the existing system with Medicare for All.

The speech translates the policy framework developed in my new paper, A Durable Path Forward on American Health Care, into the language of a congressional campaign. The paper explains the proposal in greater technical detail, including its four mutually reinforcing reforms: catastrophic reinsurance, portable employer contributions, modernized Health Savings Accounts and Flexible Spending Accounts, and a more efficient role for Medicaid.

The speech does five things:

1. Rejects the false choice between government withdrawal and complete government control. It argues that Americans should not have to choose between cutting Medicaid and ACA assistance or replacing nearly all existing coverage with a single federal program.

2. Presents a practical path toward universal coverage. The proposal combines catastrophic reinsurance, portable employer contributions, improved premium tax credits, FSA and HSA reform, and expanded Medicaid and CHIP eligibility.

3. Explains how the reforms work together. Rather than treating each proposal as an isolated initiative, the speech shows how lower premiums, portable coverage, smoother subsidies, and public insurance for lower-income households reinforce one another.

4. Connects health insurance to household financial security. Continuous and affordable coverage helps families avoid medical debt, preserve emergency savings, change jobs, start businesses, and save for retirement.

5. Offers a different philosophy of governing. The candidate supports the complete plan but invites Congress to examine, improve, and enact individual provisions rather than insisting that every reform be accepted at once.

The full speech appears below.

Good evening and thank you for being here.

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There is no left lane in Montana Politics.

• The Proxy Trap: Independent campaigns fail if seen as path-markers for a national Democratic majority that inherently opposes Montana’s core economic interests.

• The Bankhead Paradox: The Democratic nominee’s refusal to withdraw shields Seth Bodnar from being branded a partisan proxy, enabling a true center-right campaign.

• The Cannibalized Primary: A Pyrrhic victory by the progressive activist in Montana’s first district Democrat party with 37 percent of the vote will lead to a big defeat in the general election.

Montana is, by all current metrics, a bright red state heading toward an inevitable conservative sweep. Yet national political pundits consistently misread why. In the standard, hyper-polarized vocabulary of Washington, Montana is filed away as a monolithic echo chamber, populated by reflexive partisans.

This assessment is lazy; the looming red wall is not a sign that Montana voters are inherently unreachable, but rather that they are entirely unreachable by the modern, national Democratic Party. Forced into a rigid binary choice, Montanans vote Republican because the alternative directly threatens their way of life—leaving the GOP as the only viable choice that fits the state’s economic baseline.

Montana voters are, above all, acutely aware of their own economic architecture. They understand that their standard of living relies entirely on natural resource extraction, a robust agricultural engine, and a fiercely guarded ethos of personal liberty. When national media operations analyze Montana federal races, they often assume a traditional, linear political spectrum consisting of a “left lane” and a “right lane.” But in Montana, the political geometry is completely different: there is no left lane wide enough to secure a statewide majority. Instead, the true, wide-open vacuum in the state’s politics exists entirely within a sensible, right-center lane. When candidates fail to recognize this, or worse, try to masquerade as independent centrists while acting as proxies for national Democratic majorities, Montana voters see right through it.

The State Profile: Economic Survival vs. National Dogma

To understand why the national Democratic brand faces an existential wall in Big Sky Country, one must look at the specific, material policy pressure points. The contemporary national Democratic platform does not merely clash with Montana’s cultural values; it directly threatens its core industries. Consider the sweeping environmental mandates emerging from federal agencies and progressive urban hubs. The push to fast-track electric vehicle (EV) mandates and restrict gasoline-powered cars—championed by states like California and mirrored in national legislative packages—is viewed east of Lake County with deep suspicion, if not outright hostility. In a geographically massive state where ranchers and utility workers regularly drive a hundred miles through whiteout sub-zero conditions, an EV mandate is not a progressive luxury; it is a practical impossibility.

The friction amplifies across the state’s energy sector. Recent federal restrictions on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export approvals and the ongoing institutional squeeze on fossil fuel lending options—often accelerated by urban ESG directives—act as an artificial brake on high-wage, blue-collar employment in central and eastern Montana. Similarly, heavy-handed agricultural regulations strike at the heart of family-owned ranches already squeezed by volatile global markets. When forced to choose between standard populist-conservative rhetoric and a national Democratic agenda that structurally destabilizes their energy grids and agricultural supply chains, Montana’s independent voters will choose the GOP every time, regardless of their personal ambivalence toward national partisan figureheads.

The friction amplifies across the state’s cultural landscape, revealing a distinct brand of Big Sky libertarianism that upends standard partisan assumptions. On sensitive social questions like reproductive rights, Montana voters have proven to be remarkably independent, even outpacing much of the nation by explicitly enshrining abortion access in their state constitution. Consequently, national Democratic messaging on abortion doesn’t necessarily alienate the electorate; rather, it is completely neutralized by a hierarchy of needs where economic survival trumps everything. A voter may favor reproductive freedom, but when forced into a binary choice, that preference is entirely eclipsed by a national Democratic economic agenda—on energy, agriculture, and regulation—that rural Montanans view as an existential threat to their livelihoods.

The U.S. Senate Main Event: The Defiant Democrat and the Proxy Illusion

This economic reality provides the essential backdrop for the marquee federal showdown: the U.S. Senate race. Republican Kurt Alme has anchored his base firmly within the populist GOP, benefiting from institutional consolidation following the intra-party shakeups orchestrated by national figures. Across the aisle, the traditional Democratic base nominated Alani Bankhead. But the true disruptive force in the race is Independent Seth Bodnar, the former University of Montana President and decorated veteran whose pristine resume theoretically poised him to capture the state’s massive block of unaligned voters.

For months, conventional wisdom dictated that Bodnar’s path to victory required consolidating the anti-GOP vote, leading to massive backroom pressure from national operatives urging the Democrat, Bankhead, to drop out and avoid splitting the “left lane.” However, as a recent New York Times report vividly detailed, Bankhead dug her heels in, fiercely refusing to step aside and publicly declaring that Bodnar was “absolutely the last person on the face of this earth” she would clear the field for.

While partisan strategists viewed Bankhead’s defiance as a fatal blow to the centrist coalition, a colder calculation reveals it is the best gift Bodnar could have received. If Bankhead had capitulated and withdrawn, Bodnar would have instantly inherited the “Democrat proxy” mantle. Kurt Alme’s campaign would have easily weaponized that development, convincing right-center voters that Bodnar was simply a Trojan horse designed to deliver a Senate majority to leadership in Washington.

With Bankhead remaining on the ballot to absorb the institutional, deep-blue progressive votes in Missoula and Bozeman, Bodnar is liberated. He no longer must pander to progressive policy positions that are toxic statewide. Instead, he can mount a true two-front war: criticizing the national Democratic apparatus for economic and environmental overreach, while simultaneously hammering Alme as a rubber stamp for national partisan excesses. Bankhead’s presence proves Bodnar’s independence, allowing him to credibly construct a distinct, center-right perspective tailored directly to the state’s unique character.

This structural independence isn’t just a clever electoral strategy; it addresses a critical legislative crisis in Washington. Under the current gridlock, massive federal bills are routinely voted up or down on a strict party-line basis, driven entirely by partisan whims rather than rigorous fiscal or economic analytics. A truly independent center-right representative from Montana answers to no national party boss, positioning them uniquely to intercept these hyper-partisan packages, demand structural data-driven modifications, and strip away coastal policy riders that sabotage rural economies.

The House Districts: Polarized Flanks and Pyrrhic Victories

The architectural failure to deliberately claim the right-center lane is even more pronounced in Montana’s two congressional districts. In the massive, rural strongholds of the 2nd District, the primary landscape was defined by an uncontested clear-out. Incumbent Republican Troy Downing faced zero intra-party opposition, smoothly advancing to a safe general election cruise against a deeply fractured and under-funded Democratic ticket.

The real tactical lessons emerge farther west in the highly competitive 1st District.

In House District 1, voters are treated to a stark, highly polarized choice that perfectly underscores the vacuum in the middle. The Republicans nominated Aaron Flint, an aggressive, populist conservative talk radio host who built his victory by explicitly leaning into national culture-war narratives and securing the endorsement of Donald Trump. Rather than countering with a pragmatic, rural populist who could pick off moderate independents, the Democrats committed a major tactical error by elevating Sam Forstag.

The mechanics of Forstag’s primary win lay bare a profound structural breakdown. He won a crowded primary with just 37.3% of the vote—not because he represented a party-wide mandate, but because most of the party cannibalized itself. The center-left electorate split its votes between rural populist Ryan Busse (33.1%) and agrarian moderate Matt Rains. While the moderate majority was fragmented, Forstag’s highly disciplined progressive base in university hubs like Missoula and Bozeman turned out with 100% efficiency to secure a narrow plurality.

It is the definition of a Pyrrhic victory. Forstag won the primary battle but structurally doomed the general election ticket. He enters November commanding less than forty percent support from his own primary base, burdened by endorsements from national progressive icons like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders that are completely toxic to general election swing voters. Furthermore, Forstag’s alignment with the national progressive wing exposes a severe flank on foreign policy. His core activist base’s highly critical stance on Israel and traditional defense allocations stands in sharp, disqualifying contrast to Western Montana’s patriotic, pro-defense veteran populace. With Flint pulling the GOP to the populist right and Forstag pushing the Democrats to the urban left, District 1 is screaming for a viable, center-right independent candidate. Yet, no such option exists on the House ballot, leaving moderate voters to choose between two unpalatable extremes.

The political layout of Montana is not monolithic but is more the result of an unattractive binary choice. Until a permanent, organized center-right party emerges to bridge this gap, Montana’s pragmatic independent majority will continue voting red as a matter of economic survival, waiting for a vehicle that can translate their unique regional needs into real, analytical leverage in Washington.

Author’s Note: The political friction in Montana perfectly illustrates a national crisis: a broken binary system where local economic survival is routinely sacrificed to party-line whims. Breaking this gridlock requires a fundamentally different approach to governance—one built on objective data and fiscal realism rather than partisan dogmas. For a comprehensive look at how these evidence-based policies can design a pragmatic path forward for competitive districts, read my independent vision here: 2026 Campaign Resources Briefing.

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Ten Policy Briefs

Healthcare & Education Finance

• A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Health Care: Several tax provisions which could lead to universal health coverage

• Should Democrats Adopt Medicare for All in 2028? A critical evaluation of long-term healthcare platforms and their electoral viability.

• A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt: A fiscally responsible approach to student debt relief without massive loan discharges.

Fiscal Policy & Tax Reform

• A Pro-Growth, Progressive Alternative to No Tax on Tips” An analysis of the distortionary impacts of the 2025 no tax on tips provisions on ordinary wage income and retirement savings incentives.

• Tax Reconciliation and Capital Gains Tax Reform A proposal for a broader base instead of higher rates.

• Policy by Posture: Behavioral Blind Spots in California’s One-Time Billionaire Wealth Tax Six core problems with wealth tax proposals.

• Tax Reconciliation and Retirement Policy A proposal to use the tax code to stimulate private retirement savings for all households.

Energy & Technology Infrastructure

• Trump and Biden on Wind and LNG Neither Trump nor Biden offer a pro-growth energy policy.

