Abstract: Investors can often postpone capital gains taxes by choosing not to sell. Higher tax rates can therefore discourage sales, leaving people holding investments or homes they would otherwise sell. This proposal pairs lower capital gains rates with fewer opportunities to defer or permanently avoid tax. It preserves and indexes the home-sale exclusion and ends new tax-deferred exchanges of investment real estate.
For ordinary inherited assets, half of the gain accumulated before death would be permanently exempt, and half would become taxable when the heir sells, with no capital gains tax due at death. Ending the complete exemption of pre-death gains would reduce the tax advantage of holding assets until death. Combined with lower rates on sales during life, this change would encourage owners to sell when another investment or home better meets their needs. A higher investment-income tax on higher-income households would help finance the rate reductions and maintain progressivity.
The proposal also supports limiting tax avoidance through borrowing against appreciated investments and taxing carried interest as ordinary income, while leaving the design of borrowing restrictions open.
Introduction
Capital gains policy is often debated as a choice between higher taxes on wealthy investors and lower taxes to encourage investment. Both positions give too little attention to a central feature of the system: investors can often choose when to sell and report their gains.
A worker generally cannot postpone reporting salary by leaving the money untouched. An investor can often postpone capital gains tax simply by declining to sell an appreciated asset. Holding the asset until death can provide an additional advantage: appreciation accumulated during the owner’s lifetime generally escapes income tax because the heir receives a new tax basis equal to the asset’s market value.
Higher capital gains rates can therefore discourage sales and lower the incentive to realize gains. People often retain concentrated stock positions, postpone business transactions, or remain in homes they would otherwise sell. Economists call this lock-in: holding an asset partly to postpone taxes.
My earlier proposals on health care, student debt, and retirement security apply five questions to major domestic reforms: Is the problem serious? Can substantial harm be avoided? Is the transition feasible? Is the result sustainable? Is there a more efficient approach?
Capital gains reform requires the same discipline. Lower rates should be accompanied by fewer opportunities to make gains permanently tax-free. Changes must also allow a workable transition and provide credible financing.
Reform One: Lower Capital Gains Rates While Preserving Progressivity
Most long-term capital gains face federal rates of zero, 15, or 20 percent. This proposal retains the zero-percent bracket, reduces the 15-percent rate to 12.5 percent, and reduces the 20-percent rate to 17.5 percent. Qualified dividends would follow the same schedule, and the income thresholds defining the brackets would remain indexed for inflation.
Lower capital gains rates would reduce the tax cost of selling appreciated assets. Raising the Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT) from 3.8 to 6 percent would help finance the rate reductions and maintain progressivity, although the package would require revenue and distributional estimates. Its income thresholds—$200,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers—would be indexed prospectively. For gains fully subject to the NIIT, combined federal rates would fall only slightly, from 23.8 to 23.5 percent at the top and from 18.8 to 18.5 percent in the intermediate bracket; gains outside the NIIT would receive the full 2.5-percentage-point reduction.
An extensive literature, reviewed in Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues, examines how capital gains taxes affect investors’ decisions to sell assets. Estimates vary widely across studies, reflecting differences in data, methods, and the treatment of temporary timing responses versus lasting changes in realizations.
The largest reductions in the tax rate on gains would therefore accrue to households below the NIIT thresholds. For wealthier investors, ending the complete exemption of gains accumulated before death would do more to reduce the incentive to hold assets until death.
The higher NIIT would also increase taxes on covered income receiving no offsetting rate reduction, including taxable interest and some rental income. These effects must be included in the assessment of the package. Rules preventing compensation from being relabeled as investment income should remain.
Reform Two: Help Homeowners Move to Homes That Better Meet Their Needs
The general capital gains rate reductions described in Reform One would also apply to taxable home-sale gains. In addition, the existing exclusions—$250,000 for qualifying single filers and $500,000 for qualifying joint filers—would be indexed for inflation prospectively. Together, these changes would reduce the tax barrier to selling a home when moving would improve a household’s circumstances.
A worker may want to relocate for a better job. An older homeowner may need a smaller home, fewer stairs, less maintenance, or proximity to family and care. Yet homeowners with substantial appreciation can face a large tax bill when they sell, even after the home-sale exclusion.
The problem can be particularly acute for older people who have owned their homes for decades. Selling may generate substantial taxable gains, while remaining until death generally allows the appreciation to escape capital gains tax through the heir’s basis adjustment. The tax system therefore rewards staying even when another home would be more manageable.
