Diplomacy After Victory, Not Before
Why pre-negotiated “political horizons” can strengthen militant regimes instead of restraining them
Abstract: A dominant school of foreign policy argues that military force without a diplomatic endgame is futile. This piece challenges that premise. Using Gaza, the Palestinian Authority, and Iran as case studies, it argues that premature diplomacy alters incentives in favor of militant actors, allowing them to regroup rather than reform. The last two decades function as a natural experiment: where force was often constrained in favor of politics and militant capacity expanded. Durable diplomacy, this analysis contends, is not the substitute for military clarity—it is its consequence.
Introduction: The Gaza Precedent: Testing the Diplomatic Model
In “The Four Most Dangerous Words in the Middle East,” Thomas L. Friedman argues from a familiar premise: that military force is a hollow tool without a pre-negotiated political “landing zone.” His worldview treats diplomacy as the primary engine of security. His fear is that the current U.S.-Israeli kinetic operations against Iran lack a sustainable exit ramp. To Friedman, seeking a “once and for all” military victory is a dangerous illusion that risks regional chaos.
However, Friedman’s approach suffers from a fundamental incentive problem familiar to any economic analyst. By demanding political concessions before achieving military clarity, he inadvertently subsidizes the “Generation Four” militants he hopes to replace. In both economics and war, incentives matter: if a terror state is offered a diplomatic “out” before its infrastructure is dismantled, the incentive is to regroup and rearm, not to reform.
Furthermore, the “diplomatic primary” worldview ignores the moral character of the adversary. Mainstream critics and prominent Democrats called for continued diplomacy at the beginning of the war against the backdrop of a regime that was actively massacring its own citizens.
The March 19 public hanging of 19-year-old wrestling champion Saleh Mohammadi and two others for “enmity against God” serves as a grim reminder: a regime that treats its own youth as disposable targets for execution is not a regime that can be “incentivized” into a stable nuclear or regional settlement. If they are willing to hang a national athlete to suppress dissent, there can be little doubt they would be willing to use a first-strike nuclear capability.
Friedman views diplomacy as a prerequisite for peace; a realist understands that in 2026, diplomacy is the dividend of overwhelming military success. As Iranian missiles strike Arad and Dimona, it is clear that “containment” and “political horizons” have failed because they were built on the false hope that the IRGC could be bargained with.
Claim One: The Fallacy of “Once and For All” Friedman argues that the most dangerous belief in Middle Eastern strategy is that a military threat can be ended “once and for all” through force alone. He asserts that decapitation strategies are rarely permanent fixes, noting that Israel has killed three generations of Hamas leaders only to face a fourth. As proof, he notes that the fourth generation of Hamas currently controls the areas of Gaza where the vast majority of Palestinians live outside the Israeli-controlled zones:
Analysis of Claim One: Friedman’s critique of the “once and for all” mentality ignores the historical reality that Hamas only reached its peak lethality after Israel pursued his advice, by withdrawing entirely from Gaza in 2005 and later engaging in political compromises—such as the 2011 prisoner exchange that released Yahya Sinwar. The evidence suggests that the current crisis isn’t a result of pursuing a “once and for all” military solution. Rather it was the result of attempts to pursue a peace deal with a party that did not one.
A critical analysis of Friedman’s call for “politics” must consider the alternative reality of a negotiated settlement immediately following October 7. A political settlement with Hamas immediately after October 7 would have left Hamas in total control of Gaza right up to the Israeli border and would have left tunnels and smuggling routes intact allowing Hamas to gain weapons for the next war.
There is no evidence to suggest Hamas would have modified its foundational goal of destroying Israel; instead, a ceasefire without a military defeat would have been framed as a “divine victory,” exponentially increasing Hamas’s ability to recruit new members globally.
The reason Hamas survives as “Generation Four” today is arguably not the failure of military force, but the fact that the international community pressured Israel to stop or slow its operations and that the hostages were used as human shields preventing successful military maneuvers.
Claim Two: The Necessity of Political Alternatives Friedman claims that Israel’s failure to finish Hamas in Gaza is partly due to the Netanyahu government’s refusal to work with the Palestinian Authority (PA). He argues that by delegitimizing the PA, Netanyahu is effectively helping Hamas stay in power. Furthermore, Friedman asserts that Netanyahu’s true objective is the permanent control and eventual annexation of the West Bank, using the war and the dismissal of the PA to make a two-state solution impossible. Finally, he warns that depriving Palestinians of a contiguous state will eventually force Israel to choose between being a non-Jewish binational state or an apartheid state.
Analysis of Claim Two: The Gaza Precedent: Testing the Diplomatic Model. I acknowledge that Israeli treatment and violence in the west bank is disturbing and inconsistent with Jewish values.
Friedman’s argument that a political alternative is the missing piece for peace overlooks a consistent historical pattern of Palestinian leadership rejecting the very “contiguous state” he advocates for. Between the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Olmert offer in 2008, Palestinians were presented with several deals that would have granted them the vast majority of the West Bank; in every instance, the Palestinian leadership turned these deals down. This suggests the obstacle to peace is not merely a lack of Israeli “political compromise,” but a fundamental Palestinian refusal to move the peace process partially forward while deferring discussion of harder issues.
Friedman critiques the “ugliness” of the settler movement, but he fails to address the strategic lesson of the 2005 Gaza pullout. Israel removed every settler and soldier from Gaza, yet instead of a peaceful “political alternative” emerging, the vacuum allowed Hamas to seize power and launch the October 7 massacre.
Had a similar pullout occurred in the West Bank, there is a high probability that Hamas would have seized power there as well, launching attacks from a much more strategic and elevated territory.