• Where Should America Build AI”. Data Centers, Waters Scarcity and the Economics of Resource Allocation The lack of awareness of externalities by industry is creating substantial support for moratoria proposals.

• A Tale of Three Energy Sectors Can wind, solar, and nuclear coexist or is it winner take all?

Two Political Memos

• The Real Marquee Race in Maine Parties are moving to the fringe. Can an independent win in the center?

• Mapping the Colorado 2026 Congressional Landscape A district-by-district evaluation of Houses in a true swing state with very different urban and rural constituencies.

David P. Bernstein, PhD, is an economic consultant and author specializing in quantitative market modeling, retirement finance, and fiscal policy analysis.

For inquiries regarding policy drafting, campaign brief development, or strategic advisory roles for independent and centrist congressional campaigns, please connect via Linkedin. Also, consider supporting his work by subscribing to his blog www.economicmemos.com

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National political pundits are obsessively focused on the Planter-Collins contest for the U.S. Senate but the most consequential race in Maine involves the race to replace Jared Golden in ME-2.

Representative Jared Golden, widely recognized as one of the most effective, independent, cross-aisle lawmakers in the House is retiring. The reason for his retirement is a sobering reflection on the state of U.S. politics.

A Marine veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, Golden bluntly noted that escalating political violence and frequent threats against him and his family forced him to re-evaluate the heavy personal cost of public service, stating he had come to “dread the prospect of winning” in an unproductive and hyper-partisan environment.

https://www.bangordailynews.com/2025/11/05/opinion/opinion-contributor/jared-golden-why-i-wont-seek-reelection-column/#:~:text=I%20have%20long%20supported%20term,limits%20in%20the%20Maine%20Legislature.

ME-2 is a massive, predominantly rural swing district that structurally leans Republican.

• The Partisan Lean: The district has a Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI) of R+4. Donald Trump carried the district by roughly 9.5 percentage points in 2024.

• The Golden Exception: Despite its strong conservative tilt, Golden repeatedly defied gravity here, holding the seat for four terms and winning his last re-election by less than 1%.

• The Republican Heavyweight: With Golden out, the Republican path runs through former Governor Paul LePage. As an unapologetic pioneer of the MAGA movement, LePage easily secured the 2026 Republican nomination.

• The LePage History: LePage has a flawless track record in ME-2. In his successful 2010 and 2014 gubernatorial runs, he carried the district handily. Even in 2022, when he lost the statewide gubernatorial race to Janet Mills by 13 points, LePage still won the 2nd District by roughly two percentage points. He starts with an undeniable baseline of strength here.

· An Undecided Race for Democrats: The June 9 primary results triggered an official RCV tabulation for next week, revealing a deeply divided Democratic base. Mainstream center-left State Senator Joe Baldacci holds a narrow initial lead at 31.7%, leaning on deep family name recognition in the district. Right on his heels are two candidates running firmly to his left: progressive former congressional staffer Jordan Wood at 29.2%, and traditional rural institutionalist Matt Dunlap at 28.9%. Progressive insurgent Paige Loud sits in fourth place with 10.3% of the vote.

How the Process Works:

Maine utilizes a Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) system for federal elections, which completely alters traditional campaign math.

• Voters rank candidates in order of preference (1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice, etc.).

• If a candidate secures more than 50% of the first-choice votes in the initial count, they win outright.

• If no one crosses the 50% threshold, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated.

• The ballots cast for that eliminated candidate are redistributed to the second chance of the voters.

• This cycle of elimination and reallocation repeats until a single candidate surpasses the 50% mark.

Maine voting machines are entirely offline so it will take a week to secure the votes and make the RCV tabulations. In France, they run an actual second election in two weeks.

Likely Rank Choice Voting Outcome for Democrats:

Because Dunlap, Wood, and Loud ran as a unified block to Baldacci’s left, the progressive wing commands most of the total primary turnout.

With Paige Loud firmly in fourth place, her 10.3% of the vote will be redistributed first. Because her platform leans heavily progressive, most of her secondary support is highly likely to flow directly to Jordan Wood.

This redistribution should could push Wood past Dunlap into the top two. From there, Dunlap’s working-class and rural backers will see their second choices counted. Those votes will likely split between Baldacci’s establishment credentials and Wood’s progressive momentum. The choice between Wood and Baldacci could be close. Dunlap is probably closer to Wood ideologically, but Wood is sort of a newcomer and Dunlap voters may have a closer affinity to Baldacci than Wood.

The General Election Outlook: Confronting LePage

No matter which Democrat survives the RCV process next week, they face an uphill battle against Paul LePage. Nonpartisan forecasters like Cook Political Report have already moved this seat to “Likely Republican” following Golden’s exit. Most notably, LePage won ME2 in all three of his gubernatorial contests, even the one he lost.

Jared Golden won repeatedly in ME2 because he routinely broke with his own party on high-profile cultural and economic issues, earning the trust of independent and conservative ticket-splitters. A more traditional establishment figure like Baldacci or a firm progressive like Wood will struggle to replicate that cross-over appeal in a district Trump won by nearly double digits. LePage enters the general election as the distinct favorite to flip this seat red.

The empty center lane:

A polarizing contest between a hard-left progressive and a staunch MAGA conservative creates a massive vacuum for a moderate third-party or independent candidate. In a standard plurality election, third-party candidates usually act as spoilers. But Maine’s Ranked-Choice Voting system fundamentally changes the math.

To win, a centrist independent doesn’t need to win the initial round outright—they just need to secure second place. If a credible moderate can outlast either the MAGA or the progressive candidate and take second in the first round he or she can get 50 % + and win the RCV round and the election.

Concluding Remarks:

Golden’s departure highlights a dark trend for the next Congress: it is virtually guaranteed to be more partisan and less functional than the current one. When the pragmatists exit, they leave a vacuum. With both national parties continuously moving toward their respective ideological fringes, the lawmakers replacing independent voices like Golden will have little incentive—and even less political cover—to reach across the aisle.

The second major concern is strategic. Across the country, Democrats are enjoying substantial structural tailwinds in the 2026 midterms. Yet, by drifting further to the left to appease activist bases, the party risks snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in crucial swing districts. In a naturally conservative, working-class district like ME-2, running a standard progressive platform against a well-entrenched, populist conservative like LePage is a recipe for an unforced error.

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Authors Note: The author is more focused on economic and financial policy than on politics. Here is some of his recent work.

Tax Reconciliation and Retirement Policy

A Third-Party Tax Reconciliation Approach to Student Debt

A Pro-Growth, Progressive Alternative to “No-Tax on Tips”

He is however devoting some time and energy to an evaluation of the 2026 political contests, which will determine control of Congress. Subscribe here and stay tuned!

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The speech argues that American households are struggling with their finances—even during periods when the broader economy appears strong—and that neither major political party has demonstrated the ability to address these challenges in a sustainable way.

At the same time, Social Security is moving toward a funding crisis that will require difficult decisions that Republicans and Democrats have repeatedly failed to confront.

Rising out-of-pocket health-care costs, burdensome student debt, inadequate retirement savings, and the approaching Social Security shortfall are not isolated problems but interconnected challenges.

Recent policy debates on renewal of the ACA premium tax credits, student debt reform, and improved retirement savings incentives show that Congress is incapable of balancing the needs of struggling households in a way that is fair to taxpayers.

Absent changes to the political system, the projected Social Security deficits will lead to automatic cuts to Social Security benefits in around seven years.

The third-party health care, student debt and retirement incentive proposals outlined in this speech are both desirable on their own merits but are also necessary for the adoption of a Social Security reform adjusting both future taxes and benefits.

Thank you all for being here.

We are standing at a crossroads—not just in this district, but across our entire nation.

Look around us.

We are told by the headlines that our economy is strong.

We are told by the talking heads in power that everything is on the right track—and we are told by the talking heads out of power that the sky is falling.

[Pause]

My perspective is different.

Even when the macroeconomy is strong, everyday households are struggling. Struggling to save. Struggling to pay off debt. Struggling to maintain health insurance or cover the out-of-pocket costs of a routine medical procedure.

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· Among Colorado Democrats there is a strong positive correlation between positions on Medicare-for-all and criticism of Israel and the partisan lean of the district.

· Colorado Republicans are fundamentally aligned on most issues with a minor exception regarding tariffs.

· The fundamental Republican litmus test is support for President Trump. President Trump is not now opposing any Colorado Republican candidate.

· CO-8 the only true toss-up in the state where a robust Democrat primary will determine whether a progressive or a centrist will oppose the incumbent Republican.

· Democrats will nominate viable centrist candidates in three Republican leaning districts CO-3 CO-4 and CO-5. Can these centrists win in a year where there should be a blue wave?

· Democrat failure in CO-03, CO-04, CO-05 and CO-8 in 2026 should cause the party to look inward and perhaps cause voters to consider a third-party alternative.

Introduction: A potential national blue wave is providing a significant tailwind for Democrats as the nation heads toward the 2026 midterm elections, but all political contests are local and factors specific to each state and contest shape results.

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Four distinct factors are shaping congressional races in Colorado in 2026 and beyond:

· A favorable macro-environment that gives Democrats a systemic advantage in competitive margins.

· An escalating progressive and democratic socialist challenge to establishment norms in deep-blue urban strongholds like CO-1.

· A true swing territory in CO-8 where both a fiercely contested Democrat primary and a razor-thin general election will define the exact ideological profile needed to win a toss-up electorate.

· An intentional effort to field pragmatic, district-matched centrist Democrats in traditionally Republican-leaning districts like CO-3, CO-4, and CO-5.

To understand how these competing forces and internal party tensions will manifest on Election Day, we must look directly at the underlying partisan math and current battlefield status of each individual seat.

Current Political Status of Colorado’s Eight Congressional Districts

• CO-01 [Denver Urban Core]: Diana DeGette (D) | Leaning: D+29

• CO-02 [Boulder & Northern Front Range]: Joe Neguse (D) | Leaning: D+20

• CO-03 [Western Slope & San Luis Valley]: Jeff Hurd (R) | Leaning: R+5

• CO-04 [Eastern Plains & Douglas County]: Lauren Boebert (R) | Leaning: R+13

• CO-05 [Colorado Springs & El Paso County]: Jeff Crank (R) | Leaning: R+5

• CO-06 [Aurora & Denver South-Metro Suburbs]: Jason Crow (D) | Leaning: D+11

• CO-07 [Jefferson County & Central Mountains]: Brittany Pettersen (D) | Leaning: D+8

• CO-08 [Northern Front Range]: Gabe Evans (R) | Leaning: EVEN (R+0)

Note: The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI), the statistic used in the bullets above, does not display the simple candidate-to-candidate margin or raw voter spread within a district; rather, it quantifies how much more Democrat or Republican a district behaves relative to the entire United States. The metric is calculated by isolating the two-party vote share (completely stripping out third parties) from the two most recent presidential elections, weighing the most recent cycle more heavily, and subtracting the national major-party baseline from the local district average. Consequently, a massive local victory margin like the 55-point spread in Denver’s CO-01 registers as a D+29 because the metric filters out the national baseline, indicating that the district’s major-party electorate is exactly 29 percentage points more Democrat than the national baseline average.