Hui Shan’s research on the 1997 home-sale tax changes provides evidence that capital gains taxes affect home sales. Her study of Boston-area communities found that the reform reduced lock-in for homes with low or moderate gains and suggested continued lock-in when appreciation exceeded the exclusion.
Consider a married couple selling a long-held home with an adjusted tax basis of $300,000 for net proceeds of $1 million. Their gain is $700,000. After the full $500,000 joint exclusion, $200,000 remains taxable. The rate reduction from 15 to 12.5 percent would lower the regular federal capital gains tax from $30,000 to $25,000.
Indexing the exclusion would prevent inflation from gradually exposing more appreciation to tax. The inheritance reform discussed below would further reduce the tax advantage of holding a home until death. These changes would allow employment opportunities, health, family needs, and the suitability of the home to play a larger role in decisions about moving.
Investment real estate requires a related change. Section 1031 currently allows qualifying owners to exchange business or investment real property without immediately paying tax on the gain. Successive exchanges can postpone taxation, and the basis adjustment at death can ultimately eliminate income tax on the deferred gain.
New Section 1031 exchanges would end prospectively, alongside the general rate reductions in Reform One. This would replace a special deferral available to qualifying real-estate investors with lower rates available more broadly.
There is a tradeoff. Research on like-kind exchanges and real-estate investment finds that exchanges are associated with larger subsequent property investments. Removing deferral can itself discourage transactions, reinforcing the importance of evaluating repeal together with the proposed lower rates and transition.
There are some unresolved issues about how to treat previously deferred Section 1031 gains, including a possible transition concession, their treatment at inheritance, and depreciation recapture. I have not made up my mind on these details.
Reform Three: Exempt Half of Gains Accumulated Before Death and Tax Half When the Heir Sells
Under the usual current rule, appreciation accumulated during an owner’s lifetime generally escapes capital gains tax when the asset passes to an heir. The heir receives a new tax basis equal to the asset’s market value at death, so only subsequent appreciation generally becomes taxable upon sale.
Gale, Hall, and Sabelhaus explain that eliminating the basis step-up would reduce lock-in while allowing tax to remain payable when assets are sold. CBO likewise distinguishes carryover basis from taxing gains at death. My proposal takes a partial carryover approach: half of pre-death appreciation remains exempt, while half stays taxable upon sale.
Half of the gain accumulated before death would be permanently exempt, and the other half would become taxable when the heir sells. No capital gains tax would be due at death or merely because the heir receives the asset. Any additional appreciation after inheritance would also be taxable upon sale.
Suppose an investor bought stock for $100,000 and died when it was worth $500,000. Under the usual current rule, the entire $400,000 gain escapes capital gains tax, and an immediate sale by the heir for $500,000 produces no taxable gain.
Under the revised rule, $200,000 of the pre-death gain would be permanently exempt. The other $200,000 would become taxable upon an immediate sale for $500,000. The heir’s tax basis would therefore be $300,000.
If the heir instead sold later for $600,000, the taxable gain would be $300,000: the $200,000 taxable portion of the pre-death gain plus $100,000 of appreciation after inheritance.
Previously carried-over taxable gains would remain taxable through subsequent inheritances; the half-exemption would apply only to appreciation accumulated during the most recent owner’s lifetime.
This change would reduce the tax advantage of holding appreciated assets until death while allowing heirs to postpone tax until they sell.
For investment assets that have declined in value, the corresponding rule would preserve half of the pre-death loss for recognition upon sale. Ordinary restrictions on deducting personal-use losses would remain.
Transfers to a surviving spouse would carry forward the existing basis. The half-exemption rule would apply at the surviving spouse’s death.
Reform Four: Limit Tax Avoidance Through Borrowing Against Appreciated Investments
Wealthy investors can borrow against appreciated investments to finance spending without selling assets or triggering capital gains tax. Holding those investments until death can then eliminate income tax on the appreciation. This strategy, commonly called “buy, borrow, die,” illustrates how taxpayers can enjoy their wealth while postponing or avoiding tax.
Edward Fox and Zachary Liscow find that annual new borrowing among the wealthiest 1 percent amounts to roughly 1–2 percent of their economic income. Simply holding appreciating assets accounts for a much larger share of untaxed gains. Borrowing reform should therefore complement inheritance reform rather than substitute for it.
Proposals differ. Colin Heath’s analysis in the NYU Law Review supports treating borrowing against appreciated assets as a taxable event. Yale’s Budget Lab compares that approach with collecting an advance capital gains tax payment and imposing an annual tax on covered loan balances.
