Israel votes on October 27, 2026. Voters elect the 120-member Knesset rather than the prime minister directly. They choose a ranked candidate list representing one party or an alliance of parties. Seats are allocated proportionally: a list winning ten seats sends its first ten candidates to parliament. To enter the Knesset, a list must receive at least 3.25% of the national vote.
After consulting the parties, the president assigns a Knesset member the task of forming a government, initially allowing 28 days, potentially extended by 14. The largest party does not automatically secure the premiership: the decisive question is who can assemble a government with parliamentary support, with 61 seats providing a working majority.
The election therefore raises three distinct questions:
Can Benjamin Netanyahu’s opponents replace him?
Can they form a durable government?
How much would a change in leadership alter security policy given Israel’s perilous security situation?
Removing Netanyahu could produce consequential changes in governance and military strategy, but expectations of a fundamental security-policy reversal deserve skepticism.
Israel’s major parties and alliances differ over security, Palestinian statehood, religion, democratic institutions and economic policy:
Likud — Netanyahu: Nationalist right; military strength, settlement support and limits on judicial power.
Together — Bennett and Lapid: Alliance of the nationalist right and secular center, united against Netanyahu but divided over Palestinian statehood.
Yashar — Eisenkot: Security-oriented center; competent government, accountability and national cohesion.
Blue and White — Gantz: Centrist; national security and institutional stability.
The Democrats — Golan: Social democratic left; stronger social protections, judicial independence and a negotiated Palestinian settlement.
Yisrael Beiteinu — Lieberman: Secular nationalist right; hawkish security policies and opposition to ultra-Orthodox military exemptions.
Shas: Sephardi and Mizrahi ultra-Orthodox interests; religious education, welfare and military exemptions.
United Torah Judaism: Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox interests; religious institutions, public funding and military exemptions.
Jewish Power — Ben-Gvir: Far-right Jewish nationalism; harsher security measures and expanded Jewish sovereignty.
Religious Zionism–Zehut — Smotrich and Feiglin: Religious nationalist far right; settlement expansion, annexation and opposition to Palestinian statehood.
Ra’am — Abbas: Islamist Arab party; practical gains for Arab citizens through cooperation with Jewish parties.
The Joint List: Arab nationalist and Arab–Jewish left-wing alliance; equal citizenship, Palestinian rights and opposition to occupation.
Smaller lists matter because crossing the 3.25% threshold can change the coalition arithmetic, while votes for parties that fall short produce no parliamentary representation.
Opposition to Netanyahu crosses ideological boundaries. Agreement on replacing him does not necessarily translate into agreement on how to govern. Reuters’ October 7 polling update, using data through October 5, projects approximately 64 seats for parties opposing Netanyahu and 51 for his supporters.
Recent polls place Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar narrowly ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud: an October 4 Kan survey projected 23 seats for Yashar and 21 for Likud, while a recent Maariv poll favored Eisenkot over Netanyahu as prime minister, 47% to 41%. Yet leading the polls does not guarantee the premiership. Israel’s fragmented party system, the 3.25% threshold for entering the Knesset and disagreements over coalition partners make assembling a 61-seat governing majority considerably harder to predict than which party will finish first.
Three figures have the clearest paths to the premiership — Benjamin Netanyahu, Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett — while other prominent leaders could emerge through coalition bargaining.
Benjamin Netanyahu: Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, a former finance minister, UN ambassador and special-forces soldier. His brother Yoni died leading the 1976 Entebbe hostage rescue. A skilled political survivor and security hawk, Netanyahu combines extensive governing experience with deep controversy over judicial reform, his corruption trial and responsibility for October 7.
Gadi Eisenkot: Former IDF chief of staff and wartime cabinet minister, now leading Yashar. Born in Israel to Moroccan Jewish immigrants, he would become the country’s first Mizrahi prime minister — representing Jews with roots in the Middle East and North Africa. His son Gal and two nephews were killed fighting in Gaza. He presents himself as a sober, security-minded alternative to Netanyahu, emphasizing accountability, competent government and national cohesion.
Naftali Bennett: Prime minister in 2021–22 and previously economy, education and defense minister. A former special-forces officer and successful technology entrepreneur, he brings substantial business and executive experience. He is a pragmatic coalition builder but remains a nationalist hawk opposed to Palestinian statehood.
Other prominent leaders could influence coalition negotiations or emerge as compromise candidates.