Factors Impacting the 2026 Colorado Congressional Midterms

The 2026 midterm landscape in Colorado presents a paradox defined by two powerful, competing national forces: the severe geopolitical, economic, and institutional crises surrounding the current Trump administration that lay the groundwork for a sweeping “Blue Wave,” juxtaposed against a significant leftward drift within the national Democrat brand that threatens to stall that momentum.

On one side, the baseline conditions for a massive anti-incumbent shift mirror the historic wave election of 2006. Under the Trump administration, severe geopolitical mismanagement failed to prevent the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a harsh domestic energy price shock and sticky inflation. Paired with highly controversial, aggressive domestic ICE enforcement actions, tracking of political enemies, and autocratic executive overreach, the administration has deeply alienated moderate and independent voters.

In a small, fiercely independent purple state like Colorado -- where unaffiliated voters now account for over 50% of the active electorate—this intense dissatisfaction with executive overreach should naturally fuel a sweeping Democrat realignment.

On the other side, an equally potent counterweight exists in the significant leftward drift of the national Democrat brand, which actively hamstrings the party’s ability to capture these frustrated voters. While many center-right independents are eager for an alternative to Trump’s autocracy, the national party’s increasingly extreme ideological platforms on economic policy and foreign affairs give mainstream voters deep pause. Rather than offering a pragmatic, stabilizing baseline, the national party is frequently perceived as captive to its furthest-left factions.

For Colorado’s vital independent center, the choice becomes an agonizing calculation: using their ballot to reject Trump’s executive overreach risks inadvertently empowering a progressive agenda they view as fundamentally unfeasible. The following structured comments analyze how this intense national tug-of-war is playing out locally across the state’s individual congressional districts.

Comment One: Democrat Candidate Ideological Views Correlate with District Partisan Lean

Democrat candidates in safe, progressive districts actively champion “Medicare for All,” and frequently criticize Israel reflecting a long-term leftward evolution that is occasionally accelerated by primary friction.

In Colorado’s deepest-blue urban center, Denver’s CO-01 (D+29), the policy landscape has veered sharply left, forcing established Democrats to aggressively defend their progressive flanks. Thirty-year incumbent Diana DeGette has steadily migrated leftward over her career, but intense pressure from democratic socialist and progressive factions nearly prevented her from securing a ballot spot on the ballot at the state Democratic convention. She is now relying on ads featuring AOC to win against progressive challengers.

This Colorado Sun survey accurately describes CO-1 candidate positions on issues and all three candidates including the incumbent have moved fairly far to the left. The winner of the convention Melat Kiros is running an explicitly ant-Israel campaign. Her rhetoric as evidenced by her posts appears both vehemently anti-Israel and antisemitic.

In contrast, safely insulated incumbents Joe Neguse (CO-02, D+20), Jason Crow (CO-06, D+11), and Brittany Pettersen (CO-07, D+8) face no meaningful primary challenges, allowing them to concentrate on the general election.

Democrat candidates in competitive or conservative districts bypass single-payer rhetoric to focus on ACA modifications and local concerns. Unchallenged in her primary, Brittany Pettersen (CO-07, D+8) avoids the mandate entirely to protect her centrist suburban position, focusing instead on high-visibility issues like medical debt and behavioral health. In redder territory—CO-03 (R+5), CO-04 (R+13), and CO-05 (R+5)—Democrat contenders like Eileen Laubacher, Alex Kelloff, Dwayne Romero, and Jessica Killin target market-friendly stabilization models: saving rural clinics, expanding telehealth, capping premiums, and modernizing VA networks.

As Colorado’s most competitive toss-up seat, the dead-even CO-08 Democrat primary serves as a direct proxy war over healthcare policy, pitting progressive Manny Rutinel and his $3.4 million single-payer platform against centrist Shannon Bird, who explicitly rejects a mandate in favor of a voluntary “Medicare for All Who Want It” option.

On the Mideast, most Democrats outside CO-1 pair criticism with Netanyahu with the stance that Hamas must be fully dismantled. Absent from that discussion is a plan on how to dismantle Hamas without the use of force.

On the issue of health care and the issue of Israel there is a clear correlation between the Democrat lean of the district and the partisan drift.

Comment Two: Position of Republican Candidates and Closeness to Trump

An issue-by-issue analysis of health care among Colorado’s Republican candidates is functionally impossible because the party maintains absolute ideological uniformity. There is no internal dissent: zero Republican candidates or incumbents support Medicare for All, no one broke ranks over preserving the ACA premium tax credits, and all stand aligned on standard federal spending restraints.

Colorado Republicans are also fairly closely aligned in their support for Israel. The internal division among Republicans is defined by a hawk-versus-isolationist split that aligns closely with how safe a district is. Traditional defense hawks running in highly competitive or suburban seats fully back international security assistance packages as essential to national defense. However, “America First” populists leveraging safe margins in deep-red strongholds, such as Lauren Boebert in CO-04, emphasize cuts to foreign assistance without specifically targeting Israel.

Because there are no policy cleavages to map against the Cook PVI, evaluating the Republican field requires pivoting away from specific issues to look at a candidate’s structural proximity to Donald Trump.

On the right, the primary rift factor is not healthcare or social policy—it is trade and executive power. The case of freshman incumbent Jeff Hurd (CO-03, R+5) proves just how thin the margin for dissent is. Hurd became one of only six House Republicans to vote with Democrats to lift the administration’s emergency tariffs on Canada, explicitly warning that normalizing broad emergency executive trade powers would backfire under a future Democrat president. The reaction was immediate: Trump labeled Hurd a “RINO,” rescinded his endorsement, and backed a hardline primary challenger.

The national party persuaded Trump to back down to avoid losing the district, something Trump did not do in redder parts of the nation. So, the political lean statistic appears to affect candidate selection for both parties.

Comment Three: Likely 2026 Outcomes

The overarching landscape of Colorado’s 2026 midterms centers on a single question: can national headwinds and optimized candidate recruitment overcome the natural gravity of a district’s Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI)? While a national blue wave provides a potent tailwind, the path to actually altering the state’s congressional map is strictly restricted to a narrow 3.5-district playing field...

Subscribe to Economic Memos with this 20 percent off coupon $48 per year to get the 2026 prediction,

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This memorandum provides a comprehensive analysis of the 2026 Senate landscape, evaluating the structural and ideological factors that will define the upcoming midterm elections; a separate analysis focusing on the House map will follow.

In a field crowded with partisan prognosticators, this report is grounded in a commitment to objectivity -- explicitly acknowledging personal political preferences to ensure they do not dictate or distort the resulting data. By identifying these biases upfront, we can more clearly navigate the competing narratives that define this cycle.

Key Results

• Divergent Narratives: The 2026 political cycle is defined by a paradox: a macro-environment heavily favoring a “Blue Wave” is being countered by a Democratic shift toward extreme positions on healthcare, taxes, and Middle East policy that risks alienating moderate voters.

• Candidate & Policy Liabilities: Georgia and Maine are two states where a drift to the left and specific problems with Democratic nominees may derail prospects in these essential defensive contests, turning winnable races into significant vulnerabilities.

• The Michigan Friction: Deep intra-party divisions regarding Middle East foreign policy have created a significant vulnerability in Michigan, potentially fracturing the coalition necessary for Democrats to hold the seat.

• The Need for a New Approach: If Democrats fail to win in states like Texas, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, and Iowa during a favorable “Blue Wave” environment, it will signal that the party brand is irreparably damaged in these regions. Such an outcome would confirm a state of de facto one-party rule and the urgent need for a new political approach or a third party to restore genuine choice.

• The Pickup Map: North Carolina remains the most likely state to flip in favor of Democrats. New Hampshire and Michigan have emerged as premier GOP targets following the retirement of Democratic incumbents.

Introduction: Perspective vs. Analysis

In a world defined by hyper partisanship, the line between independent observation and partisan advocacy has dangerously blurred. As Gerard Baker noted in the Wall Street Journal (March 30, 2026), many commentators now prioritize “instantaneous certitude” over objective uncertainty, allowing their ideological preferences to dictate their forecasts. Baker argues that such “metaphysical certainty” is a hallmark of political engagement, but it is fatal to honest analysis.

I hold distinct worldviews on the Mideast and domestic economic policy. The reader must understand my perspectival biases and my commitment to not having these biases shape my analysis.

My strategic foreign policy outlook aligns with John Bolton’s viewpoint. The underlying objective in Iran must be regime change. A government that killed 40,000 of its own citizens in a couple of weekends and publicly executes its own youth -- such as the recent hanging of 19-year-old wrestling champion Saleh Mohammadi -- is not a credible partner for diplomacy. I believe that true diplomacy in 2026 is not a substitute for military victory, but a dividend of it.

However, an analyst’s preference for a policy must not be confused with its success. While I support concept of the war in Iran, I must objectively note that the administration failed to adequately prepare for the regime’s stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, successful regime change, the only real justifiable goal of this war, depends on coordination with the Kurds and Iranian opposition -- a synchronization that is currently not evident.

My views on domestic reform also diverge from the current binary choices offered by two major parties. I reject the policy adopted by both parties of delaying necessary implementation of Social Security reform, a policy which can only increase costs and the pain of the adjustment process. I reject both the Republican erosion of ACA subsidies and the Democratic push for Medicare for All.

In my view, the Democratic party is more interested in making grand overtures towards its base than in sponsoring realist economic reforms. It is against this backdrop -- acknowledging my biases while ruthlessly prioritizing data over dogma -- that I assess the current political, economic, and policy environment.

An evaluation of the 2026 political environment:

This evaluation of the upcoming November election balances two approaches -- an assessment of the broad political-economic “mood” versus a granular analysis of policy positions and individual matchups.

Historically, midterm elections serve as a referendum on the party in power. Currently, the “political environment” strongly favors a Democratic surge. The war in Iran remains broadly unpopular, and the domestic economy is reeling from rising interest rates and inflation (with headline CPI projected to hit 3.5%–3.8% by Q3). My view is that inflation and interest rates can go much higher than headline projections.

Policies championed by the Trump Administration and the Republican congress -- including the phase-out of enhanced ACA subsidies and aggressive deportation strategies have impacted some people directly and have been witnessed by many friends and neighbors of affected people.

These factors suggest a significant “blue wave” is structurally possible.

The 2026 blue wave is not a certain outcome. Increasingly, the Democratic party has moved to the left with many candidates taken extreme positions on health care, taxes and the middle east to mollify the base of the party.

Despite a major opening created by Republicans eliminating ACA subsidies, Democrats are doubling down on Medicare for All. This unworkable model risks the insurance of 160 million people, turning a Republican fumble into a Democratic liability, as explained in the essay Should Democrats Adopt Medicare for All in 2028?

Similarly, the progressive fixation on wealth tax, an unrealistic approach risks alienating high-income voters who are open to paying more but are terrified of structural wealth destruction.

Vehement criticism of Israel, and in some cases actual support of Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah, from the Democratic base allow Republicans to classify some Democrat candidates as soft on terror.

Mainstream voices including the IOC and Bob Costas, the legendary sportscaster, are pushing back on the progressive view that transgender people should be allowed to compete against women in sports.

Candidate views and quality can influence election outcomes even in a wave election. Candidate quality is especially important in Senate elections where major party nominees tend to have a long resume and reputation to defend.

The remainder of this memo analyzes key 2026 Senate races to evaluate the likely outcome of the contest for control of the Senate. I attempt to control and point out the perspectival biases which impact the analysis.