Friedman characterizes the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a viable alternative, yet the reality on the ground contradicts view that a moderate PA could effectively govern a Palestinian state on the west bank.
While the PA ostensibly controls the West Bank, Hamas groups operate within it. According to October 2025 PCPSR polling, Hamas continues to outpoll Fatah in the West Bank (32% to 20%), with 80% of residents explicitly opposing the group’s disarmament.
This popular mandate effectively prevents the PA from acting against Hamas cells without risking its own collapse. Any deal that allows Hamas to operate freely under a PA umbrella is a recipe for renewed terror, not a peace deal. The PA is currently prevented from being overthrown by Hamas largely because of the Israeli military’s presence.
The PA continues its “Pay for Slay” policy, providing financial aid to the families of terrorists. This is not evidence of moderation inside the PA.
The evidence suggests that rather than the PA being a solution that Netanyahu is blocking, the PA is a fragile and ideologically compromised entity that has shown neither the will nor the capacity to be the “self-sustaining” peaceful leadership Friedman envisions.
Claim Three: Issues in Lebanon and the Risk of Ungovernability
Friedman argues that destroying the infrastructure and economies of Lebanon and Iran could backfire by making these countries ungovernable. He claims this would leave Israel trapped in a “permanent occupation” because no local authority would have the “institutional cohesion” left to negotiate or rule. Furthermore, he asserts that Hezbollah can only be eliminated if their own domestic base—specifically Lebanese Shiites—generates a political alternative. He warns that excessive bombing and occupation only make it harder for these local populations to turn against militant regimes.
Analysis: The Hierarchy of Threats and the “Head of the Snake” Strategy
The focus of the Israeli and U.S. command must remain fixed on the primary actor, Iran not Lebanon. Having entered the fourth week of direct war with Iran, the coalition cannot afford to be diverted by the secondary goal of nation-building in Beirut or managing the “institutional cohesion” of Lebanon.
Hezbollah is totally dependent on Iran. Once the Iranian regime is neutralized, the international community and the Arab League will have a strong incentive and the means to assist Lebanon with the task of disarming Hezbollah. This objective is not possible as long as the IRGC is funneling advanced weaponry and “suitcases of cash” into Beirut.
I understand the need Israel has to immediately secure its norther border. I don’t have insider information about the extent of the immediate threat from Lebanon and as an economist trained to understand incentives, I am not in a position to evaluate Israel’s immediate military moves.
At this time the threats are from missile attacks appear paramount and a credible argument could be made that the Israeli focus should be on Iran not Lebanon.
There is actually a real opportunity for diplomatic solutions once the war end and the Iranian regime is replaced.
Conclusion: The Limits of Diplomacy and the “Natural Experiment”
Typically, the political left leads on human rights while the right adopts a more pragmatic, Realpolitik stance—Henry Kissinger being the quintessential example. However, the current crisis has inverted this dynamic. In this instance, two issues stand out that expose the terminal limits of the diplomatic path advocated by Friedman and other critics.
First, one must look at the Iranian regime’s internal conduct as its primary diplomatic signal. On March 19, 2026, the regime publicly hanged 19-year-old wrestling champion Saleh Mohammadi and two others for “enmity against God.” This was the regime’s true “overture” to the international community. When a government treats its own national athletes as disposable targets for execution to suppress dissent, it signals that its survival is untethered from international norms.
How does one negotiate a reliable nuclear or missile limit with a regime that views a public hanging as a domestic necessity? A state willing to massacre its own youth to maintain power would undoubtedly view a first-strike nuclear capability as a legitimate action.
Second, the history of the last two decades has inadvertently created a “natural experiment” that tests Friedman’s thesis.
In 2005, Israel pursued the ultimate territorial compromise: a total withdrawal from Gaza, removing every soldier and settler. Conversely, a peace deal was offered but not reached for the West Bank in 2008.
The results of this experiment are devastating for the pro-diplomacy camp. The “clean break” in Gaza did not produce a peaceful Palestinian alternative; it produced a terror state and the atrocities of October 7. Meanwhile, the PA-controlled West Bank remains a fragile entity where Hamas’s popularity—currently outpolling Fatah—suggests that “politics first” is a recipe for a second front, not a solution.
Diplomacy will be possible and will be necessary after a decisive win by the United States and Israel in this war. Both Palestinians and Israelis have proven that forward progress is impossible without a framework that addresses all the root causes of Middle Eastern instability and all parties involved in this long conflict.
However, this diplomacy cannot be the failed bilateral model of the past. Effective post-war diplomacy must involve the Arab League and perhaps the Trump Peace Board, moving toward an international presence capable of addressing the total regional landscape.
The evidence suggests that while diplomacy may be possible and even necessary after a decisive military victory, pursuing it as a prerequisite is a dangerous delusion. Once the “head of the snake” in Tehran is neutralized and the IRGC’s financial and military oxygen is cut off, we will indeed need a robust diplomatic architecture to manage the aftermath.
However, this diplomacy cannot be the failed bilateral model of the past. Effective post-war diplomacy must move toward an international “Trustee” framework led by the Arab League and the Trump Peace Board. This recipe for future stability should focus on three specific pillars:
Replacing the hollow “security cooperation” of the PA with a multilateral Arab-led force capable of enforcing the total demilitarization of Gaza and South Lebanon.
Reforming Palestinian and Lebanese civil services by stripping away the “resistance” curricula and welfare-for-terror structures.
Tying reconstruction aid and sovereignty directly to the “Abrahamic” model of collective defense and trade.
Progress is only possible when the international community provides the guardrails that neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have been able to maintain in a vacuum.
Authors Note: The blog www.economicmemos.com covers policy, politics and personal finance. Go to this post for my overview of Domestic Economic Policy and this post for an overview of some personal finance work.