A Speech to Israel That Was Really About American Politics

Rahm Emanuel minimizes Israel’s enemies, excuses Democratic extremism, and offers little practical guidance

Rahm Emanuel presents his speech as candid advice to Israelis confronting growing international isolation. I found it deeply disappointing. Instead of seriously addressing Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Iran, and the repeated failure of Palestinian leaders to accept imperfect but substantial gains, Emanuel delivers an overwhelmingly political argument aimed at an American audience and assigns disproportionate responsibility to Benjamin Netanyahu. He also avoids the Democratic Party’s growing willingness to placate activists and candidates who excuse terrorism, erase Palestinian agency, or treat compromise as betrayal. Diplomacy remains essential, but useful diplomacy must tell Palestinians and their supporters that partial victories should be accepted and built upon—and that replacing Netanyahu will not eliminate Israel’s enemies or its security dilemmas.

Rahm Emanuel delivered a speech at Tel Aviv University setting out his views on “The U.S.-Israel Relationship: Where It Stands Today and the Road Ahead.”

He began by acknowledging Israelis’ deep distrust of renewed peace initiatives after repeated Palestinian rejectionism and violence. He then argued that Prime Minister Netanyahu, enabled by unconditional American support, has relied too heavily on military power while allowing settlement expansion, humanitarian suffering, and diplomatic isolation to worsen. Emanuel proposed replacing the traditional two-state framework with an Arab-led “23-state solution” combining Palestinian reform, Israeli restraint, regional recognition, and economic integration. He also called for conditioning the alliance, sanctioning settler violence and settlement activity, and eventually ending direct American military subsidies while preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge.

Emanuel is an ambitious political figure, and there is widespread speculation that he may seek the Democratic presidential nomination in 2028. His Tel Aviv speech was geared to an audience in America, not Israel. It offered strong criticism of the Israeli government, understated Palestinian and Arab responsibility for the tragedy, and did not offer a practical approach forward. The speech was motivated by the leftward drift and increased support of Hamas inside the Democratic Party, a process which is eroding Jewish support for Democrats, shaping foreign policy and reducing odds for a successful peace process.

Comment One: Emanuel Understates Israel’s Security Dilemma

Emanuel implies that greater restraint or further concessions would improve Israel’s security and legitimacy. But in the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon, withdrawal can create openings that Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and other armed groups exploit.

• West Bank: Israeli control carries real costs, and some settlements burden the military. But Emanuel never explains how Israel would prevent attacks from territory overlooking Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion Airport, and its main population centers.

• Gaza: Israel withdrew in 2005. Hamas then built a base for rockets, tunnels, kidnappings, and the October 7 massacre. After that attack, restraint was not a strategy unless an outside force was prepared to remove Hamas, free the hostages, and govern Gaza. None was.

• Lebanon: Hezbollah’s attacks drove tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes. Israel could accept their indefinite displacement or use force to push Hezbollah back. Emanuel offers no practical diplomatic alternative approach.

Emanuel is right that military gains must produce political results. But a serious roadmap must explain who will enforce any agreement and what happens when Hamas, Hezbollah, or another armed group violates it.

Comment Two: Arab Governments Have Signed Peace Without Preparing Their People for It

Regional normalization was advancing before October 7. But formal agreements did not eliminate popular hostility toward Israel, and many governments did little to reduce it—or actively inflamed it.

• Egypt and Jordan: Their peace treaties have endured, but public and commercial normalization remains limited, while anti-Israel rhetoric is still common in politics, media, religious institutions, and education.

• Abraham Accords states: Diplomatic and economic ties expanded, but government-to-government cooperation did not necessarily produce broader acceptance of Israel among their populations.

• Turkey: Although not an Arab state, it demonstrates the same danger. Its increasingly hostile rhetoric and support for Hamas have led many Israelis to view it as a potential security threat rather than a dependable mediator.

Emanuel asks Israelis to trust regional governments as the “adults in the room.” Yet governments cannot provide a durable foundation for peace while tolerating—or promoting—hatred of Israel at home. Regional cooperation remains essential, but genuine peace will require political and educational change, not merely signed agreements.

Comment Three: The Coalition Emanuel Needs Does Not Exist

Emanuel’s “23-state solution” faces four problems: the Arab coalition does not exist, major non-Arab Muslim powers remain outside it, Iran can sabotage it, and no one has agreed to enforce it when violence returns.

The 23 states are Israel, Palestine, and the 21 other Arab League members. Yet most of those Arab governments do not recognize Israel, several are openly hostile, and others are failed or war-torn states with little capacity to guarantee peace.

The formula also excludes Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Iran is the critical disruptor because it can arm Hamas, Hezbollah, and other proxies while intimidating governments that cooperate with Israel. The others could influence or contribute to a settlement, but none currently offers Israel a dependable security partnership.

Regime change in Iran appears to be a prerequisite for successful implementation of Emanuel’s proposal.