A subsequent memo will do the same for the contest for control of the House.

Senate elections:

Competitive Senate candidates typically have defined resumes, governing records, and policy histories. Statewide contests tend to expose gaps in credibility quickly, hence candidates in competitive states – states that are neither deep blue nor deep red – cannot rely on party coattails.

Many states have sorted into safely red or blue categories. The number of potentially competitive Senate races is, in the current political map, fairly small. At this time, Senate races in 10 states -- Maine, Georgia, Texas, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, North Carolina, Iowa, and New Hampshire -- are potentially in play. (Although, I would argue Democrat victories in five of the states Texas, Montana, Ohio, Alaska, Iowa -- require a substantial blue wave.)

Maine Senate:

The Maine Democratic primary has devolved into a bitter choice between Governor Janet Mills, who at 78 would become the oldest freshman senator ever elected to a full term, and frontrunner Graham Platner, a 41-year-old oyster farmer with no governing resume. Platner has out-raised the Governor nearly three-to-one, fueled by a populist message and high-profile endorsements from Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren.

The support for Platner is astonishing given his history of disqualifying rhetoric and personal baggage. His past social media comments -- including Reddit posts that critics condemn as victim-blaming regarding sexual assault -- and a controversial chest tattoo resembling the Nazi SS Totenkopf symbol make him a massive liability.

This primary dynamic is a gift to Susan Collins who crushed a far more robust, capable Sara Gideon, in 2020. Collins won that race by nine points even though the party’s presidential nominee lost the state. The only way Democrats flip this seat is a total collapse of the Trump and Republican brands and if Platner is the nominee they could lose the race even if there was a huge blue wave.

Georgia Senate: Ossoff’s Strategic “Reagan” Blunder

Jon Ossoff enters 2026 with a massive $25 million war chest, but his re-election is complicated by a significant historical and policy error. In justifying his recent votes to halt arms shipments to Israel, Ossoff cited Ronald Reagan’s 1982 pause on munitions as a successful precedent for using “leverage.”

Reagan’s 1982 pause created a security vacuum that led directly to the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 American service members. Far from a success, that catastrophe -- orchestrated by the Iranian-backed nascent Hezbollah --forced Reagan to reverse course and deepen strategic cooperation with Israel. By sanitizing this history, Ossoff risks promoting a policy that has historically invited disaster for U.S. peacekeepers.

Israel is not the top issue for most Georgians, but it is visceral for many of the state’s 130,000 Jewish voters and for a large number of voters in Georgia with ties to the military. Ossoff, the first Jewish senator from the Deep South won’t do well in a group where typically 70 percent of voters go to the Democrat and given the closeness of Geogia elections even a small shift in a small part of the electorate could be decisive.

The Republican primary on May 19 will determine if the GOP can capitalize on this “security gap.” The field currently includes two current members of Congress, Mike Collins and Buddy Carter and an outsider Derek Dooley, a former coach with the backing of the governor Brain Kemp. The primary contest will likely be determined in a runoff.

My bias in this election is clear. I am a Zionist, who can tolerate some but not much criticism of Israel. I find Ossoff’s use of the Reagan analogy to be historically flawed and dishonest. I am not a citizen of Georgia, but, if I was, I could not vote for Ossoff.

Texas Senate: The Grudge Match and the Seminarian

Democrats have pinned their 2026 hopes on State Representative James Talarico, a former middle school teacher and Presbyterian seminarian who defeated U.S. Rep. Jasmine Crockett in the primary. Talarico is an articulate, faith-forward candidate without much economic expertise. His mantra is

“We follow a barefoot rabbi who gave only two commandments: love God and love your neighbor.”

The real spectacle is the Republican runoff race between incumbent Senator John Cornyn and the impeached but acquitted Attorney General Ken Paxton. Hands down this is the most entertaining race in the country.

Cornyn’s campaign has focused heavily on Paxton’s legal “baggage,” including his 2023 impeachment and long-standing securities fraud charges, using a “Thou Shalt Not” ad to highlight Paxton’s violation of several of the ten commandments. Paxton has retaliated with the “Love Boat” theme song to highlight Cornyn’s years in Washington. (I might have gone with the B 52s Love Shack, if I was running Paxton’s campaign.)

Democrats have not won a statewide race in Texas since Ann Richards in the 1990s. They are hoping that this time will be difficult. If it is not different, someone should think about organizing a third-party in Texas because, a loss by the Democrat this year would verify that in statewide races Texas only has one choice in the current two-party system.

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Michigan Senate: A Primary “Shit Show”

The Michigan Democratic primary is a battleground for a party deeply fractured between constituencies with different views of the Mideast. Two of the candidates Haley Steven and Mallory McMorrow have fairly conventional views while Abdul El-Sayed is a vocal critic of U.S. Mideast policy.

A recent leaked recording revealed El-Sayed was not willing to say anything about the death of Khamenei because a lot of people in Dearborn are sad today. Here is a partial list of Iranian backed terror initiatives. The world is better off with the precedent set that terror has consequences.

Republican Mike Rogers, a former congressman who lost a close Senate contest in 2024, will be the Republican nominee. The Cook report lists the race as a toss-up. I suspect the state would easily flip to the republicans if El-Sayed is nominated, a possibility in a three-way Democratic primary.

Montana Senate: The “Tester Strategy” and the Independent Gamble

The Montana Senate race was upended when incumbent Senator Steve Daines withdrew from the race at the last minute and his choice for his successor, former U.S. attorney Kurt Aimes filed paperwork to enter the race.

This maneuver was designed to freeze the field and prevent Democrats from recruiting a heavyweight contender like Jon Tester or a former governor. Alme is not yet the nominee “for certain” as he faces two primary challengers on June 2, but with the immediate and dual endorsements of Daines and President Trump, he is the overwhelming favorite.

Seth Bodnar, a West Point graduate, Green Beret, and former University of Montana President, is running as an Independent. Bodner has Tester’s endorsement and is raising funds through Act Blue. This approach, which was used unsuccessfully in the 2024 Nebraska Senate race, assumes that the Democratic brand is dead in rural America.

Whether an Independent can announce a desire to caucus with Democrats and win in a red state is the cycle’s experimental gamble.

Ohio Senate: The return of Sherrod Brown

The Ohio Senate special election is shaping up to be a clash of statewide titans, as former Senator Sherrod Brown, the former Senator who lost his reelection race in 2024 is the favorite for the nomination in 2026.

Following the resignation of J.D. Vance to become Vice President, Governor Mike DeWine appointed then-Lieutenant Governor Jon Husted to the vacancy. Husted will be the Republican nominee.

The polls have this election as a dead heat in November. Ohio has been trending sharply Republican. Obama was the last Democrat to win the state at the presidential level. This race should be close and could flip to the Democrat if the national mood and events turn against the Republicans.

Alaska Senate: Ranked Choice and the Peltola Surge

Alaska is likely to remain a toss-up election the entire year because of its unique rank-choice voting system and the existence of four candidates on the ballot. The two top candidates, current Senator Dan Sullivan and former Representative Mary Peltola have both won statewide races. It is highly likely that neither candidate will initially have 50 percent of the vote and the outcome will be determined by the second choice of people who vote for the minor candidates.

North Carolina Senate: The Battle of the Heavyweights

North Carolina represents the Democrats’ premier pickup opportunity, as the retirement of Republican Thom Tillis has transformed this into a high-stakes open-seat contest between two seasoned veterans. Former Governor Roy Cooper, who never lost a statewide race during his eight-year tenure (2017–2025), enters the general election with a formidable $14 million war chest and a consistent 8-to-10 point lead in post-primary polling.

Governor Cooper faces Republican Michael Whatley, the former RNC Chairman and Trump-backed operative who consolidated the GOP base with a dominant 65% primary victory. Whatley is a disciplined campaigner, but Cooper’s brand of moderate politics combined with a favorable environment of Democrats should flip North Carolina.

2026 Iowa Senate Outlook

Ashley Hinson, a current congresswoman is the likely Republican nominee for Senate. Iowa Democrats have a competitive primary between State Senator Zach Wahls, the candidate with local support and State Representative Josh Turek, the candidate with a lot of endorsements from national leaders.

The Republicans control all major offices in Iowa today including all four Congressional seats. In 2018, Democrats had 3 of 4 House seats. Hinson is the heavy favorite even if there is a blue wave.

Open Seat in New Hampshire:

The New Hampshire Senate race is a high-stakes battle for the open seat of retiring Democrat Jeanne Shaheen, where former Senator John E. Sununu currently dominates the Republican primary field with a 29-point lead over Scott Brown. The Democratic nominee will be Representative Chris Pappas. Polls show the race to be close. Political analysts rate the race as tilt or leans Democratic.

Ultimately, the state is a “must-hold” for Democrats to maintain Senate control. The race is currently rated a “Tilt” or “Lean” Democratic in a traditionally swing state,

Conclusion:

Amidst a crowded field of 2026 political prognosticators, my analysis deliberately prioritizes an honest accounting of my own biases to ensure they do not cloud the objective data.

The current landscape is defined by sharply competing narratives, starting with the undeniable structural tilt of the political environment, which suggests a massive “blue wave” is possible. However, momentum for the Democrats faces a significant counter-narrative: a party drifting toward symbolic, unpractical, and extreme positions on healthcare, taxes, and Middle East policy that risk alienating the very voters required to sustain a national mandate.

This ideological drift, combined with specific candidate liabilities, creates a precarious map for the Democratic caucus. In key battlegrounds like Georgia and Maine, the combination of extreme policy platforms and weak candidate profiles could doom what should otherwise be winnable seats. Furthermore, deep internal divisions regarding the Middle East threaten to cripple the party’s coalition in Michigan, potentially handing a crucial swing state to the opposition through sheer intra-party friction.

Finally, the Democratic brand has deteriorated so significantly in deep-red states like Texas, Montana, Iowa, Ohio, and even Alaska, that voters appear to be experiencing de facto one-party rule. In these environments, the absence of a competitive opposition highlights a growing necessity for a viable third party to challenge the current status quo. Ultimately, while the national environment favors a Democratic surge, the party’s insistence on “far-left” positioning and its failure to compete in rural strongholds may prevent them from fully capitalizing on a favorable 2026 cycle.

Friends, neighbors, and members of this community, thank you for being here today.

Before anything else, sincere thanks go to the friends and family who have supported this effort from the beginning. Entering public life is never an individual decision. It is something made possible by the encouragement, patience, and belief of the people closest to us. Their support means everything.

Today, standing here with that support behind me, I am announcing my candidacy for the United States House of Representatives.

This campaign is not about ambition or personal advancement. It begins with a simple observation that many Americans share: the country is on the wrong path, and the two major parties have shown that they are unable to put us back on the right one.

Across this country and in communities like ours, households are struggling financially. The cost of living has risen faster than wages for many families. Health insurance is increasingly expensive and complicated. Student debt is preventing millions of people from saving, buying homes, or preparing for retirement.

These problems are serious, long-term challenges that require honest solutions. Yet neither political party has presented a viable plan to address them.

Take Social Security. The program is moving steadily toward insolvency, a reality acknowledged by experts across the political spectrum. Yet year after year the problem is ignored. Both parties prefer to postpone the conversation rather than confront it honestly.