Yair Lapid, a former journalist, prime minister, finance minister and foreign minister, is a secular centrist who helped assemble the coalition that displaced Netanyahu in 2021.
Benny Gantz, a former military chief, defense minister and alternate prime minister, brings substantial security experience. Gantz left Netanyahu’s emergency government in June 2024, accusing him of allowing political considerations to obstruct strategic decisions and failing to establish a clear postwar plan for Gaza.
Avigdor Lieberman, a Soviet-born immigrant and former defense, foreign and finance minister, combines secular nationalism with a hard security line. He resigned as defense minister in November 2018 because he regarded Netanyahu’s ceasefire with Hamas as capitulation — an objection to excessive accommodation, whereas Gantz’s departure centered on deficient strategy and leadership.
Yair Golan, the Democrats’ leader and a former deputy military chief who rescued civilians during the October 7 attacks, represents the social democratic left. These figures could help determine who governs, even if none becomes prime minister.
Arab citizens vote, serve in the Knesset and can help determine who governs Israel; there is no legal requirement that the prime minister be Jewish. Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, is the most plausible Arab coalition partner: it joined the Bennett–Lapid government in 2021 and emphasizes practical improvements for Arab communities.
The Joint List, combining Hadash, Ta’al and Balad, could instead support an anti-Netanyahu minority government from outside the coalition. Ahmad Tibi has signaled openness to parliamentary cooperation, while the alliance’s backing would depend on negotiations over its demands.
Jewish–Arab cooperation also has advocates among the Jewish left. Yair Golan supports including Ra’am in the next government, although this is his Democrats’ position rather than an agreement among opposition leaders.
Reuters has also reported on A Place for Us All, a new Jewish–Arab party founded by leaders of Standing Together, seeking to mobilize younger and disillusioned voters. Its challenge is clearing the electoral threshold without fragmenting the opposition vote.
Arab parties could become decisive if Netanyahu’s opponents fall short of a governing majority without them. They could supply coalition seats, negotiate outside support for a minority government, or cooperate on specific parliamentary votes. Political barriers remain substantial:
Eisenkot has rejected including Ra’am, and Lieberman opposes such a partnership. A viable arrangement would therefore require some opposition leaders to reconsider their positions or accept a negotiated form of outside support. An anti-Netanyahu parliamentary majority would not automatically become a governing majority.
Arab citizens of Israel can vote in competitive parliamentary elections, elect their own parties and influence government formation, although opposition to Arab coalition participation is a significant obstacle.
A direct comparison with Jewish participation in neighboring countries is limited because Jordan and Saudi Arabia have very small, poorly documented Jewish populations. Iran retains a longstanding Jewish community, estimated at approximately 8,500 in 2025, with a reserved parliamentary seat, but its members face substantial discrimination and intimidation within an electoral system tightly controlled by the regime. (There are reasons why so few Jewish people exist in Islamic countries.)
My assessment is that a fragile coalition or prolonged bargaining is more likely than a decisive, durable governing majority.
Expectations of a drastic security-policy reversal or an immediate diplomatic breakthrough stemming from the election are overblown. Israel’s next prime minister will inherit the same neighborhood:
Israel faces a depressingly long list of security challenges: Iran’s missiles, unresolved nuclear ambitions and armed allies; Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza; Hezbollah in Lebanon; the Houthis in Yemen; Iran-backed militias in Iraq; extremist networks and violence against minorities in Syria; Turkey’s hostility and expanding regional influence; popular hostility and antisemitism in Egypt and Jordan despite their peace treaties; and a Palestinian conflict with no settlement approaching.
Israel’s deteriorating relations with much of the world add another challenge. Netanyahu’s inept diplomacy and political choices bear substantial responsibility. His resistance to an independent state commission investigating October 7 — comparable to the Agranat Commission established after the 1973 war — also undermines accountability. In my view, he should go. But I live in Denver; the decision belongs to Israeli voters.
A successor could improve military strategy, restrain settlement expansion and strengthen diplomacy. Those would be consequential changes, but Israel’s adversaries will not retire when Netanyahu does. The election may change how Israel manages its security challenges more than its determination to confront them.
Author’s note: Israeli voters have reason to watch America’s elections closely, particularly the Senate race in Michigan. In my open letter to Michigan voters, I explain why Abdul El-Sayed’s positions on Israel and his evasiveness about Iran lead this usually Democratic voter to support Republican Mike Rogers. My concern is that Israeli voters will hear a larger message: even defensive support from their American ally may depend on who wins the next election.