Taxing covered borrowing would accelerate recognition of gains, while the inheritance reform would both encourage earlier realization and reduce the amount permanently escaping taxation.
Reform Five: Tax Investment Management Compensation as Ordinary Income
Managers of private equity, real estate, venture capital, and hedge funds can receive a share of investment profits, known as carried interest, for managing other people’s money. When those profits qualify as long-term capital gains, the manager’s compensation can receive preferential rates. The benefit does not apply to every fund profit: short-term trading gains generally receive short-term treatment, and current carried-interest rules generally require a holding period exceeding three years for covered gains to qualify for long-term treatment.
The Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2025 would tax covered compensation at ordinary income rates. The Ending the Carried Interest Loophole Act, introduced in April 2026, also addresses deferral through annual recognition of compensation. Revenue estimates depend on the design: CBO estimates that one option taxing carried interest as ordinary income and applying self-employment tax would raise approximately $13 billion over 2025–2034. That estimate should not be treated as the score for every proposal.
I support ending preferential tax treatment of carried interest because it is equitable and likely to promote growth if the additional revenue helps finance broader tax reform or reduce deficits.
Evaluating Revenue and Growth
Conventional revenue estimates incorporate some behavioral responses but may not fully capture how lower rates and fewer tax-avoidance opportunities change asset sales and investment. Dynamic scoring also considers broader effects on economic growth, although its assumptions and results remain controversial. I favor giving credible dynamic estimates substantial weight because I believe these reforms would improve investment decisions and promote growth.
Author’s note: This is the fifth paper in my series on improving household finances. Most of my work appears at Economic Memos, with additional articles on Medium. Forthcoming work will examine Social Security financing and how potential benefit changes could affect younger workers’ saving needs, including whether a modest levy on large inherited Roth accounts could contribute to a solution.
Readings:
Capital gains rates, realizations, and revenue
IRS — Capital Gains and Losses. Overview of capital gains taxation and the general long-term capital gains rates.
IRS — Net Investment Income Tax. Explains the 3.8 percent surtax, income thresholds, and covered investment income.
Dowd, McClelland, and Muthitacharoen — New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains. Examines how tax rates affect realizations, distinguishing persistent responses from temporary changes in timing.
· Gravelle, Jane G. Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral Responses and Revenues. Congressional Research Service, Report R41364, updated March 3, 2026.
Home sales and investment real estate
IRS — Selling Your Home. Explains eligibility for the home-sale exclusion and calculation of taxable gains.
Hui Shan — The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Home Sales: Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Provides evidence of housing lock-in and how the 1997 reform affected sales. This link provides the Federal Reserve working-paper version of the subsequently published article.
IRS — Like-Kind Exchanges. Describes Section 1031 deferral for qualifying business and investment real estate.
The Impact of Like-Kind Exchanges on Investment, Leverage, and Liquidity. Examines the relationship between exchanges and subsequent real-estate investment, providing evidence relevant to the potential costs of repeal.
Inherited assets and basis reform
IRS — Basis of Assets. Explains adjusted basis and the general treatment of inherited property.
Gale, Hall, and Sabelhaus — Taxing the “Angel of Death”. Discusses how basis step-up strengthens lock-in and compares carryover basis with taxing gains at death.
CBO — Change the Taxation of Assets Transferred at Death. Explains and estimates two alternatives: carryover basis and recognition of gains at death. Neither estimate is a revenue score for this paper’s proposed half-exemption.
Borrowing against appreciated assets
Fox and Liscow — The Role of Unrealized Gains and Borrowing in the Taxation of the Rich. Compares borrowing with unrealized gains among wealthy households.
Colin J. Heath — Taxing “Borrow” in “Buy/Borrow/Die”. Develops the case for treating borrowing against appreciated collateral as a realization event.
Yale Budget Lab — “Buy-Borrow-Die”: Options for Reforming the Tax Treatment of Borrowing Against Appreciated Assets. Compares deemed realization, capital gains tax prepayment, and an excise tax on covered borrowing.
Carried interest
IRS — Section 1061 Reporting Guidance FAQs. Explains the special holding-period rules for covered partnership interests.
Senator Tammy Baldwin — Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2025 Summary. Summarizes proposed ordinary-income treatment of carried interest.
Senate Finance Committee — Ending the Carried Interest Loophole Act. Describes the April 2026 proposal, including its approach to deferred compensation.
CBO — Tax Carried Interest as Ordinary Income. Provides the approximately $13 billion revenue estimate for a specified reform over 2025–2034.