At the same time, both parties are increasingly being driven by the most ideological voices within their coalitions.

On the Democratic side, proposals such as Medicare for All are often presented as simple solutions, even though the economic and political obstacles to implementing such a system are enormous. Meanwhile Republicans have pursued policies that weaken the Affordable Care Act, including allowing key coverage supports such as enhanced premium tax credits to expire while advancing regulatory changes that could further destabilize the system.

The result is not progress but paralysis.

The same dynamic appears in higher education policy. Many Democrats promote the idea of free or universal debt-free college, including for families that have the means to pay their share. Republicans, meanwhile, enacted sweeping changes to the student loan system in the 2025 tax legislation that could make access to higher education more difficult and leave many borrowers more financially vulnerable.

Neither approach reflects a balanced understanding of the problem.

What is missing in Washington today is a basic recognition of tradeoffs.

Public policy always involves choices. Resources are limited, and responsible leaders must weigh costs against benefits. Yet too often Democrats default to the most expensive possible solution, accompanied by constant calls for new and higher taxes, even when lower-cost approaches could achieve many of the same goals.

At the same time, Republicans are not being honest with the public about the steps required to restore long-term solvency to programs like Social Security. Any credible solution requires that Americans save more for retirement. But how can families save more when they are losing health insurance coverage or struggling under the burden of student debt?

Ignoring these realities does not solve the problem. It only makes the eventual choices more difficult.

This campaign begins with a different premise: that honest leadership means acknowledging tradeoffs and pursuing practical solutions that improve people’s lives without pretending that difficult choices do not exist.

Running as a third-party candidate is not easy. The two established parties form a powerful duopoly in American politics. They control most of the institutions, most of the funding, and most of the political infrastructure.

But the fact that something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted.

Many Americans today feel politically homeless. They see a system dominated by partisan conflict and ideological purity tests rather than by problem-solving. They want leaders who are willing to work for the common good rather than for the interests of party factions.

This campaign is for those voters.

We know this will be a difficult race. Competing against two established parties is never simple. But change in this country has always begun with citizens willing to challenge entrenched systems when those systems stop serving the public.

And today, it is increasingly clear that the existing two parties have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that they cannot solve the problems facing this country.

That is why this campaign matters.

A third-party movement grounded in practical solutions, fiscal responsibility, and a willingness to acknowledge tradeoffs can help move this country forward again.

Once again, sincere thanks go to the friends and family whose support made this moment possible, and to all of you who have come here today to be part of this effort.

The road ahead will not be easy. But it is necessary.

Thank you for being here, thank you for believing in the possibility of a better politics, and thank you for joining this campaign.

God bless you all, and God bless the United States of America.

Author’s note: This post is partly a thought experiment and written with a bit of fun. www.economicmemos.com normally focuses on developing serious policy proposals and analyzing major economic challenges. Posts like this one explore how those ideas might appear in real-world political debate. Reader support helps make it possible to continue developing and publishing new policy proposals.

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Lisa Lerer’s New York Times report on the unusually high number of congressional retirements — 63 members so far — frames the exodus as a story about threats, dysfunction, Trump’s continuing grip on Republican primaries, and generational impatience among Democrats. Go to Ballotpedia for a list of retirees from the House.

But the deeper question is not why members are leaving. It is what replaces them. When incumbents depart, decisive power shifts from general electorates to primary electorates. And primary voters in both parties reward ideological clarity and factional loyalty more than coalition maintenance or legislative pragmatism.

This dynamic is visible not only in House retirements but in marquee statewide contests. The two Texas Senate races are a revealing test. On the Republican side, whether the nominee resembles a John Cornyn–style institutional conservative or a more combative, Trump-defined figure such as Ken Paxton will signal how fully MAGA loyalty has become the entry ticket to viability. On the Democratic side, the contest pits U.S. Rep. Jasmine Crockett, a high-profile Dallas congresswoman known for her combative, base-energizing style and emphasis on turnout, against State Rep. James Talarico, an Austin legislator with a reputation for coalition-building and a more traditional electability-focused message — making the primary a clear illustration of the tension between activist priorities and broader general-election appeal.

A Paxton versus Crockett outcome for the general election could be viewed as the canary in the coal mine test for future politics. It is not clear either party wants to win this race.

Arizona offers a parallel signal. The recent departure of a comparatively moderate Republican candidate, Karrin Taylor Robson, narrows the field and may strengthen the lane for overtly MAGA-aligned contenders.

The House map reflects the same structural pattern. In deep-blue districts such as CA-11 (Pelosi), NJ-11 (Sherrill), and several Chicago- and New York–based seats, retirements remove institutional stabilizers and empower activist-heavy primaries. Additional examples include MD-05 (Hoyer) and CA-26, where open-seat volatility favors energized ideological factions. In ME-02, a highly contested district, the departure of a Jared Golden could result in the nomination of a left wing Democrat and the flipping of the seat.

On the Republican side, deep-red districts such as GA-14 (Marjorie Taylor Greene), TX-19 (Jodey Arrington), and FL-02 (Neal Dunn, retiring), along with open or newly unanchored seats including NE-02 (Don Bacon, retiring), NY-21 (Elise Stefanik, retiring), FL-16 (Vern Buchanan, retiring), and NV-02 (Mark Amodei, retiring) — and even R-leaning but competitive terrain like TX-22 (Troy Nehls) — collectively illustrate how retirements and structurally safe primaries are intensifying incentives to compete on ideological purity, turning many of these contests into intra-party races to demonstrate the strongest alignment with MAGA-oriented voters rather than broader general-election adaptability.

What qualifies as “leftward” or “rightward” drift differs by party. Among Democrats, movement left is defined less by rhetoric and more by issue alignment: Medicare for All, Green New Deal–style climate frameworks, a harder line on Israel, and calls to abolish or significantly defund ICE or police institutions.

Among Republicans, the central sorting variable is allegiance to Donald Trump, with reinforcing signals on immigration maximalism, skepticism of Ukraine funding, tariff advocacy, and willingness to nationalize cultural confrontation. In both parties, drift means tighter alignment with activist issue clusters rather than district-specific cross-pressure.

Across roughly twenty structurally revealing open House seats, many are structurally incentivized toward outward ideological movement relative to the incumbents they replace. Because this sorting dynamic is occurring simultaneously in both parties, polarization intensifies even if chamber control changes hands. The center thins while the activist wings thicken. Today’s Congress may appear dysfunctional. Compared to the more ideologically sorted institution emerging from these primaries, it may eventually look comparatively restrained.

Authors Note: The way out of this mess is in my view the formation of a third party, which could become viable very quickly if the third party concentrated on winning seats in the House of Representatives.

This blog available at www.economicmemos.com has a lot of information on policy including student debt and healthcare, see this material on student debt and this material on health insurance. The blog also covers personal finance and investments. Sometimes the material can get really technical. See this article about how to conduct statistical tests on PE ratios.

Most blogs are concentrated on a narrow set of topics. The real strength of this blog is its ability to analyze problems by combining information and methods developed in different fields. The most recent example of this is a paper on UNH valuation, which incorporates the author’s expertise as an investor and an economist with a finance background with his expertise on health care policy.

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Key Takeaways by Race

Races covered (in memo order):
Maine-02 (ME-02), Alaska At-Large (AK-AL), Nebraska-02 (NE-02), New Jersey-11 (NJ-11), New York-10 (NY-10), New York-12 (NY-12), California-47 (CA-47).

• ME-02: Jared Golden’s exit removes a uniquely cross-partisan incumbent; depending on the GOP nominee, the race could either flip Republican or produce a rare ranked-choice coalition outcome with implications for House control.

• AK-AL: Incumbent Nick Begich III is the clear front-runner under Alaska’s top-four system but ranked-choice rules mean a strong plurality does not fully eliminate upset risk if he fails to attract second-choice support.

• NE-02: Despite an open seat, both parties appear likely to nominate broadly acceptable candidates; polarization risk is low and the race will turn on execution and the national environment rather than ideology.

• NJ-11: A splintered Democratic special primary may yield a nominee with a weak mandate, while a credible, non-MAGA Republican makes the seat meaningfully more competitive than recent history suggests.

• NY-10: A clean establishment-versus-progressive primary, centered around mid-east politics, creates a realistic scenario for an independent “insurance” candidacy if the anti-Israel candidate prevails.

• NY-12: A crowded field creates low-plurality risk, but demographic constraints—especially a large, institutionally rooted Jewish electorate—have so far prevented ideological polarization.

• CA-47: California’s top-two jungle primary elevates coalition math over ideology; while the incumbent is likely to advance, fragmentation could still produce a nonstandard general-election matchup.

ME-02: Golden’s Open Seat and Polarization Risk

The retirement of Jared Golden leaves Maine’s 2nd District unusually exposed. Golden repeatedly won a Trump-leaning seat by assembling a personal, cross-partisan coalition and relying on ranked-choice transfers. No declared candidate clearly reproduces that formula, making this one of the most volatile races of the cycle.

The Democratic field includes Joe Baldacci, a Bangor-based state senator with local roots and family name recognition; Matthew Dunlap, a former statewide officeholder with institutional credibility; Paige Loud, a lower-profile grassroots candidate; and Jordan Wood, whose résumé is largely national and issue-driven and appears poorly matched to the district’s rural, working-class electorate. On the Republican side, Paul LePage, the former governor, brings high name recognition and a polarizing style, while James Clark, an Army veteran, offers a more conventional and less incendiary conservative profile.

The general election hinges on the matchup. A LePage–Wood race would likely be highly polarized, creating room for a third-party centrist.

A Clark–Wood race would favor Republicans and could flip the seat.

A Clark versus a more mainstream Democrat would likely be close and could plausibly be one of the marginal races that determines control of the House.

AK-AL: Begich Leads, but RCV Leaves Room for Surprise

Rep. Nick Begich III is seeking reelection and is the clear front-runner in Alaska’s at-large House race, both because he is the incumbent and because of the enduring strength of the Begich family name in Alaska politics. He is the only clearly defined conservative in the field, making him well positioned to lead the August 18 top-four primary, potentially with a sizable plurality.

That advantage, however, does not guarantee victory under Alaska’s ranked-choice voting system. Begich will be the first choice of many voters but he will need fifty percent to win under rank choice voting rules and my not be the second choice for many voters.

NE-02: Competitive but Unlikely to Produce an Extreme Nominee

The retirement of Don Bacon removes a Republican who repeatedly won Nebraska’s most competitive district by cultivating crossover appeal and distancing himself from his party’s national brand. His absence creates uncertainty, but the current field does not show signs of ideological escalation on either side.

On the Democratic side, the primary is genuinely competitive, but the declared candidates largely come from mainstream backgrounds — elected officials, veterans, administrators, and party professionals — and are differentiating on experience, competence, and biography rather than on ideological position. There is little risk that Democrats will nominate a candidate out of step with the district’s moderate, suburban electorate.

On the Republican side, the picture is clearer. Barring an unexpected late entry, Joe Harding (Omaha City Council) appears positioned to be the nominee. While he lacks Bacon’s districtwide electoral history, his local executive experience and urban governing profile point toward a broadly acceptable, non-MAGA style candidacy rather than an ideologically polarizing one.

