Many observers expect a big Democratic blue wave in 2026. Trump’s low approval rating gives Republicans a substantial headwind: unpopular presidents often fuel midterm losses for their party. Republican waves in 1994 and 2010 and Democratic waves in 2006 and 2018 illustrate how sharply the political balance can shift.
But waves are not inevitable. Democrats gained a net 41 House seats in 2018, while Republicans gained just nine in 2022, securing only a narrow majority despite Biden’s unpopularity.
Does 2026 more closely resemble the 2018 outcome where there was a substantial Democratic wave or 2022 where there was a smaller Republican wave?
My focus is on the two most recent elections because recent elections provide a better comparison for today’s polarized electorate, in which Americans’ close friendships often remain within partisan lines and the rural–urban political divide has widened. These divisions may leave fewer congressional seats genuinely competitive in 2026, limiting the size of a Democratic wave even amid widespread dissatisfaction with Trump.
One of the factors that impacts the size of a potential wave is the composition of the Congress prior to the election. The Republicans had a substantially larger margin entering the 2018 midterm (241 R versus 194 D) than the Democrats had in 2022 (222 D versus 213 R). One of the reasons the Democrats had a much larger pickup in 2018 than the Republicans had in 2022 is that there were many more vulnerable Republicans up for reelection in 2018.
On this measure, 2026 more closely resembles 2022 than 2018. Republicans won a 220–215 House majority in 2024, comparable to Democrats’ 222–213 majority after 2020 and far smaller than Republicans’ 241–194 majority after 2016. Democrats therefore need fewer pickups to regain control, but Republicans’ smaller seat total may also limit the opportunities for a large wave.
A second factor affecting the size of a potential wave—and driving much of the speculation—is presidential approval. Trump’s September 2026 Quinnipiac rating of 33% is substantially below his 44% approval in late October 2018 and Biden’s 40% in late October 2022. Although the figures come from different polling sources and dates, they suggest a considerably stronger presidential headwind for Republicans in 2026.
A third factor, often overlooked, is the opposition party’s standing. Democrats in 2018 and Republicans in 2022 each had 44% favorability in September Gallup polling. In September 2026, Quinnipiac found only 21% approval of congressional Democrats, with 70% disapproval. Job approval and party favorability are different measures, so these figures cannot establish how much weaker Democrats are today. But they suggest a potential obstacle to a blue wave: dissatisfaction with Trump does not necessarily translate into confidence in the Democratic alternative.
These comparisons leave me skeptical that a blue wave is in the bag. Trump’s weakness could expand Democratic opportunities, but the narrow Republican starting majority provides less evidence of an extended delegation waiting to be swept away.
Democrats’ poor performance ratings also raise questions about their ability to attract voters beyond their existing supporters. A Democratic takeover and a large Democratic wave are different outcomes: the former requires only a small net gain, while the latter requires victories across a much broader battlefield. District-level evidence will determine whether that broader opportunity exists.
This skepticism about the likelihood of the blue wave is reinforced by my ongoing analysis of competitive races.
A probabilistic analysis of roughly 70 contested House races points to a narrow Democratic majority. I have also collected data, discussed, and evaluated districts currently held by Democrat with the potential to flip Republican and seats currently held by Republicans with the potential to flip to the Democrats. The sum of the number of potential flips supports the forecast of a very small Democrat majority in the next Congress.
However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the Republicans will retain control of the House of Representatives.
Three factors, candidate selection, adverse coattails, and Republican gerrymandering, appear to be limiting Democratic gains this election year.
First, the Democrats have nominated several progressive candidates in swing districts including but not limited to Matt Little in MN-02, Manny Rutinel in CO-08, Sam Forstag in MT-01, Bob Brooks in PA-07, and William Lawrence in MI-07.
Second, the nomination of several Democratic Socialist candidates in some states or in urban districts could adversely impact the chances of more conservative nominees in the region and the state.
Zohran Mamdani’s prominence could complicate Democratic campaigns across the New York metropolitan area, particularly in competitive districts with substantial Jewish electorates concerned about Israel and antisemitism. Concern about Mamdani could bolster Lawler in NY-17.
Melat Kiros could give Republicans campaign material against Democrats in several other districts in Colorado.
Many Democrats, including Dana Nessel Dana Nessel, are troubled by positions taken by Abdul El-Sayed and this person could potentially weaken support for other Democrats among voters who share those concerns.
My Minnesota analysis examines whether Republicans could win both the Senate race and MN-02, given the Democratic nominees’ positions.
The concern is that voters may judge individual Democrats partly by the party’s most prominent progressive figures rather than the quality of the local candidate.
Third, Republican gerrymandering could contribute to roughly a dozen Democratic-held seats changing hands; my district-by-district analysis of Democratic seats that could flip Republican provides the details behind that estimate, available to paid subscribers.
My 2026 Midterm Election Resources provides links to papers on the 2026 midterms. People on LinkedIn should subscribe to the newsletter for updates on my economic and political analysis.