The uncertainty extends across the political spectrum. Trump’s hesitation about joining Saudi Arabia’s military response after the deadly attacks on Riyadh’s airport reinforces my concern about the reliability of American commitments. For Israelis choosing their next government, the conclusion may be uncomfortable but unavoidable: we must stand on our own two feet; we cannot assume our ally will always come to our defense.
Reading List
The election and Jewish–Arab cooperation
The Times of Israel, September 27, 2026: “Day after meeting opposition chiefs, Golan says Arab parties could be in next government.” Golan’s support for Arab coalition participation and divisions among opposition leaders.
Reuters, July 29, 2026, updated August 2: “New Jewish-Arab party may complicate bid to oust Netanyahu.” A Place for Us All, voter mobilization and the risks of fragmenting votes among small parties.
Iran and armed organizations
Matthew Levitt: Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God — Amazon (select Kindle under formats). A detailed account of Hezbollah’s international terrorist operations, financing and organizational networks, including its relationship with Iran. The Washington Institute
Reuters, October 7, 2026: “The status of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme.” The unresolved nuclear issue.
Reuters, October 6, 2026: “One year on, Trump’s Gaza plan has not stopped Israeli fire or disarmed Hamas.”Continuing violence and disagreements over Hamas’s disarmament.
Wilson Center: “Doctrine of Hamas.” Hamas’s founding charter and subsequent political document.
U.S. National Counterterrorism Center: Counterterrorism Guide Profiles of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and other armed organizations.
Syria and regional security
Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2026: “Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy.” Syria’s transition, continuing al-Qaeda-linked cells and the separate Islamic State threat.
Reuters, May 14, 2025: “Syrian leader Sharaa’s path from global jihad to Trump meeting.” Sharaa’s jihadist background and subsequent political evolution.
Reuters, July 15, 2025: “Israel strikes Syrian city, vows to protect Druze from government forces.” Violence in Sweida and Israel’s military intervention.
International Crisis Group, November 26, 2025: “Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida.” Sectarian violence, Israeli intervention and the withdrawal arrangement.
Reuters, August 23, 2026: “Syria foreign minister sees Israel security talks resuming despite no trust.” The possibilities and limits of a negotiated security agreement.
Reuters, October 1, 2026: “Syrian government officials and Hezbollah held secret talks in Turkey, sources say.”Reporting on residual networks, arms smuggling and regional bargaining.
James Jeffrey, Washington Institute, September 26, 2026: “Israel and Its ‘Near Abroad’ After the October Elections.” Security and diplomatic choices facing Israel’s next government.
Antisemitism, minority rights and school curricula
Anti-Defamation League: Global 100: Index of Antisemitism. Survey evidence on antisemitic attitudes, which should be distinguished from government policy or military intentions.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, July 2025: “Country Update: Iran.” Iran’s Jewish population and the discrimination and intimidation faced by religious minorities.
Jordan — IMPACT-se: “Review of the Jordanian Curriculum 2025–2026.” Finds that messages of tolerance and coexistence sit alongside antisemitic stereotypes and material glorifying violent jihad and martyrdom. A troubling contradiction in a country with a peace treaty with Israel.
Egypt — IMPACT-se: “Review of Changes and Remaining Problematic Content: Egyptian Textbooks, Selected Examples 2023–24.” Documents substantial improvements in revised textbooks, including recognition of Egypt’s Jewish heritage and Israel as a peace partner. However, unrevised textbooks in higher grades retain antisemitic stereotypes and hostility toward Israel.
Regional comparison — Institute for National Security Studies: “The Portrayal of Jews and Israel in Muslim and Arab Textbooks: Major Trends.” Examines differences across education systems, including Egypt’s general public schools and separate Al-Azhar religious schools. Useful for understanding why neither hostility nor reform is uniform across the region.
UNRWA schools — U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 2026: “West Bank and Gaza: State’s Reporting on UN Efforts to Address Problematic Textbook Content Had Gaps Before Funding Ended.” Examines Palestinian Authority textbooks used in UNRWA schools, efforts to address material inconsistent with neutrality, nonviolence and nondiscrimination, and weaknesses in oversight. Reports that teacher and community resistance complicated implementation of corrective guidance.
Saudi Arabia — IMPACT “Review of Saudi Textbooks 2024–2026.” Documents continued reductions in extremist content and stronger messages of coexistence and religious tolerance. An important example of progress, although the report identifies room for further improvement.