Both parties appear likely to nominate candidates capable of appealing beyond their base, making this a contest defined more by execution and national environment than by primary-driven polarization.

NJ-11: AIPAC’s Intervention, a Fragmented Democratic Outcome, and a Real General Election Test

The Democratic primary to replace outgoing Rep. Mikie Sherrill in New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District has become one of the earliest intra-party flashpoints of the 2026 cycle.

Eleven candidates competed in the February special primary, which remains unresolved, with progressive organizer Analilia Mejia narrowly leading former Rep. Tom Malinowski in late returns, roughly 28.9 percent to 27.8 percent, with thousands of ballots still outstanding. The eventual nominee will face Republican Joe Hathaway in the April 16 special general election in a district that has leaned Democratic in recent cycles.

A defining feature of the primary was heavy outside spending by American Israel Public Affairs Committee and allied entities aimed at defeating Malinowski. That intervention fragmented the field and may now result in the nomination of a candidate with rigid openly anti-Israel views.

Joe Hathaway, the mayor of Randolph, a former aid to Governor Christie, a Yale graduate, is the Republican nominee. He was not opposed in the primary. He is firmly in the Chris Christie wing of the party, is not MAGA, is thought to be a good communicator, is openly pro-Israel. This race could become quite competitive.

NY-10: Goldman vs. Lander, and the Outer Edges of a Safe Seat

Rep. Dan Goldman faces a Democratic primary challenge from Brad Lander in New York’s 10th Congressional District, a Lower Manhattan–Brooklyn seat that is overwhelmingly Democratic but internally diverse. The race has sorted along establishment versus progressive lines rather than around local service issues. Goldman’s coalition centers on institutional Democrats and older, pro-Israel voters; Lander’s support draws heavily from the city’s progressive and activist base.

Goldman enters with strong backing from party leadership, including Gov. Kathy Hochul and House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries. His campaign emphasizes governance, rule of law, and a conventionally pro-Israel posture that aligns with the district’s long-standing mainstream Democratic electorate. Lander, while an experienced citywide official, is running as the vehicle for the party’s left flank, with endorsements from Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani. The substantive contrast is less about policy detail than about coalition composition and turnout in a low-salience primary.

The Republican baseline in NY-10 is minimal. In 2024, Republicans captured roughly 15 percent of the general-election vote, underscoring how limited the GOP’s role is in a typical cycle. That matters for possible 2026 scenarios. If Lander were to win a narrowly contested Democratic primary, the district would be one of the few in New York where an independent or third-party candidacy could plausibly test dissatisfaction among pro-Israel, centrist, and moderate Democrats who supported Goldman. Any such effort would draw primarily from Democratic and unaffiliated voters rather than from Republicans. Ballot access is feasible but time-constrained: independent nominating petitions must be filed in late May, ahead of the June primary, meaning any serious effort would need to be organized in advance as an insurance option rather than a post-primary reaction.

NY-12: Splintered Field, Not Yet an Ideological Fight

New York’s 12th District, opened by the retirement of Jerry Nadler, has a highly splintered Democratic primary in which a winner could plausibly emerge with well under 30 percent of the vote. Early speculation that Nadler stepped aside because his pro-Israel views were no longer viable has not been borne out by the race itself. Unlike NY-10, the contest has not sorted into a clear progressive-versus-establishment or pro- versus anti-Israel fight.

A key reason is demographic. NY-12 has a substantially larger and more institutionally rooted Jewish electorate than NY-10, which has acted as a moderating constraint on how far any serious contender can push on Israel or foreign policy. As a result, the race remains centered on credibility, experience, and coalition building rather than ideological polarization, even as the field remains crowded and fragmented.

CA-47: Jungle Primary Creates Unusual Math, Even With an Incumbent

California’s 47th District uses a top-two jungle primary, meaning all candidates — Democrats, Republicans, and independents — appear on the same ballot and only the two highest vote-getters advance. That structure can occasionally produce unexpected outcomes if one party’s vote fragments badly while another consolidates.

In 2026, incumbent Dave Min is the clear anchor and is very likely to finish in the top two. The remaining field is more fractured, with multiple Republican candidates and at least one independent competing for the second slot. While an independent advancing would require an unusually high level of vote splitting and remains unlikely based on current information, the jungle primary rules mean the race is shaped as much by coalition math as by party strength — leaving open the possibility of a nonstandard general election matchup even if Min advances comfortably.

For the framework and discussion on when and why centrist third-party candidacies become viable, especially in fragmented primaries and alternative electoral systems, see my earlier piece here: https://www.economicmemos.com/p/where-centrist-third-party-candidates.

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Why this quiz

A recurring argument for third-party or independent runs is that some races are simply “too expensive” to contest seriously. That claim is not equally true across offices.

U.S. House races, especially in smaller states, can sometimes be competitive at single-digit millions. In Iowa, several House races have been decided by razor-thin margins, and there is at least one closely contested seat opening up because a Republican incumbent is running for the Senate. In that context, a well-organized, well-targeted House campaign costing a couple of million dollars can plausibly matter.

U.S. Senate races are different. Even in a small, relatively inexpensive media state, the financial scale is much larger.

I am illustrating this point by giving you questions on the relative costs of House and Senate races in Iowa, a small state with a relatively inexpensive media market.

Quiz Question 1: Iowa U.S. House (2024)

In the 2024 general election, Iowa held four U.S. House races. Looking only at campaign spending by the general-election nominees from the two major parties, how much did Republicans and Democrats spend in total, and what was the statewide House total?

A)
Republicans: $9.0 million
Democrats: $6.1 million
Statewide total: $15.1 million

B)
Republicans: $13.0 million
Democrats: $8.1 million
Statewide total: $21.1 million

C)
Republicans: $18.7 million
Democrats: $11.6 million
Statewide total: $30.3 million

D)
Republicans: $24.5 million
Democrats: $15.2 million
Statewide total: $39.7 million

Quiz Question 2: Iowa U.S. Senate (2020)

In the 2020 Iowa U.S. Senate general election, the race featured an incumbent Republican senator and a well-funded Democratic challenger.

How much did each major-party candidate spend, and what was the statewide total?

A)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $19 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $26 million
Statewide total: $45 million

B)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $34 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $73 million
Statewide total: $107 million

C)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $30 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $56 million
Statewide total: $86 million

D)
Republican: Joni Ernst — $46 million
Democrat: Theresa Greenfield — $94 million
Statewide total: $140 million

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Answer and discussion

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Memo: Why Republicans Are Willing to Challenge Senator Cassidy Without Risking the Louisiana Senate Seat

Former President Donald Trump’s decision to endorse and actively encourage a MAGA-aligned challenger against a sitting Republican U.S. Senator would be risky in a competitive two-party state. In Louisiana, and in many other states throughout the country, it is not.

Trump won the state decisively. Louisiana Democrats have not held a U.S. Senate seat since 2005. Since then, Democratic statewide success has been episodic and contingent, largely confined to gubernatorial races under unusual conditions. Those victories depended on a weak Republican opponent, a uniquely positioned Democratic candidate with strong cultural or family ties to the state, and favorable timing. They did not produce a durable Democratic bench or competitive federal infrastructure. As a result, Democrats remain structurally noncompetitive in Louisiana’s federal elections.

Senator Bill Cassidy is often described as a moderate, but his policy record does not support that characterization. He is a consistently conservative legislator who has supported low taxes, limited government, and restrictive approaches to federal health spending. His legislative focus on restructuring ACA-related subsidies and premium supports places him squarely within contemporary conservative policy frameworks.

This distinction matters, because Cassidy’s vulnerability within the Republican Party is not ideological but relational. His vote to convict Trump in the second impeachment created a lasting breach with a large portion of the Republican base. Since then, he has governed conservatively but without the personal loyalty signaling that increasingly defines Republican primaries in Louisiana.

In Louisiana, more than ten candidates are seeking or preparing to seek the Republican nomination, while only a handful of Democrats have entered the race. None of the Democratic candidates show evidence of broad statewide appeal, major fundraising capacity, or an ability to consolidate independent or crossover Republican voters.

The practical result is a de facto one-party system in which the Republican primary, not the general election, determines who holds the Senate seat. In that environment, there is little political cost to pushing candidates toward ideological extremes. When only one party can realistically win, internal factional conflict replaces inter-party competition.

These one-party dynamics, replicated across multiple states, have meaningful national consequences. The modern Senate map increasingly insulates Republicans from sustained losses of control. One-party Republican states such as Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and several other rural states effectively remove entire Senate seats from genuine competition, even in favorable Democratic cycles.

As a result, Democratic paths to Senate majorities depend on winning an unusually large number of swing or marginal states simultaneously. Even during blue-wave elections, Republican losses tend to be limited and reversible. Control may shift temporarily, but structural advantages make long-term Democratic dominance unlikely.

This insulation fundamentally alters Republican risk calculations. Because the downside of losing a seat is low and often short-lived, party actors are more willing to tolerate internal disruption. Challenging incumbents, discarding experienced legislators, or elevating more ideologically rigid candidates carries limited existential risk when the underlying electoral terrain remains overwhelmingly favorable. Even in 2026, it is difficult to construct a plausible scenario in which Republicans lose Senate control due solely to intra-party contests in deep-red states.

The answer to the question of whether Democrats can now emerge as a competitive force in states like Louisiana is “Not now,” because a “D” next to a candidate’s name functionally disqualifies him or her. The more consequential question is whether a center-right alternative can emerge within or alongside the existing party system.

A separate memo, Viable Third-Party Opportunities in the 2026 Election, examines where a center party might compete without acting as a spoiler and tilting outcomes toward one of the two major parties. That analysis is available at https://www.economicmemos.com/p/viable-third-party-opportunities.

In Louisiana and similar states, a third party would not be the spoiler. Instead, the Democratic Party would more likely absorb anti-Trump voters, limiting the third party’s downside risk.

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Key Findings

1. Third-party viability in 2026 is highly constrained at the Senate level, with meaningful opportunities limited to a small number of states that combine independent voting traditions, favorable electoral rules, and manageable campaign costs.

2. The House represents the most credible near-term entry point for a centrist party, particularly in districts where primary dynamics, open seats, or polarized incumbents leave the ideological center unoccupied.

3. Spoiler risk is asymmetric: in some regions a centrist candidate could consolidate middle-of-the-electorate voters more effectively than a major-party nominee, while in others institutional barriers make third-party entry nonviable regardless of appeal.

4. This memo examines a targeted set of House districts across selected states where these conditions appear most salient; it is not a comprehensive national inventory, and further work is required to assess additional districts as filing deadlines approach and primary fields take shape.

Introduction

This memo assesses near-term tactical opportunities for a centrist or third-party effort under the current U.S. political map and electoral rules. It does not lay out a strategy for permanently changing the political environment and dialogue or for building long-term party viability. Instead, it identifies specific races in the 2026 cycle where, given current political circumstances a centrist candidate could plausibly compete and win without functioning primarily as a spoiler.

Senate seats

Third-party Senate competition in 2026 is realistically viable only in Maine and Alaska. Both states combine three necessary conditions: a demonstrated independent voting tradition, ranked choice voting in U.S. Senate general elections, and relatively inexpensive statewide media markets.

Outside Maine and Alaska, a third-party Senate run in 2026 would almost certainly function as a spoiler rather than a competitive alternative.