Broader Arab and Muslim participation is essential. But even 23 signatures would mean little unless governments are willing to disarm Hamas, prevent its return, and defend the agreement when doing so becomes dangerous or unpopular.

Comment Four: Emanuel Misreads the Democratic Party’s Israel Problem

Emanuel is right that opposition to Israel now extends beyond the Democratic left; Republican isolationism is also growing. But the sharper political shift is within the Democratic Party, where hostility toward Israel—and tolerance for rhetoric rationalizing violence against Jews—has moved closer to the mainstream.

The congressional faction once centered on Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, and the Squad is growing. Analilia Mejia, who has accused Israel of genocide, already entered Congress from New Jersey. Melat Kiros in Colorado and New York nominees Brad Lander, Claire Valdez, and Darializa Avila Chevalier are favored to join her. Lander calls the Gaza war genocide; Valdez campaigned against that “genocide”; and Avila Chevalier attended an October 8 pro-Palestinian rally and supports one state rather than a Jewish and Palestinian state. Aisha Wahab is competing for Eric Swalwell’s former California seat, while Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan and Cori Bush in Missouri face August primaries.

I have been a Democrat throughout my adult life. Criticism of Netanyahu, Israeli policy, and civilian deaths is legitimate, although as noted it often lacks accuracy or alternative solutions.

What is driving me away is the party’s failure to distinguish such criticism from rhetoric that excuses October 7, equates Israel with Hamas, or refuses to recognize violence against Jews as antisemitic.

• Melat Kiros: She called October 7 an “inevitable” consequence of Israeli policy and declined to identify the deadly Boulder firebombing of a Jewish hostage rally as antisemitic. Her description of the massacre as the predictable “gaze” of an oppressed people crossed from explanation toward rationalization.

• Abdul El-Sayed: He calls Israel a genocidal, apartheid “rogue state” and has compared its government’s evil to Hamas’s. After an explosives-laden truck was driven into a Michigan synagogue, he condemned the attack but added that “hurt people hurt people,” linking the terrorism to Israeli strikes on the attacker’s family.

Such rhetoric shifts responsibility from people who deliberately attack civilians to the society they attack. When terrorism is routinely portrayed as a foreseeable response to Israeli conduct, the accompanying condemnation becomes nearly meaningless.

Emanuel says too little about antisemitism, Hamas apologetics, and Democratic leaders’ failure to set boundaries. Unless the party rejects candidates who rationalize terrorism, erase Hamas’s responsibility, or use “genocide” as a political slogan, it will drive away part of one of its most loyal constituencies—including people like me.

Conclusion: Peace Requires Partial Victories—and Time

Emanuel begins in the wrong emotional place. A useful diplomat must recognize both peoples’ trauma without pretending their culpability is equal. October 7 confirmed Israelis’ fear that withdrawal, economic cooperation, and international assurances cannot protect them from enemies committed to their destruction. Gaza’s devastation reinforced Palestinian beliefs that Israel is indifferent to their lives and aspirations. A speech aimed largely at Israeli failures cannot reach Israelis—or create the mutual recognition peace requires.

This imbalance also makes compromise less likely. When Western leaders increase pressure on Israel while placing fewer demands on Palestinian leaders, they encourage Palestinians to wait for international opinion to deliver more than negotiation can deliver now. Hamas draws the same lesson from demonstrations, genocide accusations, diplomatic recognition, and Israel’s declining support: October 7 changed the world in its favor. A strategy that sacrifices another generation while promising eventual total victory is not a peace strategy.

The 2008 Olmert-Abbas negotiations show the alternative. Olmert offered withdrawal from roughly 94 percent of the West Bank, land swaps intended to compensate for most of the remainder, a corridor to Gaza, and a Palestinian capital in Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem.

Constructive diplomacy would have urged the Palestinians to bank the enormous gain, establish a state, and continue negotiating unresolved borders and other issues. Europe’s experience shows how slowly trust can develop: after centuries of conflict culminating in two world wars, it still took decades of security cooperation, economic integration, and institution-building before substantially open borders became possible. Diplomacy in this conflict likewise should build a staircase—secure borders, demilitarization, recognition, functioning institutions, trade, and only gradually greater freedom of movement as trust develops. A partial victory today can create the conditions for further gains tomorrow; rejecting it can leave both sides with nothing but more violence.

Emanuel’s regional proposal could become one step on that staircase, but only if Arab and Muslim governments confront Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the glorification of “resistance.” Israelis must accept Palestinian national legitimacy, and Palestinians must accept that Israel will remain a Jewish state. Western leaders must confront antisemitism, reject rationalizations of terrorism, and stop encouraging the belief that pressure on Israel can eliminate the need for Palestinian compromise. Israel should hear Emanuel’s warnings about settlements, civilian suffering, isolation, and military power without a political strategy. Emanuel’s American audience needs an equally difficult message: pandering to the fringe of your political party is not consistent with serious diplomacy.