Even in Alaska and Maine, where electoral rules most strongly favor independent candidacies, the absence of serious centrist efforts indicates that organizational readiness and candidate recruitment, rather than voter resistance or spoiler dynamics, remain the binding constraints on third-party viability.

House races (strategic focus)

The House is the most credible entry point for a third party in 2026. House races are lower cost, less nationalized, and involve smaller electorates, increasing the likelihood of direct voter–candidate interaction. Across states, the decisive variable is the primary process. In most cases, independent candidates may file after the primaries, allowing the center candidate and party to enter races where one or more of the major party, nominate someone from the fringe leaving the center lane empty.

The binding constraint is readiness: candidate recruitment, funding, and ballot-access execution must be prepared in advance.

In some districts, particularly in culturally conservative or strongly anti-Democratic regions, the Democratic nominee does not function as the natural alternative to a Republican candidate. Under those conditions, a centrist candidate may be better positioned than the Democrat to consolidate opposition to an extreme Republican, with the Democratic Party effectively acting as the spoiler. This dynamic is most visible in districts such as CO-03, where a Democrat has repeatedly proven nonviable in the general election and a centrist candidate could plausibly consolidate opposition to a polarizing incumbent more effectively than a major-party challenger.

Maine — House races

Maine is one of the most favorable environments nationally for a third-party House effort. Ranked choice voting materially reduces spoiler risk, campaigns are relatively inexpensive, and voters have a long history of supporting independents.

Most viable: ME-02 (open seat). Ranked-choice voting, an evenly divided electorate, and the absence of an incumbent create a genuine path to competitiveness.

Nebraska — House races

Nebraska offers a real choice for a center candidate with Don Bacon retiring, the Omaha-based NE-02 becomes an open seat where Republican primary incentives may favor a more conservative nominee.

Colorado — House races

Colorado presents selective third-party opportunities driven less by marginal partisanship than by the risk of polarized nominees on both sides.

CO-03 currently represented by Lauren Boebert is the polarizing incumbent. The district is deeply conservative, but the district was better represented by Ken Buck a more mainstream Republican than Lauren Boebert. It is highly likely that a well prepared center-party candidate would have a better chance of winning this race than a Democrat.

CO-08 remains a highly fluid district with no entrenched partisan identity. The republican incumbent is on the right wing of the party. Again, if Democrats nominate a progressive there is a lot of room for a centrist third party candidate.

Two other districts, CO-04 and CO-05, remain highly competitive and should be monitored closely because primary outcomes could impact feasibility of a third-party run.

California — House races (jungle primary dynamics)

California’s top-two (“jungle”) primary creates opportunities for non-aligned or centrist candidates not by requiring them to win a plurality, but by allowing entry into the general election whenever dominant-party fields splinter sufficiently that no second major-party candidate consolidates the vote.

There are multiple districts in California where a qualified centrist could get in the top 2 and possibly win in November.

California’s top-two primary means a centrist can reach the general election without majority support when the dominant party splinters and the opposing party is structurally weak; in districts such as CA-12, CA-17, CA-30, CA-32, CA-37, CA-47, and CA-51.

Special case: CA-17 (Silicon Valley)

Ro Khanna is not the only Democrat facing potential intra-party competition, but he is distinctive in that his support for a federal wealth tax has generated observable interest among Silicon Valley donors and networks in identifying or backing a challenger.

If Nicholas Finan and any aligned backers were willing to compete explicitly as a centrist alternative rather than as a conventional Democratic primary challenger, CA-17 would represent one of the clearest examples in California of how the jungle primary can convert a splintered dominant-party field into a viable general-election entry point.

Iowa — House races

Iowa combines low media costs, a retail-politics culture, and voter fatigue with national polarization. Structural conditions are favorable, but time to organize and file is becoming the binding constraint.

Most viable: IA-02 (open seat). The absence of an incumbent reduces barriers to entry. Success depends on early organization to consolidate the middle.

IA-03 is conditionally viable if major-party nominees leave the ideological center unoccupied.

IA-01 is constrained by a two-party rematch dynamic.

IA-04 is not viable.

Pennsylvania — House races

The analysis in Pennsylvania centers on three districts, with PA-07 emerging as the most promising opportunity for a centrist candidate under current conditions.

PA-7 is a fundamentally moderate suburban district and Trump’s low approval ratings may hurt the first-term Republican incumbent. Formerly represented by Susan Wild, this district flipped Republican in 2024, probably because of Wild’s inconsistent statements on Gaza. A genuine third-party centrist may have a better opportunity to win this seat than a Democrat who panders to the base. (See this article for example https://freebeacon.com/democrats/rep-susan-wild-calls-herself-very-pro-israel-while-touting-endorsement-from-group-that-slanders-israel-as-apartheid-state/ Use Google to find other examples.)

PA-08 is currently represented by Rob Bresnahan. Despite its history of close general elections, Democratic leadership and primary dynamics in the district remain strongly oriented toward electability and rapid consolidation around a mainstream nominee, most likely Paige Cognetti rather than a more left-leaning or outsider challenger such as Eric Stone. As a result, there is limited unoccupied space in the political center. PA-08 is probably not a strong option for a centrist party unless something genuinely unusual occurs in the Democratic nomination process, such as a fractured primary, an unexpected nominee collapse, or a sharp ideological turn that alienates moderate voters.

PA-12 represented by Summer Lee. Republicans are not competitive in a two-party race, but the Democratic coalition is internally fractured. A centrist or pro-Israel candidacy could potentially consolidate moderates and disaffected Democrats, though this remains more conditional and less immediately promising than PA-07.

New York — House races

Several New York Democratic primaries have become explicit referenda on Israel and Middle East policy, creating the potential for coalition rupture in otherwise noncompetitive general elections.

NY-10 represented by Dan Goldman. Goldman is among the most visible pro-Israel Democrats and has drawn sustained opposition centered on Gaza and Middle East policy. If Goldman were to lose a Democratic primary on this basis, the general election dynamics would change materially. Republicans are not competitive in this district, and if a Republican nominee were to back off or remain minimal, a pro-Israel centrist candidate could plausibly win outright by consolidating moderates, Jewish voters, and pro-Israel Democrats.

NY-12 is an open seat following the decision by Jerry Nadler not to seek reelection. The district is safely Democratic in the general election, which has produced a large and ideologically diverse Democratic primary field with no clear successor or consensus candidate.

Middle East and Israel policy has emerged as a meaningful fault line among Democratic voters in the district. A potentially progressive, anti-Israel nominee could create an opening for a centrist candidate by leaving a cohesive bloc of pro-Israel, moderate, and institutionally minded voters without representation in the general election. Under those conditions, post-primary consolidation should not be assumed, and the district warrants close monitoring as a potential centrist entry point.

NY-15 is currently represented by Ritchie Torres, who has taken a consistently strong and unambiguous pro-Israel position. The Democratic primary opposition is fragmented among multiple progressive challengers who are largely competing with one another rather than consolidating against the incumbent. Under current conditions, the district appears safe for Torres in the primary and safe for Democrats in the general election.

NY-21 is an open seat following the retirement of Elise Stefanik, and both parties are facing crowded, unsettled primaries. On both the Republican and Democratic sides, most prospective candidates appear oriented toward mobilizing their respective party bases in order to survive competitive nomination contests. That incentive structure raises the risk that one party—most plausibly Republicans in a GOP-leaning district—could nominate a candidate whose profile is poorly matched to the general electorate. If either party nominates a perceived extremist or culturally rigid candidate, an opening could emerge for a centrist alternative. As is often the case with open seats, the absence of an incumbent creates volatility; the existence of a center lane depends less on structural ideology in the district than on nomination outcomes and candidate quality.

Wisconsin — House races

WI-03 is likely to feature a conventional two-party rematch. This is not a good opportunity for the center party unless the Democrats nominate someone from the fringe.

Montana — House races

MT-01 is driven by candidate quality rather than partisan fundamentals. A third-party entry would likely function as a spoiler.

Arizona — House races

AZ-01 and AZ-06 are districts where Democrats have lost recent close general elections after nominating progressive candidates, and the 2026 cycle again features splintered Democratic primaries, making these seats additional examples of centrist-party opportunity contingent on Democratic primary outcomes.

Texas — House races

Texas should be excluded from consideration in 2026 due to ballot-access constraints.

Florida — House races

Florida should be treated as non-viable for third-party entry absent a structural shock.

Conclusion

This memo represents a preliminary look at a limited set of races that immediately stand out under current political conditions. It is not a comprehensive national inventory; a fuller mapping can be developed as filing deadlines approach and primary dynamics clarify across states.

In the current political environment, with a newly elected president entering a midterm and a closely divided Congress, conventional expectations would point toward Democrats gaining more than enough seats to regain control of the House, particularly given current polling. However, the statistics in this essay suggest that the leftward drift of the Democratic party could result in the Democrats fall short of their objective of winning back the House of Representatives. This leftward drift of the Democratic party and the existence of some fairly conservative Republicans incumbents in districts with a substantial number of voters either a bit right or a bit left of center could lead to opportunities for a center party.

Ballot-access constraints rule out these races in 2026 and shift relevance to the 2028 cycle, but they also illustrate that in some regions the Democratic Party, not a centrist challenger, is the binding constraint on anti-Republican consolidation.

The caution throughout this memo regarding third-party entry reflects an assumption that a center party would enter races without a fully articulated and distinctive governing agenda. Under those conditions, restraint is appropriate to avoid functioning as a spoiler. That assessment would change if a center party offers a clear, substantive alternative to both major parties—one that addresses concrete policy failures rather than merely offering a more civil tone or technocratic competence. A sharply differentiated platform can enable consolidation rather than fragmentation by giving voters a reason to realign, not simply defect.

Note that a center party effort to gain a relatively modest number of House seats could result in the center party having real political power and could improve the political environment because neither side could elect a speaker without some support from the moderates. The key ingredient for the emergence of a such a liftoff is a positive, constructive agenda that contrasts clearly with the reactive status quo currently offered by both major parties. Go to the memo Neither Party is Solving the Household Debt Problem for a discussion of how the center party could do a better job solving four challenges impacting finances of American household -- obtaining affordable health insurance coverage, reducing student debt, saving for retirement, and assuring the solvency of Social Security.

This memo will be expanded to include other states and updated as filing deadlines approach and primary dynamics evolve.

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Key findings

• Iowa has shifted from electing four Democrats to the U.S. House in 2018 to holding four Republican seats today.

• The prevailing 2026 baseline is three seats that lean or are likely Republican and one seat that is safely Republican.

• IA-01 is a rematch of remarkably close previous races.

• IA-02 is an open seat that leans Republican.

• IA-03 is extremely competitive may highlight a MAGA candidate against a centrist Democrat.

• IA-04 appears safely Republican.

• Independent candidates could plausibly appeal to Iowa voters given low campaign costs, a tradition of ticket-splitting, fatigue with polarized politics, and voter concern about ideological nominees.

• No credible centrist campaigns appear to be forming in IA.

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Introduction:

Iowa is a retail-politics state. Door-to-door contact, county-level credibility, repeat exposure, and local media matter more than national branding. Media markets are relatively inexpensive, which reduces the advantage of national money and raises the value of field operations and candidate familiarity. The electorate is overwhelmingly white and older than the national median, a structure that has constrained Democratic performance as the national party message emphasizes constituencies that are small in Iowa.

The Democratic Party’s decision to de-prioritize Iowa in presidential nominating calendars weakened long-term organizing pipelines, volunteer morale, and candidate recruitment.

Presidential-nomination success does not translate reliably to congressional outcomes because House primaries and general elections feature older, habitual voters who emphasize general-election survivability and local fit while presidential primaries have wider turnout.

IA-01 — Eastern and Northeast Iowa

Status: incumbent-held Republican seat.
Likely nominees: Mariannette Miller-Meeks and Christina Bohannan.

This district is a rematch of remarkably close previous races, including contests decided by margins so small they required recount-level scrutiny. That record demonstrates that Democrats can compete here while also underscoring the advantages of incumbency built through persistence, donor loyalty, and turnout discipline. The rematch dynamic simplifies coalition building for the Democratic nominee and reinforces name recognition on both sides. Meeks is the favorite because she is the incumbent, but Bohannan could win in a blue wave election.

IA-02 — Eastern Iowa

Status: open seat following the incumbent’s decision to run for Senate.

This is the most volatile race structurally, but the volatility does not equal competitiveness parity. Without an incumbent, candidate quality and message matter more, yet the district’s fundamentals still lean Republican. If Democrats nominate a broadly acceptable candidate, the race resembles a traditional open-seat contest that favors Republicans by a modest margin. If Democrats nominate a more ideologically sharp candidate, the absence of a true centrist independent means dissatisfied moderates have no consolidating alternative, increasing fragmentation rather than producing a three-way realignment.

IA-03 — Central Iowa and Des Moines

Recent results here were close, and the incumbent is beatable under the right conditions. The district blends a Democratic-leaning metro core with suburbs and exurbs that have trended right. Democratic success requires a nominee who maximizes Polk County turnout while limiting suburban losses. Democrats appear poised to nominate a centrist candidate, which keeps the district plausibly in play and preserves a credible path to defeating the incumbent in a favorable environment.

IA-04 — Western and Northwest Iowa

This district is structurally Republican and not competitive at the congressional level. Democratic nominees typically run to advance issues rather than to win, and there is no independent or centrist presence capable of changing that equilibrium. Republican primaries matter more than the general election, unless there is a huge blue wave.

The centrist and independent question

Iowa presents several conditions that could support a centrist or independent candidacy: low media costs, a voter culture that values pragmatism, fatigue with polarized parties, and anxiety about ideologically extreme nominees. An open seat like IA-02 would be the natural venue. Under Iowa law, independent and non-party candidates must file nomination papers during the general-election window in late summer (July 27 to August 22, 2026), which places a premium on early organizational groundwork well before formal filing.

Credible success would require early organization, substantial fundraising, county-by-county ballot-access execution, and a clear, unifying brand. At present, no well-funded, explicitly centrist effort is organizing at scale anywhere on the Iowa House map. Existing independents do not consolidate the political middle and are more likely to fragment dissatisfaction. The absence of a true centrist candidacy—particularly in an open district—appears to be a missed opportunity, leaving a potentially receptive electorate without a vehicle.

As a result, the center remains unoccupied, and close races default to two-party dynamics that favor Republicans. Iowa’s House landscape in 2026 therefore remains tilted Republican: IA-01 and IA-03 are competitive by Iowa standards, IA-02 is open but still structurally Republican, and IA-04 is not in play. The theoretical opening for a centrist alternative exists, but without organization it remains unrealized.

Iowa’s House landscape in 2026 remains tilted Republican. IA-01 and IA-03 are competitive by Iowa standards, IA-02 is open but still structurally Republican, and IA-04 is not in play. The theoretical opening for a centrist alternative exists, but without organization it remains unrealized.

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· The state that has remained Republican at the statewide level since the Ann Richards era, despite repeated Democratic claims that Texas is on the verge of turning blue, claims that consistently fall short at the ballot box.

· Early filing deadlines eliminate meaningful independent or third-party alternatives, meaning that once nominees are chosen, voters have little recourse even if both choices are polarizing

· Many Texans appear to vote reliably Republican not because of enthusiasm for the Republican band but more because of dislike of the Democrat option.

· The 2026 Senate primary process could lead to the nomination of both a Democrat and Republican on the political extreme.

· A mid-decade redistricting may increase the number of Republican seats but the new map also increases the number of House seats in play.

U.S. Senate (2026)

There is a real possibility that the two 2026 nominees for Senate in Texas will be from the extremes of both parties, if Jasmine Crockett becomes the Democrat nominee and Ken Paxton the Republican one. This outcome leaves centrists in Texas without a voice in the general election contest for Senator.

In the Democratic primary, Rep. Jasmine Crockett has consolidated support among progressive activists through aggressive, highly visible criticism of former President Donald Trump. Her rhetoric—often framing Trump and his supporters as a direct threat to democracy—plays effectively with a Democratic primary electorate but is poorly aligned with the broader Texas electorate, where Trump remains popular and Republican identification is strong.

Crockett has also endorsed progressive positions such as abolishing or sharply reducing funding for immigration enforcement and has taken strongly critical positions toward the Israeli government in the context of the Gaza conflict, positions that place her well to the left of the Texas median voter and invite nationalization of the race.

These positions are likely to dominate a general election narrative. Republicans would have little difficulty portraying Crockett as hostile to law enforcement, dismissive of border enforcement, and aligned with the most critical elements of the pro-Palestinian movement at a time when Texas voters remain broadly supportive of Israel. Even where her statements emphasize humanitarian concerns, the cumulative effect is to anchor her candidacy on cultural and foreign-policy issues that test poorly in statewide Texas contests.

Veteran Democratic strategist James Carville has publicly warned that Crockett’s political style prioritizes viral moments and personal brand-building over broad electoral appeal, arguing that such an approach may win attention and a primary but is ill-suited to winning statewide in a conservative-leaning state. That critique echoes quieter concerns among Democratic operatives that Crockett could plausibly win a low-turnout primary while struggling to assemble the cross-partisan coalition required to compete in a Texas general election.

State Rep. James Talarico brings a profile that aligns unusually well with the kind of coalition Democrats would need to compete statewide in Texas. His background as a public school teacher is a tangible political asset in a state where education remains a high-trust profession, particularly in rural communities that have grown uneasy with aggressive private-school voucher and school-choice initiatives advanced by Gov. Greg Abbott. While Abbott’s education agenda has energized conservative activists, it has also generated backlash among rural Republicans who see local public schools as civic anchors and are skeptical of policies that could drain funding or weaken small districts.

Talarico’s teaching experience allows him to speak credibly to those concerns without sounding ideological or confrontational. Combined with his low-key demeanor, faith background, and emphasis on affordability and service, he presents a political style that is culturally legible to conservative and Republican-leaning voters even when they disagree with him on policy.

Unlike more nationalized Democratic figures, Talarico does not project as a partisan combatant; his appeal is rooted in competence, restraint, and moral seriousness. In a state that has been solidly red for decades, that posture may not be sufficient on its own—but it is meaningfully better suited than a confrontational progressive profile to attracting rural voters, soft Republicans, and independents who are uneasy with both ideological extremes.

Republicans face a very different internal choice. Sen. John Cornyn is one of the most experienced and institutionally powerful Republicans in Congress. Having served more than two decades in the Senate, Cornyn is among the chamber’s senior members and has held some of the party’s most consequential leadership roles, including Senate Republican Whip, where he was responsible for vote-counting, message discipline, and floor strategy. Earlier in his tenure, he chaired the National Republican Senatorial Committee, playing a central role in shaping the GOP’s Senate majority strategy.

Substantively, Cornyn’s committee assignments reflect both trust and influence. He has long served on the Judiciary Committee, where he helped shape conservative legal priorities and federal judicial confirmations, as well as the Finance Committee, giving him leverage over tax, trade, and entitlement policy. His service on the Intelligence Committeeplaces him within a small group of senators trusted with national security oversight. Collectively, these roles make Cornyn one of Texas’s most effective conduits for federal influence, constituent services, and policy outcomes.

From both a governing and electoral perspective, forcing Cornyn out would be a major unforced error. Substantively, Texas would be trading seniority, committee power, and leadership reach for uncertainty. Politically, Cornyn represents the safest available option for holding the seat in the general election: low-drama, well-funded, and difficult to caricature. While his style may frustrate segments of the Republican base that prize confrontation, removing a seasoned institutional actor in favor of a more volatile nominee would unnecessarily increase general-election risk and weaken Texas’s position within the Senate.

Attorney General Ken Paxton is among the most polarizing figures in Texas politics, combining strong support from the Republican base with an unusually long record of controversy and hard-line policy choices.

In 2023, Paxton was impeached by the Texas House of Representatives, including by members of his own party, on charges stemming from allegations that he abused the powers of his office to benefit a political donor, retaliated against whistleblowers, and engaged in improper conduct. Although he was acquitted by the Texas Senate, the trial aired extensive testimony from former aides and senior officials, reinforcing public perceptions of ethical risk even as it failed to meet the high bar for conviction.

As Attorney General, Paxton has pursued an aggressively ideological agenda that has placed Texas at the forefront of national conservative legal battles. He played a central role in enforcing and defending Texas’s near-total abortion ban, including legal strategies that deter providers from offering care even in medically complex cases. Paxton has also led multistate lawsuits challenging federal immigration enforcement, environmental regulations, and administrative authority, often framing policy disputes as existential conflicts with the federal government. These actions have elevated his national profile and energized conservative voters but have also positioned him well to the right of the general Texas electorate, particularly suburban and business-oriented Republicans.

Electorally, Paxton has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to survive scandals and win statewide by consolidating grievance-driven and ideological voters. At the same time, his record ensures that a general election campaign would center less on partisan policy differences and more on judgment, institutional integrity, and the appropriate use of public power. That dynamic creates higher volatility than a conventional Republican nominee and introduces material downside risk in a general election, even in a state that remains structurally favorable to the GOP.

Rep. Wesley Hunt provides Republicans with a third option. A West Point graduate and former Army Apache helicopter pilot, Hunt combines military credentials with service on committees relevant to Texas’s economic interests, including energy and small business. While he currently trails Cornyn and Paxton, his presence increases the likelihood of a runoff and prolongs internal conflict, potentially weakening the eventual nominee.

The central Senate reality is that Texas Democrats remain heavy underdogs. Republicans have not lost a statewide race since Ann Richards. Any Democratic upset would require a nominee who minimizes ideological caricature and shifts voter attention toward competence, character, and Republican risk rather than partisan identity.

Author’s Note

Economic and Political Insights is running a weekly focus on the 2026 political races and how electoral outcomes intersect with real-world economic policy. The prior installment examined New York.

My broader work focuses on economic and financial policy affecting households, with particular attention to health care, student debt, retirement savings, and Social Security. A recent essay argues that neither political party is adequately addressing the economic pressures facing families.
https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/neither-party-is-solving-the-household

I also publish practical personal-finance guidance aimed at helping readers make better saving, investing, and planning decisions, often saving many times the cost of a subscription.
https://bernsteinbook1958.substack.com/p/personal-finance-in-the-real-world

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U.S. House (2026)

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